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Foreword

The JDZB's activities address a wide range of subjects, dealing with issues of current interest but also seeking to cover areas of long-term relevance. One of the main topics in 2004 has been German-Japanese regional security cooperation.

This conference on "Security Threats and Strategies of a Regional Security Policy in North East Asia" jointly organized with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation intends to serve as a forum in which the security situation in most likely one of the most complex and potentially dangerous regions can be debated and a policy-relevant analysis be stimulated.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "the variety and magnitude of the strategic dangers and dilemmas emanating from North East Asia are formidable. The region is replete with historical animosities and unsettled legacies of the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War and the Cold War. Power balances within the region are in state of flux. There are strong US-centric bilateral defense alliances and security agreements, but no formal overarching multilateral security institutions to inspire confidence or consensus. The region is a locus for the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction."

North Korea's efforts to develop nuclear weapons have indeed presented North East Asia, Japan and the international community with a serious security challenge. In 2003 it became the first country to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Policy options discussed to deal with North Korea range from diplomacy and limited engagement to isolation and containment.

In the spring of 2004 I had the opportunity to accompany the Vice Speaker of our Federal Parliament, Dr. Antje Vollmer, on her visit to South Korea and Japan. We arrived in Seoul on the eve of the parliamentary elections. Two days of intensive discussions with a wide range of representatives from all walks of life left a vivid impression of a society seemingly almost evenly divided over its North Korea policy, one half of our interlocutors favoring containment leading to collapse, the other half hoping for slow changes through dialogue and economic cooperation. We left, however, with the vivid impression that some kind of quiet reconciliation process seems to be in progress. It will be interesting to check this impression against the view of renowned experts participating in this conference and to whom I would like to express our gratitude.

The JDZB has a long history of cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, namely in the field of foreign and security policy. So it was a great pleasure to jointly organize this conference. The FES has set up a program on „Security in a globalized world". Its goal is to support the process involved in shaping and formulating public options on security policies in different regions of the south and to feed back the relevant positions and political developments into the German and European debates as well as into the process of the United Nations. In June 2004 the FES has organized a conference in Shanghai on „regional security architecture and multilateralism" dealing with the security policies in north East Asia. I would like to thank the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, especially Ms. Anne Seyfferth, for the successful cooperation.

Angelika VIETS
Secretary General
Japanese-German Center Berlin

Soldiering On: North Korea as a Nuclear Weapons State
Regional and International Implications

Sebastian HARNISCH*
University of Trier

1 Introduction

Thank you, Ms. Chairwoman, and thanks to the organizers for this timely opportunity to discuss the regional and international implications of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. I was asked to give you a broad overview of the security situation linking economic, political and security related aspects of the regime crisis in North Korea. Since there are sessions dealing with the roles of different actors as well as a set of distinguished experts on the economic and political situation I will focus my remarks on the following three areas: the interdependence between economic, political and security dynamics, the status of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs (emphasizing the nuclear and delivery system issues), and the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the crisis after the U.S. presidential elections.

To begin with, let me briefly outline the argument before I delve into these three areas more deeply: First, I posit that today it is probable that North Korea is the ninth nuclear weapons state, which has accumulated enough weapons grade plutonium for a significant arsenal, i.e. 6 to 8 warheads, and mastered the necessary techniques to weaponize this material into deliverable nuclear devices. Second, I hold that this weapons program, and other WMD programs as well, has been driven and condoned by both internal and external dynamics. The internal driving forces are economic considerations (trade in threat reduction), political (regime survival, stabilization of power position within the regime) and security considerations (nuclear weapons as strategic equalizers). External factors, which facilitate regime stabilization and the advancement of the weapons program, are the willingness of the international community to accept nuclear ambiguity under the Geneva Agreement and its inability/unwillingness to commit to a plausible negotiated resolution. Third, and based on the assumption that ending the WMD programs requires a substantial change in the internal structure of the regime and the external security situation on the Peninsula I argue that assisted regime transformation that includes an end to all WMD programs is desirable and (still) possible, but that this course of action is also not very probable. Hence, the short-term prospect is that the current North Korean regime will soldier on as a nuclear weapon state and that con-

* Dr. Sebastian Harnisch
Dept. of Political Science
University of Trier
54286 Trier
Tel.: +49-651-201-2164
Fax: +49-651-201-3821
E-Mail: harnisch@uni-trier.de
Web: http://www.sebastian-harnisch.de

cerned (regional) actors are obliged to manage the already visible effects of this development.

I will proceed as follows: First, I tackle the internal and external dynamics that led to the current situation. Second, I will assess the current state of the North Korean Nuclear programs. Third, I will surmise from my analysis the prospects for a peaceful solution.

2 Implosion, Explosion, Proliferation: Internal and External Dynamics?

When talking about regime change it is important to distinguish between different levels of change, i.e. the policy, the regime and the state level. Whereas a status quo situation refers to a continuation of existing policies by the ruling regime, system modification entails either the pursuit of new policies by an existing regime (i.e. the Chinese model under Deng) or new policies in combination with a new regime type (i.e. a military developmental dictatorship, Park Era). Collapse can then be defined as either the forceful end of a political regime or the demise of a sovereign state as such. In this scenario the collapse of political structures can originate within a state (Romanian model), be imposed from outside (the Iraqi model) or feature a confluence of both factors that result in a de facto rule by an outside power (trusteeship) for an extended period of time (Moon 2004).

With regard to North Korea, most analysts probably agree that during the 1990s the governing regime under both Kims faced a severe and sustained regime crisis that might well have led to a forceful implosion (regime change) or explosion, that is an offensive military campaign by North Korea resulting in a subsequent regime change. However, as Marcus Noland in a recent study suggested, the probability of regime change today is low (Noland 2004). That does not mean that the country and its people do not suffer enormously from the structural deficits of the command economy and political repression. What it does mean is that Kim Chông-il has been able to cope.

2.1 The Political Economy of Regime Stabilization under Kim Chông-il

Since the severe crisis in the mid-90s, Kim Jong-il has been able to consolidate his rule and to stabilize the food supply through a two-pronged strategy: He has increasingly relied on the military as a source of power and legitimacy, and he has opened up the country to international exchange, that is to extracting resources from the international community. This has led to the somewhat schizophrenic situation where Pyongyang is the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Asia and its most ardent enemy.

The two-pronged strategy had two contradictory effects: First, the more the regime relied on the military domestically the less it was able to neglect the military's interest in powerful weapons systems internationally. Second, the more the regime opened up internationally thereby learning about the structural defects of its command economy, the less it was able to sustain its concept of self-reliance.

Facing this two-fold dilemma the regime has modified its policy both in style and name. In 1998 it revised the constitution. In summer 2002 it introduced more far-

reaching reforms that centered around the asymmetrical increase of wages and prices for basic goods, but also included macroeconomic measures such as the partial abolition of the rationing system, of exchange coupons and an increase of the autonomous distribution rate of agricultural products (Frank 2003, Beal 2004; Gey 2004). While the jury is still out on the substance of the reform, it is already obvious that the reforms have led to substantial inflationary pressures and a widening gap in income distribution, thereby intensifying the existing inequalities. It also appears that the government had to devaluate the won as well as issuing "People's Life Bonds" to extract additional resources for the state (Noland 2004a), and it has been further suggested that the reforms are beginning to shift the balance between the official economy (which is contracting), the military economy (which is stagnating), and the private economy (which is growing) (Lee/Yoon 2004). As a consequence of these substantial changes in the economic make-up of the country, a clear shift in the ideological posture can be discerned: In March and April 2003 the Rodong Shimun proclaimed a new "Military First Doctrine" that holds that the military precedes the working class, which loses its privileged status as the leading revolutionary group in North Korean society (Frank 2003a).

In sum, what we see in North Korea today is system modification on a policy level that has some potential for more substantial change on the regime level. Contradictions in the economic reform process may well lead to an ever-widening gap between different groups in North Korean society so that the function of the military as an instrument to quell social unrest may grow. This prospect does not bode well for a negotiated end to WMD programs, because the political leadership, i.e. Kim Chông-il, will have to convince his generals, on whom he increasingly depends that they can live and prosper without WMD (Quinones 2004).

2.2 External Regime Stabilization: The Failure to Resocialize the "Rogue"

By now it is clear that the international effort to moderate North Korean security policy behavior, in particular its quest for WMD and their export, through engagement has failed to some degree. Let me be clear about this: Engagement is still our best option! However so far engagement has failed to resocialize, that is to change the basic foreign policy outlook of North Korea in congruence with international norms so that it does not need WMD for extracting foreign aid to pep up its failed economy or to ensure regime survival internally or externally. This may not be surprising because some policy makers in the U.S., Asia and elsewhere thought that the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would not have to deliver the two light-water reactors because North Korea would collapse in the meantime. While I do not think that this is an accurate description of the thinking of the time, I hold that the United States, its Asian and European allies plus China failed to signal that they were prepared to peacefully change the regime by addressing the underlying structural causes.

Let me briefly sketch out what I mean by this: Starting with China I think it is obvious that Beijing preferred a policy of benign neglect that focussed on regime stabilization before engaging in serious diplomatic negotiation in 2003, because it felt that a more or less predictable status quo was better than an unpredictable future (Ming 2004). Still, today I do not see any Chinese effort to facilitate the necessary concerted initiative that would provide for a plausible scheme of peaceful regime change, possibly along the lines of the Chinese model. With regard to South Korea and Japan my sense is that

domestic considerations have pulled apart their approaches towards North Korea in the last two years: The Roh administration has at times used policy differences with Washington to bolster domestic support; the Koizumi government and the LDP in particular have used the abduction issue for domestic purposes. Since the Bush Jr.-administration has come into office both governments have undertaken several independent initiatives to jump-start serious bi- and multilateral negotiations. But Seoul and Tôkyô have failed so far in launching a concerted initiative including China that would provide for a viable alternative to the U.S. plan of June 2004. Instead, Washington's Asian allies neither publicly endorsed nor criticized the U.S. Plan so that Pyongyang could infer that this plan would certainly not be the last word (Niksch 2004).

When it comes to Washington's complicity in stabilizing the Kim regime European and Asian commentators tend to argue that we have seen too much U.S. hegemonic behavior. My own feeling is that we have seen too little! For different domestic reasons the U.S. executive over the last ten years has been unable or unwilling to provide a plausible and comprehensive diplomatic solution for the North Korean problem. Having said this, the U.S. should be credited for at least trying to come up with such a solution while other nations including the European Union have undertaken only partial and mostly uncoordinated efforts to do so.

As a consequence, our best hopes reside with the U.S. executive learning from the past failure and being vigorously supported by its allies. The crucial question is thus: What went wrong? First, the Clinton administration was right in setting up the KEDO process to forego an immediate and significant nuclear weapons capability. However, the Clinton administration got it wrong when it underestimated the necessity to engage Congress preemptively to ensure sustained U.S. compliance with the Geneva Agreed Framework. Also the Clinton team, despite the initial rogue-state rhetoric, failed to address the whole range of deviant North Korean behavior, most importantly missile production and exports, so that Middle Eastern countries denied their support for the Geneva agreement through oil shipments. When the Perry Process started in 1998 that offered a more comprehensive tool to facilitate peaceful regime change, the Agreed Framework was already in deep trouble (Harnisch 2003). By then, as we now know, but as we knew from open sources in March 1999, the North Koreans had already started procurement for their uranium enrichment program. Second, and even more obviously, the Bush administration has been a dysfunctional hegemon with regard to North Korea (and Iran for that matter), because different factions within the administration could neither agree on a plausible negotiating position nor on a plausible containment or strangulation strategy (Harnisch 2002). What we got in the last four years from Washington was policy cacophony that sent two important signals to Pyongyang: First, even if there is willingness on Pyongyang's side to strike a deal and stick to it, it is not clear whether the Bush administration (or a Kerry administration with a Republican Congress at its throat) is able to uphold its commitment. Second, given the rhetoric from parts of the administration and given its policy vis-à-vis Iraq, it is better to prepare for the worst. Let me be crystal clear on this point: I am not suggesting that the Bush administration caused North Korea to develop nuclear weapons, this was started long before. What I am saying is that certain actions and rhetoric made it rational for the regime to quickly advance and publicly acknowledge their (weapons) existence.

Now, this is a serious allegation. Therefore I want to give you a concrete example: In a news conference on September 16, 2002, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, pointed out, that the administration has come to view the three member states of the

"axis of evil" differently when it comes to preemptive strikes. Rumsfeld indicated that the U.S. military may take preemptive military action only to prevent countries from getting nuclear weapons, but will not attack them if they already have them.[1] Given the timing during the run-up to the Iraq intervention this statement could, and in fact I believe was, as evidenced by North Korea's subsequent behavior, interpreted in Pyongyang as an invitation to arm itself and talk about it.

To sum up this argument about the internal and external dynamics: Internal factors explain why North Korea developed WMD and will probably continue to do so. External factors explain why engaging North Korea stabilized the regime and quickened its extension.

3 The State of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs and Their Regional and Global Implications

The question of the state of the North Korean nuclear arsenal has always been a tricky one: During the 1990s, estimates from various countries ranged from weapons grade plutonium for 1 to 2, to 1 or 2 crude nuclear devices or for even 4 to 5 fully functioning nuclear war heads (Niksch 2003, Squassoni 2003; Kim 2003; Norris/Kristensen/Handler 2003). Against the background of the Iraq experience some analysts suggest that recent U.S. estimates of DPRK capabilities may be overstated too (LaMontagne 2004). As a consequence, the easy answer would be, we just don't know. My answer is: When it comes to predicting how actors may behave in the future, more important is what policy makers believe to be the North Korean potential rather than what actually materially constitutes this capacity. Thus, with due respect for the uncertainties concerning data on North Korea and WMD, I base my judgement on the following criteria: 1) What does the U.S. government or rather intelligence community claim to constitute the North Korean nuclear weapons capacity; 2) What does the North Korean government claim to have; 3) What kind of material and circumstantial evidence do we have in open sources; 4) What is the rational course of action given the diverse motives for the program derived from the previous analysis.

Based on these criteria, North Korea has more probably than not advanced its plutonium weapons capacity from 1 to 2 (crude) nuclear weapons (up to 2003) to 6 to 8 nuclear weapons since reprocessing the 8017 fuel rods from January to June 2003. It has a running 5-megawatt reactor and an operational reprocessing plant. These facilities could, under optimal conditions, produce material for one additional nuclear warhead each year. Additional reactors (50 and 200-megwatt) are in a bad state of repair so that it is difficult to estimate when they could become operational. If so they have a huge potential for additional weapons grade material. In sum, the plutonium program has a moderate growth rate if those two reactors stay offline and no additional material is imported. However, from a military and proliferation point of view its status has turned from an ambigious to a significant status, which means that North Korea now has the

[1] Cf. *DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace*, September 9, 2002, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/t09162002_t0916sd.html>; *Rumsfeld Indicates Nuclear Status Key to Pre-Emption Policy*, September 19, 2002, <http://www.stratfor.com/fib/fib_view.php?ID=206276>.

capacity to deploy these weapons and to export some of them without loosing deterrence capacities.

In addition to the plutonium program, North Korea has probably a uranium enrichment program. That means that so far there is not sufficient evidence to prove the existence of a highly enriched uranium program (HEU) to produce weapons grade material (cf. Harnisch 2003; personal communication with U.S. intelligence official). This is significant in two respects: Depending on the state of the program a disclosure of the related activities could show that North Korea has not violated the letter of its international nonproliferation obligations, although it most likely violated the intent of those agreements. Second, even if the program became operational as a HEU program by mid-decade as a CIA estimate assessed in November 2002, this program has a (much) lower growth rate and potential than the plutonium program from today's perspective. However, from a proliferation point of view this assessment changes somewhat. As you all know, North Korea has been part of a clandestine Proliferation Network that centered around A.Q. Khan that may not have become totally dysfunctional after Khan's withdrawal in 2003 (Albright/Hinderstein 2004; Kampani 2004). Since uranium enrichment technology and related weapons design has been traded in this network with North Korea on the receiving end and with Pakistan gone as the primary supplier, it is plausible to deduce conjecture that North Korea may try to take the place as the supplier for uranium material, enrichment technology and weapons design.[2]

North Korea has been the primary proliferator of ballistic missile technology for more than a decade. It has reportedly exported systems or components to Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria (Bermudez 2000; Harnisch 2002a). As for the range of operational and thus exportable systems it is more plausible than not to assume that the program has not exceeded 1,500 km at this stage. While North Korea test-fired an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Taepo-Dong I, in 1998 — the test failed — it is now reportedly working on another IRBM system (based on Russian technology, the R-27), that could be launched both from land-based launchers or submarines (Bermudez 2004). If accurate, these reports may indicate that the DPRK tries to put the continental U.S. within range of prepositioned submarine or ship-based IRBMs in addition to, or as a substitute for advancing the intercontinental ballistic missile system Taepo-Dong II. However, it is plausible to assume that North Korea would use unconventional delivery means in a crisis situation (such as special forces, agents or commercial ships) to position unconventional weapon systems on foreign territory beyond the range of its operational but inaccurate missile force.

In sum, North Korea's nuclear weapons program advanced significantly over the last twelve months, but its prospective medium-term growth (until 2007) is moderate. It is plausible to argue that this advance does not fundamentally change the deterrence situation on the Peninsula or in Northeast Asia. However, if successfully tested this advanced program will have significant political repercussions. In addition, from a nonproliferation perspective this advancement entails a significant export potential if a customer is found. North Korea's history of exporting missile technology and its involvement in the A.Q. Khan network lend credibility to this scenario.

[2] A 2004 report by David Sanger that the DPRK had already sold uranium hexafluoride to Libya in 2002 (David SANGER/William BROAD: "Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," NYT, 23.05. 2004). However, there are questions as to the validity and plausibility of these claims, cf. Brent Choi, A Blunder from the NY Times?, http://nkzone.typepad.com/nkzone/2004/06/brent_choi_on_n.html [20.10. 2004].

4 Prospects for a Peaceful Solution after the U.S. Presidential Elections

To begin with, the North Korean leadership has persistently offered to negotiate an end to its plutonium program, to its missile program and to dispel concerns about its uranium enrichment activities. In the last several weeks there have been indications that Pyongyang may be willing to return to the 6-party talks after the November elections. By now it should be obvious that I am sceptical as to the ability of the political leadership to convince the military leadership to abandon these formidable deterrence weapons and instruments which bolster the military's standing in the political system. North Korea is the most militarized country of the world, its military eats up about 20% of GDP, WMD technology export, and illicit trade (counterfeiting, drugs etc.) is a major source of foreign currency and a primary source of military technological innovation. As a consequence, any negotiated solution must address this internal dynamic quest for WMD technology of a full-blown garrison state.

Of course, Kim Chông-il's leadership should be tested with regard to striking a deal and implementing it. As I have argued, the United States and its allies have not tried hard and consistently enough in the past. Instead, as I see it, especially America's Asian allies have quietly condoned North Korea's nuclear advancement. So far this strategy has worked, but it may well "explode into the public" if a nuclear test occurs in the North. Then, policy makers will be under tremendous pressure "to do something" about this advancement. While I still think that it is unlikely that this will initiate a "nuclear chain reaction" in Northeast Asia, I would argue that we can already detect a "secondary ripple effect" of North Korea's nuclear advancement in Northeast Asia. The deterioration of the nuclear crisis under the Bush administration and the changing domestic political environment in South Korea have led to a widening perception gap in the U.S.-ROK alliance which in turn has fuelled calls for a more independent South Korean defense policy. In contrast, the growing North Korean potential has drawn Japan closer to the US leading to TMD cooperation, more congruence in strategic thinking and operations (preemption and foreign deployment). As a consequence, both bilateral military cooperation between Japan and South Korea has not prospered as in the past, and trilateral coordination in TCOG has suffered considerably (IFPA 2004).

Finally and coming to the prospects for a negotiated solution after the U.S. election next week I would argue the following. If there is a Bush II administration and a Republican Congress much depends on whether those who still see room for a negotiated solution can dominate the policy process both in the State Department and the National Security Council. If this were to happen, the Vice Presidency and neo-conservatives in the Pentagon could be marginalized by a coalition of the willing including Japan and South Korea. In comparison, a Republican Presidency has a better chance of implementing a negotiated solution under a Republican Congress than a democratic one. If Kerry wins, it will depend on whether he can also tip the balance in Congress, which seems unlikely. While Kerry seems more inclined to vigorously pursue a negotiated settlement much depends on whether he can gather the necessary congressional support for any comprehensive deal. Last but not least, if European nations turn out to be able to negotiate a feasible end to suspicious Iranian enrichment and reprocessing activities in the coming days and weeks, this may well have a positive spill over effect in Asia. Thus, Europe may indirectly initiate a peaceful settlement in Korea, but it will

most likely play only a supportive role when it comes to funding and facilitating the necessary peaceful regime transformation in North Korea.

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North Korea: Implosion, Explosion, Proliferation

Selig S. HARRISON
Center for International Policy, Washington DC

We have been asked to discuss two topics today. First, will North Korea explode, implode or collapse? Second, will North Korea become a nuclear weapons power?

On the first, I see little or no prospect of an explosion or implosion or of the collapse of North Korea *as a state*. There used to be facile comparisons with East Germany and predictions that North Korea would be absorbed by the South. But these comparisons ignored history. The two Koreas fought a fratricidal war. There's so much distrust that both sides want to go slowly with economic and social contacts. They're not ready yet for the intensity of the contacts that developed under Ostpolitik. In any case, North Korea is much more insulated from outside influences than East Germany and the other East European satellites were — no penetration from outside TV, no short-wave radio and no cassettes from the South except for a very tiny elite.

Of course, there might be changes in the *system*, but the *state* itself won't collapse because the armed forces will continue to hold the real power and they will continue to be in charge whatever happens. Kim Jong-il is not a charismatic leader with absolute personal authority like his father Kim Il-sung. He came to power with the help of key military leaders who saw an opportunity after Kim Il-sung's death to take over effective power. For all practical purposes, North Korea has had a bloodless military coup: Kim Jong-il has collaborated with the armed forces to create a new constitutional structure in which the military supplants the Workers Party as the focus of political authority and provides his personal power base. For the present, the armed forces need Kim Jong-il as a legitimizing symbol of continuity with the era of his revered father. But even if he eventually outlives his usefulness, they will continue to provide the power based for his successor.

Kim has rewarded his loyal military supporters by giving them profitable positions in his personal network of conglomerates and trading companies. Powerful generals now control the trading firms, which handle most of North Korea's illicit opium trade as well as commercial exports of zinc, anthracite, gold, and other mineral resources. This could lead to conflicts within the armed forces over the spoils of power, leading to destructive factionalism. Scenarios of a popular revolt generated by economic privation are much less plausible.

Even when outside influences begin to creep in, the North Korean political fabric is likely to prove resilient for deeply rooted historical reasons. One often-cited factor is the powerful Confucian tradition of political centralization and obedience to authority, which dates back more than six centuries in Korea and was skillfully appropriated by Kim Il-sung. But North Koreans are more than obedient: Six years after the death of the "Great Leader," most of them are still fervent supporters of a nationalist ideology often called "Kim Il-sungism." The Kim Il-sung mystique grew initially out of his role as a guerilla leader fighting Japanese colonial rule, but its durability lies primarily in vivid historical memories of shared sacrifices under his leadership during the Korean War.

Nationalism, in the final analysis, is the psychological cement that holds North Korea together.

Now, will North Korea become a nuclear weapons power?

I will begin by considering why North Korea is developing nuclear weapons. It is necessary to answer this question at the outset in order to assess whether they are prepared to give up the nuclear option and in order to assess what terms would be required for a settlement.

There are some observers who argue that North Korea wants nuclear weapons for bargaining leverage. Leverage in dealing with South Korea. Leverage in dealing with its nuclear-armed neighbors, China and Russia, and with another neighbor that could go nuclear overnight, Japan. Some observers believe they want nuclear weapons for economic reasons — to reduce the need for costly conventional forces and thus permit a reduction of military spending. Both of these reasons have no doubt figured in North Korean calculations. But if either or both of these are the governing reasons for their nuclear weapons program, then North Korea would not be likely to give up the nuclear option.

Based on my many discussions with North Korean leaders, I do not believe that these are the governing reasons. The underlying reasons are fear and insecurity. This is not acknowledged by most American officials, but former Defense Secretary William Perry did acknowledge it when he returned from his first visit to Pyongyang. In a TV interview on September 17, 1999, he was asked why North Korea is trying to develop long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. Here is what he said: “Their primary reason is security, is deterrence. Whom would they be deterring? They would be deterring the United States. We do not think of ourselves as a threat to North Korea, but I fully believe that they consider us a threat to them.”

Why do they consider the United States a threat?

We have to keep history in mind, particularly the traumatic impact of the Korean War. When you go to Pyongyang you are constantly reminded that the scars left by that war were particularly deep in the North. The South suffered greatly but not as much as the North. The North used relatively little close air support in its operations south of the thirty-eighth parallel. By contrast, the United States inflicted three years of heavy bombing on the North in addition to the Yalu offensive on the ground. This has left a deep-rooted siege mentality that still dominates the North Korean psyche.

Pyongyang was bombed until almost no buildings were left standing, and an entirely new capital had to be built after the war. The North Korean people are of course constantly reminded about all of this on television and in other propaganda. Today, fifty years after the Korean War, there is still no peace treaty, and the United States maintains enough conventional and nuclear forces in and near Korea to destroy the North Korean regime with a preemptive strike. They’re particularly afraid of U.S. air superiority – F-16s, F-4s and the latest in intelligence and command and control capabilities against their obsolete Migs. The reason North Korea keeps forward-deployed conventional forces on the Demilitarized Zone is to deter a U.S. preemptive strike and make it too costly.

Until 1991 the United States had tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. It is now well-established history that the North Koreans started their serious efforts to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles as a direct response to the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the South for more than three decades. President George H. W. Bush removed those tactical nuclear weapons from the South in 1991.

But the United States still has nuclear weapons close to North Korea in the Pacific capable of hitting them. And of course George Bush the Younger has announced a new U.S. strategic doctrine saying we have the right to stage a preemptive strike against any country the U.S. regards as a potential threat. Iraq persuaded the North Koreans that Bush is serious. So did his interview with Bob Woodward in the book, *Bush at War*, in which The President said he "loathed" Kim Jong-il and would like to "topple" his regime.

In short, North Korea is developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and a definitive nuclear settlement is not likely until North Korea believes that the United States has given up its goal of bringing about regime change through military or other means. This cannot be accomplished with mere paper security assurances of the type envisaged in the current negotiations. It requires a reversal of the overall policy of the United States so that steps toward the normalization of economic and political relations are linked directly with North Korean steps toward denuclearization.

Such a reversal would mean that the final stages of normalization would occur when complete denuclearization is achieved. But the existing reality is that U.S. policy rules this out. The U.S. proposal for a settlement presented to North Korea in the Beijing negotiations on June 24, 2004, explicitly states that even after denuclearization, normalization could not occur until North Korea also makes other concessions relating to human rights, missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and conventional force dispositions. By contrast, South Korea is pushing a proposal in which the normalization of U.S. and Japanese relations with North Korea would follow the final dismantling of nuclear weapons capabilities.

In North Korean eyes, the normalization of U.S. diplomatic and economic relations must logically be accompanied by a peace treaty ending the Korean War. This has become a realistic objective following a major shift in the North Korean position on May 6. Previously, North Korea has insisted on a treaty limited to the United States and North Korea, but on May 6, it offered to conclude a tripartite peace treaty including South Korea. The Pentagon fears that a peace treaty would generate pressures for U.S. force withdrawals from South Korea. But normalization would not be meaningful without a formal end to the Korean War, and without normalization, complete denuclearization is unlikely.

The normalization of U.S. — and Japanese — relations with Pyongyang would not only improve the prospects for step-by-step denuclearization, linked to step-by-step aid. It would also help to liberalize and open up the repressive North Korean system. It's clear that our present policy makes it harder for Kim Jong-il's economic reforms to succeed. There's a lot of talk in the United States and Europe about the human rights situation in North Korea, and much of it is on target. But the way to liberalize North Korea, indeed the only way, is to open it up through normalization. There's a supreme irony here. The people who talk the loudest about the gulags in North Korea — as a reason for opposing a nuclear deal — are actually helping to prolong the repressive system there.

North Korea: Implosion, Explosion, Proliferation (Comment)

MURATA Koji
Doshisha University

Anti-American sentiments, in particular anti-G. W. Bush sentiments, have spread all over the world, including Japan. In face of the U.S. presidential election, however, at least, at governmental and policy-elite levels, pro-Bush sentiments were stronger than anti-Bush sentiments in Japan.

There are several reasons. First, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirô has established strong personal ties with President Bush. Their ties are often referred to be stronger than the Ron-Yasu relationship between Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Second, as was Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, the first Bush administration hired many of senior officials who have strong ties with Japanese policy elites. Third, Asian policies of Senator John Kerry, Democratic presidential candidate, were uncertain for many Japanese.

Especially, many Japanese have become more and more concerned about North Korean issues. The Korean Peninsula has been of great importance for Japanese security for a long time. After the end of World War II, however, due to domestic factors, the Japanese government has been very reluctant to express its security concerns about the peninsula. Tôkyô has occasionally indirectly expressed its security concerns about the peninsula only in the context of the U.S.-Japan relations.[1]

Now, North Korea's nuclear and missile development is, however, a serious direct security concern for Japan. While Japan is trying to develop a Missile Defense (MD) system with the United States, so far, it does not have any effective counter measures against North Korea's missiles. Also, the kidnapping issues are very emotional issues among the Japanese. Although Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea twice in order to solve these issues and, probably, to improve public support to his cabinet, now Japan's North Korea policy seems to be kidnapped by the kidnapping issues.

As for the nuclear and missile issues, on the one hand, Japan had no other choice than keeping the Six Party Talks, maintaining the sound alliance relationship with the United States. At the same time, however, Japan is concerned about the U.S. tougher stances toward North Korea. On the other hand, over the kidnapping issues, Japanese public wants tougher stances towards North Korea. Japan needs to make clear the priority over the North Korean issues, and politicians must educate the public on the complexity of these complicated issues. For example, Japan's unilateral economic sanction against North Korea, if it should be severe, might damage the framework of the Six Party Talks.

The future of North Korean issues will highly depend on the future of Iraq.

If the United States is faced with more difficult situations in Iraq after the general election of January 2005, North Korea will become less willing to cooperate with the United States and Japan. But if the United States can overcome current difficult situations in Iraq in the near future, it will take a tougher stance towards North Korea. The

[1] MURATA Koji: The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Japanese View. Discussion papers, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, August 1998.

Koizumi cabinet has already dispatched the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq, and extended the dispatch one more year. According to recent public opinion polls, however, about 60% of the Japanese are opposed to this decision.

As the National Emergency Act was made with the support of more than 80% of National Diet members, mainly thanks to North Korea's repeated provocation and Chinese military build-up, Japan is going to establish consensus over territorial defense issues. As is seen in the divided public opinion about Japanese cooperation with the United States over the Iraq issues, however, the Japanese have not yet reached consensus over international security issues beyond their own territorial defense issues.[2] Japan now is somehow like West Germany during the Cold War era. When West Germany dispatched its troops outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area during the Gulf War, it was a breakthrough for West German postwar security policy. Japan's dispatch of the SDF is an equivalent breakthrough for Japan's postwar security policy. Still, Japan is more than ten years behind Germany.

Also, while the Japanese tend to feel the fear of abandonment by the United States in terms of their own territorial defense and regional security in East Asia, they also tend to feel the fear of entrapment by the United States in terms of international security affairs such as the fight against international terrorism.[3]

Japan should overcome the gap between territorial, regional, and international security issues. In order to do so, first, Japan should further promote trilateral security cooperation with the United States and South Korea. Second, it should further actively participate in multilateral security efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Third, Japan should adjust its national defense program in accordance with changes in the U.S. overseas military presence and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The improvement of information and intelligence capabilities and counter-terrorism activities are essential among others.

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2 WATANABE Akio: "Nihon wa Rubicon wo watattaka?" [Has Japan Crossed the Rubicon?]. *Kokusai Anzenhoshô* [The Journal of International Security], December 2003.

3 NAKANISHI Hiroshi: "Kyôfu to sensô no jidai" [The Age of Fear and War]. *Chûô Kôron*, June 2004.

North Korea: Implosion, Explosion, Proliferation—What Can We Expect?

Heinrich KREFT[1]
German Foreign Ministry in Berlin

Before looking at the topic in greater detail, allow me to say that I am delighted to see so many Asia hands here. In contrast to Bonn, we seem to have a broad and diverse group of foreign and security policy experts in Berlin. That is exactly what we need, particularly in the light of Germany's greater role in international affairs in the future.

Let me now turn to the subject. I would like to join Selig Harrison in applauding Mr. Harnisch for his excellent overview.[2]

I admit I belonged to those in the mid-1990s who thought that North Korea's implosion was unavoidable and advised all those involved in North Korean issues to do whatever possible to prepare for this event.

The most important lesson to be learnt for Korea from German unification—which captured the imagination of so many Koreans in the 1990s—was that a collapse could come very rapidly and the pressure of events could build up so quickly that drastic measures would be necessary.

This is history: The South Korean Ministry of Unification recalled its last envoy from the Embassy in Bonn. Since then, Kim Chong-il has managed to get a firm grip on power and he has succeeded in stabilizing the regime with the economy and state functioning at a very low level.

Economic conditions are harsh, even among the middle class. There is some evidence of change, but there are serious doubts that this is a well thought through process of reform aimed at opening up the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to market forces.

The few reform efforts have, without doubt, been motivated by the desire to underpin the regime, both in financial and political terms.

And it has to be said that many of the measures have done little more than acknowledge the existing mechanisms, how ordinary Koreans try to cope with the situation, how they try to survive.

It is difficult to see how this can lead to real development. This will not be possible without a massive influx of foreign capital and know-how to rebuild the economic infrastructure.

But how can foreign direct investment be attracted under the current circumstances in North Korea that are:

- A poor economic infrastructure
- North Korea's culture of secrecy

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1 The author is Deputy Head of the Policy Planning Staff of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin. He expresses here his personal views.

2 See page 7 in this volume.

- The continuing lack of access to modern communications, including the Internet; the mobile phone network was recently shut down
- The lack of a proper legal framework
- The lack of a consumer market given the very low purchasing power of the people

There is no doubt that the regime will continue to manipulate and exploit the economy to help ensure its own survival. There is little evidence that North Korea could follow the example of China or Vietnam, which have opened up their regimes and whose communist elites are still in power. In such a closed and controlled environment and in the absence of measures to stimulate real economic growth, the overall economy is likely to contract—though some observers see the economy growing at a very low level.

Reasonable harvests in recent years and food donations, particularly from Japan and South Korea, have papered over the fact that the humanitarian situation is still serious and may worsen in the absence of a stronger economy.

Let me now turn to the proliferation issue.

Ever since India and Pakistan opted for open nuclearization, the nonproliferation regime has been in deep trouble.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 as well as the paradigmatic shift in U.S. foreign and security policy, which they brought about, have put the nonproliferation issue at the top of the agenda. The fear, particularly in the U.S., but also in Europe and other parts of the world, that international terrorists could actively seek and get hold of weapons of mass destruction has energized foreign policy. U.S. policy on Iraq is one example, as are the policies on Iran and North Korea.

North Korea has a record of proliferation of missile technology and was an important part in the A.Q. Khan nuclear network, while Iran was only on the receiving line of proliferation of WMD. North Korea has actually actively threatened to proliferate nuclear weapons and technology in the future. And this threat is real. North Korea now has the capacity to deploy nuclear weapons and export some of them without losing its deterrence capacity.

Bad as this situation already is, the nightmare for the security environment of the whole of Northeast Asia would be if North Korea were to successfully test its nuclear devices. How would Japan react to that?

It is understandable why North Korea reactivated its nuclear program, given the likely internal power shift towards the military and the international security environment as seen from Pyongyang after the axis-of-evil-speech made by U.S. President George W. Bush in January 2002.

But given its consequences for the security environment in Northeast Asia and the threat of proliferation, we need an all-out effort by all parties involved to end the North Korea nuclear program.

The Six-Party Talks and the engagement of North Korea are still the best option.

Holding the next round of the talks in September was unrealistic as everyone is looking towards November 2, the elections in the United States.

The election of John Kerry, which is at least possible, would make a fresh start in U.S.-DPRK relations much easier. Kerry has stated that he would be willing to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea, but at the same time keep the Six-Party framework.

China is willing to continue its active role. It could step up pressure on North Korea. Japan agreed during the recent visit by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to put pressure on Pyongyang to agree to an early next round of the Six-Party Talks, although China in particular would apparently like to see us—the Europeans—play a more active role. This was clear during my visit to Beijing last week. Of course, no-one knows if the efforts will be successful. It is very unlikely that Pyongyang will give up its last trump card in its maneuvers to hold onto power for a price lower than a guarantee of regime survival.

I think it is at least relatively safe to say that for the next few years to come North Korea will most likely continue to be the last playground for an endangered species, namely Kremlinologists.

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How to Solve the Conflict: Suggested Roles of Japan

IZUMI Hajime
University of Shizuoka

People thought in the past that North-South reconciliation was the most important element to build up peace on the Korean peninsula and, once reconciliation was achieved, military tensions on the peninsula would go down by a considerable degree.

These ideas are bygones now. There was a certain reconciliation on the Korean peninsula, but peace is not definite, nor have military tensions been decreased yet. The Conflict structure on the peninsula still exists.

A kind of reconciliation is certainly in progress between the North and the South. No one could imagine ten years ago that dialogue and cooperation, as well as inter-personal exchanges in cultural and sports areas, would go so frequently.

During the four years after the first North-South summit in June 2000, there have been ministerial talks and red cross talks periodically and railroad and road connections have been established. The construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex also stepped forward.

The North and the South are truly in process of “maintainable and stable relational improvement” as President Rho Moo-hyun stated. This is a big change of situation, considering that much attention once went to the question of how to realize a dialogue between the North and the South.

The easing of North-South military tensions, on the other hand, has made little progress. The reasons for it are mainly on the part of North Korea. The North has turned its position and came to facilitate dialogues, exchanges, and cooperation with the South. It no longer rejects economic assistance from South Korea. However, it has never concurred with South Korea on the matters of arms control and disarmament.

After all, what North Korea fears most may be the military power of the United States. No matter how its relations with South Korea are improved, North Korea is not likely to move towards reducing its military forces unless its relations with the United States are improved and the U.S. military threat is reduced.

The military forces of North Korea rather have increased in the past ten years. The North’s ballistic missile capability went up steadily, and Pyongyang resumed the nuclear weapons program in December 2002. The weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability of North Korea has certainly been upgraded.

Interestingly, during this time, there was a gradual change in South Korea in the recognition of military threat from North Korea. That is, fears about the North’s military threat were slightly on the decline on the part of the South, and an atmosphere for a relatively stable “peaceful coexistence” with the Northern half of the peninsula was created in the South Korean society.

However, the WMD capability of North Korea is no doubt a threat to the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Unless the North gives up WMD, especially the nuclear ambitions, permanent peace will not come in Northeast Asia. Even if the North and the South maintain their "continuous and stable relational improvement," there will be no permanent peace on the Korean peninsula as long as North Korea holds on to WMD.

For the peace of the Korean peninsula, the North's abandonment of nuclear weapons is the most important issue to be tackled.

North Korea obviously has a limited nuclear capability, and Pyongyang continues to develop this nuclear capability with the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. If they reload the fuel and reprocess the spent one, they can obtain an amount of plutonium enough to add one more nuclear weapon in a few months, although the North is believed to have one or two nuclear weapons already plus an accumulation of weapon-grade plutonium potential for producing more than six or seven nuclear weapons.

All the countries in Northeast Asia including Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia and the United States have implicitly accepted the fact of North Korea's limited capability and have decided to live with a "nuclear armed North Korea" for the time being. The strategic environment of Northeast Asia has been changed by North Korean nuclear development.

What are the challenges that we face with? In order to stop North Korea's nuclear program, we find some clues in the Libyan model. The regime of Muammar al-Qadhafi opened up a path to engagement with the international community by undertaking to eliminate its WMD. We should seek the same kind of resolution about North Korea, and Japan and the United States hold the key to this.

Achieving such a resolution requires a mix of policies. There could be a pressure-based approach and an incentive-based approach, and all the involved countries should come together to consider the best mix of pressure and incentive policies.

Because China and South Korea regularly provide aid to North Korea, they both can bring pressure on the North by reducing or stopping their aid projects, in the light of North Korea's increasing dependence on assistance.

It is Japan and the United States, on the other hand, that can give incentives to North Korea, for these are the two countries from which North Korea can expect things that it wants but does not yet have. No matter what other countries say, commitments like a security guarantee are worthless from Pyongyang's perspective unless they are endorsed by the United States. And Japan is meanwhile the only possible country in this world for North Korea to get the large-scale economic assistance that it wishes for. That is why Japan and the United States should become the countries to offer North Korea incentives.

I believe that the approach I have just outlined is the best available mix of policies in line with multiple considerations. But in practice both sets of countries are doing the opposite of what I have described.

The countries with the leverage to apply pressure prefer to provide incentives. Neither China nor South Korea would take kindly to the suggestion that they should swap their carrots for sticks. On the other hand, Japan and the United States, the countries that could offer incentives, decline to do so and are inclined to apply pressure instead. That is why the current setup has not worked.

However, a new prospect is now opening up with regard to Japan. Breaking free from the spell of the abductions and tackling the nuclear issue may finally enable Japan to use the incentives at its disposal. This has not been possible so far because the abduction issue has overshadowed everything else. However, since Prime Minister Koizumi's second visit to Pyongyang in May 2004 made progress on the abduction issue, Japan can reopen negotiations with North Korea and use its leverage to achieve progress on the nuclear issue and in other areas of concern.

The close bond between Japan and the United States offers another way to provide

incentives. When trying to persuade North Korea to stop its disruptive behavior, Japan should make comprehensive demands. It should tell North Korea that it must yield on all the points demanded by Japan and the United States: nuclear development, missiles, abductions—everything.

As the comprehensive resolution advocated by Tôkyô is also advocated by Washington, Japan can tell North Korea that such a resolution would, at the very least, enable it to normalize relations with Japan and that a huge economic aid package would be available following normalization. At the same time, Japan is the only country that can offer to persuade the United States that it should move to normalize relations with North Korea.

All the countries involved should work together to find the best blend of pressure and incentives, but since this is basically impossible, it is up to Japan to tackle this task. Giving incentives to North Korea continuously through normalization talks while pushing forward the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Illicit Activity Initiative (IAI) positively will have a great significance in solving the North Korean nuclear issue.

The PRC and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Kay MÖLLER
German Institute for International and Security Affairs

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of (North-) Korea (DPRK) are each other's last remaining allies. Their Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of July 11, 1961, obliges both sides to make military and other assistance immediately available in the case of an armed aggression directed against either of them. According to the South Korean government, Peking virtually relinquished this obligation when normalizing relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1992.[1] In 1995, a speaker of the PRC's ministry of foreign affairs said that China did not conceive of the treaty as a basis for the dispatchment of troops.[2] More recently, however, officials from the South Korean defense ministry speculated about Peking sending some 400,000 troops in the event of war.[3]

At the same time, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the North Korean People's Army (KPA) have maintained close relations since the time of the Korean War (1950–1953), and the Chinese press has been instructed to refer to the DPRK as " shield for our strategy in Northeast Asia."[4] During the 1990s, the ally occasionally served as a proxy for Chinese missile technology exports to the Middle East and South Asia. In 2003, the PRC provided about 40% of North Korea's immediate food needs and 90% of its needs of oil.[5] Since Pyongyang's provisional withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993, Peking has prevented Security Council sanctions against the DPRK. More recently, China has opposed President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which it views as a means to economically strangle Pyongyang. According to U.S. government sources, however, the PRC since 2003 has in several, albeit not all cases prevented the export of dual use items to North Korea that could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction.[6] Contrasting with the U.S., China has not demanded that the DPRK must renounce the civilian use of nuclear energy.[7]

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1 ROK Foreign Minister Kong No-myung speaking to parliament on October 10, 1995. *Yonhap*, October 10, 1995, as quoted in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/2432/D/6, October 12, 1995.

2 *Yonhap*, November 14, 1995, as quoted in *ibid*., FE/2461/D/3, November 15, 1995.

3 *Yonhap*, October 5, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, October 5, 2004.

4 CPC Guidelines for press reporting as quoted in Choung-il CHEE, "South Korea's Security in the Age of the New World Order," *Korean and World Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (spring 1992), pp. 82–98 (89).

5 Matthew FORNEY, "Family Feud," *Time Asia Magazine*, Vol. 160, No. 24 (December 23, 2003,) pp. 5–7 (5).

6 *The South China Morning Post*, June 4, 2004 (online). In 2004, the DPRK reportedly asked the PRC to provide fuel that could be used in combustion experiments. The request was turned down. *Kyodo*, July 13, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, July 13, 2004.

7 At the same time, China's top nuclear official in September 2004 ruled out cooperation with North Korea in the field of atomic energy because of the nuclear crisis. *Reuters*, September 1, 2004 as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, September 1, 2004.

Following earlier behind-the-scenes attempts to prevent the nuclear crisis from escalating, China since August 2003 has participated in multilateral efforts to resolve the issue and has been credited by the Bush administration for its role. This paper analyses the PRC's impact by examining (1) recent developments in Peking-Pyongyang relations, (2) China's role in the nuclear crisis, and (3) the PRC's strategic motives for assuming the part of a moderator/mediator.

Bilateral Relations with North Korea

During the 1990s, China regularly downplayed the scope of its diplomatic influence on Pyongyang, and the Deng Xiaoping reforms had certainly caused an estrangement with the unreformed neighbor (in 1993, Deng allegedly refused to invite DPRK President Kim Il-song to Peking.[8]) When Hwang Chang-yop, the supposedly pro-Chinese secretary of the North Korean Worker's Party, escaped to the South in 1997, his faction was thoroughly purged. On the other hand, there was hardly any other country at the time with the same number of agreements signed with North Korea and the same frequency of high-level officials visiting North Korea.

In the early 1990s, both Moscow and Peking normalized relations with Seoul and told North Korea to forthwith pay for oil and other goods in hard currency. Bilateral trade declined from U.S.$ 560 million in 1989 to U.S.$ 486 million in 1995, representing just about 5% of Sino-South Korean trade in the same year. Over the following years, the DPRK economy shrank by an average of 5% annually. Amidst this backdrop, and encouraged by its Chinese ally, Pyongyang entered into a dialogue with the ROK while calling on Washington to replace the 1953 armistice agreement with a bilateral peace treaty. Subsequently, there were several incidents in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ,) followed by a fruitless attempt made by both Koreas, the U.S., and China in 1996/1997 at providing their relationship with a new institutional framework.

During these years, the DPRK constantly tried to keep China at arm's length by, for instance, offering itself to Washington as a counterweight to the PRC[9] or sporadically entering into contact with the Taiwan government.[10] When Four Party Talks on the armistice regime were launched in 1996, Pyongyang was initially reticent to have China included.

Since the beginning in 1996 of the North Korean famine, between 140,000 and 300,000 refugees have escaped to the PRC.[11] Whereas most of them have been hiding

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8 *Le Monde*, March 16, 1990, p. 6.

9 In July 1995, a North Korean official told a delegation of the New York Council on Foreign Relations: "If you want to balance against China's growing power, you should establish relations with us." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 21, 1995, pp. 17ff.

10 In April 1995, Pyongyang invited members of the Taiwan parliament to a sports and culture festival. The following month, the DPRK authorized two charter flights to Taiwan. There were signs of a closer economic relationship. North Korea also signalled support for Kaohsiung as host of the 2002 Asian Games. *Chungang Ilbo*, May 7, 1995 as quoted in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/2297/D/1, May 8, 1995; *ibid*., May 27, 1995 as quoted in *ibid*., FE/2315/D/3, May 29, 1995.

11 Numbers provided by the South Korean humanitarian group "Good Friends" as quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 6, 2003, p. 14–7.

among the two million strong Korean minority in Northeast China's Jilin and Liaoning provinces, some of them with the help of South Korean and other NGOs made their way to foreign missions and institutions in Peking to be later resettled in the ROK. Seoul has been playing down the phenomenon, yet the publicity has considerably damaged the PRC's international reputation, as Peking does not acknowledge the refugee's political status.[12] Furthermore, if the PRC continues to function as an economic "safety valve" for North Korea, the latter faces few incentives to reform. Whenever possible, China thus has returned the refugees to the DPRK where they frequently were imprisoned and forced into hard labor. 2004 witnessed increases in PRC border controls and an intensified search for North Korean defectors within China.[13]

Destabilization in North Korea could stir nationalist passions among the PRC's ethnic Korean population on the 1,400 kilometer-long border. When Peking and Seoul in 2004 entered into a controversy over the sovereignty of a kingdom that had straddled the present North Korean frontier 1,500 years before, a sudden light was shed on the possibility of future border disputes between the PRC and a united Korea.[14]

The DPRK leader Kim Chong-il has visited China three times (in May-June 2000, January 2001, and April 2004) since assuming responsibility.[15] Apart from the nuclear issue, each visit was used to some extent to explore prime examples of the PRC's economic opening in places such as Shanghai. It remains unclear whether this reflects a real interest. (Some observers believe that the DPRK's market-style economic reforms of July 2002 were suspended in 2004 because of high inflation.[16]). However that be, China in 2004 significantly increased its investment in North Korea to benefit from low labor costs while facilitating a gradual evolution towards the market and more interdependence.[17] In the meantime, a 2002 controversy over the PRC's arrest on corruption charges of Chinese-Dutch businessman Yang Bin, who had been appointed governor of the Sinuiju Special Administrative region, was silently buried.

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12 In 1996, UN representatives reported that China had built a large refugee camp on the border in Yanji. *Sankei Shimbun*, August 30, 1996, as quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 10, 1996, p. 26–30.

13 *The Korea Times*, August 30, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, August 30, 2004. In September 2004, China replaced its border police with 150,000 regular soldiers. In addition to the deployments, new military facilities were constructed in Hanchun, Tuman, Kaishan, and Sanhe, whereas airforce assets were also transferred to Yanji. In June 2004, China and North Korea signed a military agreement on border security. *Hindustan Times*, June 30, 2004, as quoted in *Asia-Pacific Intelligence Brief*, June 30, 2004.

14 Also in 2004, South Korean members of parliament launched another debate on territories ceded by Japan to the former Chinese Qing dynasty. Among the unsettled border issues between the PRC and the DPRK are a couple of uninhabited islands in the Yalu and Tumen rivers, almost all of which have been occupied by the DPRK, Chinese access to the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea maritime boundary, and a 33 km section of the Mount Paektu border. Daniel Gomà PINILLA, "Border Disputes between China and North Korea," *China Perspectives*, No. 52 (March-April 2004,) pp. 64–70.

15 After having be named his father's successor-designate, Kim's first foreign visit in 1983 was to the PRC where he was afforded a red carpet treatment.

16 *Chosun Ilbo*, August 19, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, August 19, 2004.

17 *Donga Ilbo*, August 24, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, August 24, 2004.

China's Role in the Crisis

China first assumed the role of a go-between for Pyongyang and Washington in 1987, when it conveyed the Reagan administration's readiness to normalize relations with the DPRK. When Kim Il-song officially visited the PRC during that year, he was urged by his hosts to accept the offer.[18] In December 1988, low-level negotiations on technical issues were held in the Chinese capital by the U.S. and North Korea.

When Pyongyang in March 1993 threatened to withdraw from the NPT, China contributed to the signing the following year of the U.S.-DPRK "agreed framework" by indirectly signaling a continued commitment to the security of North Korea while equally indirectly threatening Pyongyang with economic sanctions.[19] When delinking China's most-favored-nation status from human rights considerations in 1994, President Bill Clinton among other things mentioned "shared interests" in a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.[20] Peking nevertheless refused to institutionalize its role and did not participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) charged with implementing major elements of the "agreed framework." In December 1994, China followed Pyongyang's lead and withdrew from the military armistice commission.

Following the outbreak of the nuclear crisis, Peking resumed oil exports to the DPRK on a credit or barter basis (between 1992 and 1993, exports had dropped from 1.2 million barrels to 550,000 million barrels,[21] a level that has since been maintained.) Since 1996, the PRC has also exported large quantities of rice and other staples to a North Korea struck by famine.[22] China remains Pyongyang's major trading partner and probably continues to play a major role in assisting the KPA with both hard- and software.[23] As late as 1999, then PRC Premier Zhu Rong-ji stated that "North Korea is a sovereign nation, and it has nothing to do with us whether North Korea develops guided missiles or nuclear weapons."[24]

In October 2002, Pyongyang sabotaged the "agreed framework" by confessing that it had an ongoing highly enriched uranium (HEU) program and later offering a new "freeze" in exchange for formal U.S. security guarantees and an end to all economic sanctions. On January 10, 2003, North Korea finalized its withdrawal from the NPT. Preoccupied with war in Iraq, President Bush twice called his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin over the phone and asked China to exert its influence.

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18 *Xinhua*, May 23, 1987, as quoted in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/8576/A/3/1, May 25, 1987.

19 Commitment to the DPRK's security was signaled by large military manoeuvres held along the North Korean border in 1994. The previous year, China had closed the border for two weeks and threatened Pyongyang with a boycott of its ports of Rajin and Chonjin. *International Herald Tribune*, April 13, 1993, p. 4; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 19, 1993, p. 8.

20 *U.S. Policy Information and Texts*, May 26, 1994.

21 *Yonhap*, February 22, 1993 as quoted in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/1624/A/2 of February 27, 1993.

22 PRC rice exports had been suspended in 1988.

23 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 6, 2003, pp. 12–4.

24 Quoted from ZHU Feng, "China's Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," *China Strategy* (Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies), No. 3 (July 20, 2004), pp. 5–10 (5).

In early 2003, the PRC, in the midst of a major leadership transfer, and criticized by the U.S. for its passive role in Korea,[25] adopted a more proactive policy on the North Korean issue. In January, Jiang Zemin, in another phone conversation with Bush, for the first time declared that China "does not support North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT."[26] In February, China accepted a demand by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to defer the new nuclear issue to the Security Council and transmitted more than fifty messages between Pyongyang and Washington.[27] Behind the scenes, North Korea was warned to stop "playing with fire," and a cross-border oil pipeline was closed for three days on "technical" reasons.[28] In April, Peking not only hosted Three Party Talks but actively participated, although the DPRK had initially asked for a bilateral meeting with the U.S.[29] Following the occupation of Baghdad by coalition troops, North Korea in July 2003 accepted Six Party Talks including Japan (China and South Korea had tried to exclude Tôkyô and only accepted after Washington had approved a Russian participation.[30])

Since then, it has been Peking's foremost concern to keep the talks going, if necessary with the help of new promises of assistance made to the Pyongyang regime. It has also transpired that under certain circumstances the PRC would participate in the international guarantee of a negotiated solution.[31] A coordination of anti-terrorist strategies apart, it was this cooperation that in September 2003 prompted U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to refer to the "best U.S.-China ties" since 1972.[32]

At the same time, Peking has kept its distance on the U.S. and Japan on questions of principle such as discussing missiles, human rights, or the kidnapping issue in the Six Party framework. Furthermore, the PRC basically adopted a DPRK proposal when suggesting, in November 2003, that Pyongyang should receive security guarantees prior to the dismantlement of its facilities. The suggestion was turned down by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.[33] Since October 2002, China has expressed its scepticism regarding American assertions on North Korea's HEU program and has suggested that this issue will not be directly addressed.[34] In September 2004, the PRC's foreign minister cast doubt on Pyongyang's claim that it had "weaponized" plutonium from 8,000

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25 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 6, 2003, pp. 12–4.

26 ZHU, "China's Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," p. 5.

27 "New Formula to Solve the North's Nuclear Issue," *Vantage Point*, Vol. 26, No. 5 (May 2003,) pp. 2–9 (6).

28 *Ibid*.

29 Andrew SCOBELL, "China and North Korea: The Limits of Influence," *Current History*, Vol. 102, No. 665 (September 2003,) pp. 274–78 (275.)

30 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 28, 2003, p. 8.

31 ZHU, "China's Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," p. 7.

32 *People's Daily* English edition, September 7, 2003 (online).

33 *Agence-France-Presse*, December 3, 2003, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, December 3, 2003.

34 *Reuters*, February 27, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, February 27, 2004. Peking remained sceptical when U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney relayed Pakistani information during a visit to China in April 2004. *Ibid.* At the same time, Chinese interlocutors have unofficially accepted the South Korean view that the HEU issue would be central to any negotiated solution. *Yonhap*, August 2, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, August 2, 2004. According to Japanese reports, Peking has confirmed that North Korea at least tried to enrich uranium. *The Korea Herald*, October 4, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, October 4, 2004.

spent nuclear fuel rods and played down reports about North Korea preparing for a new missile test.[35]

On December 7, 2003, the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, said that North Korea's security interests should be taken into consideration. Wen claimed that the DPRK "for the time being" was not interested in having nuclear weapons and pronounced himself in favor of a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula.[36]

Strategic Motives

Until the end of the Cold War, China's relation with North Korea had fallen into the general framework of Peking's anti-Soviet policies.[37] And whereas the DPRK previously had been rather successful at playing Moscow against Peking and vice versa, this game rapidly lost its interest in the post-Gorbachev era.

Since 1993, the PRC's approach to the North Korean issue has betrayed a desire to prevent its sudden collapse from within or under U.S. military pressure. This has not ruled out a concern about (mostly horizontal) proliferation – with September 11, 2001, and Bush's "preemptive strike" doctrine further complicating the calculus – but due to intelligence of its own or actual Pyongyang assurances, China has downplayed this risk while encouraging North-South détente at the expense of Washington. It was thus that the ROK ambassador to Peking in 1993 mentioned an "equidistant diplomacy" between the PRC and the U.S. with China holding "the key to the reunification" of the peninsula.[38] As far as Peking was concerned, the objective was even more ambitious. According to a 1993 internal party document, the normalization of relations with Seoul had been in the interest of both peoples and would make it possible for South Korea to free itself from the influence of the U.S. and Japan. Once China and South Korea had established diplomatic relations, "it became impossible for the U.S. and Japan to keep China in check with the help of the Korean issue."[39] Today, the PRC is the ROK's most important export market and the ROK one of the most important investors in China.

After Pyongyang in October 2002 had raised the stakes again, Peking saw no other way than adopting a more proactive stance. On the one hand, China could not predict what the Bush administration would decide to do after the fall of Baghdad. On the other hand, Taiwan appeared encouraged by the seemingly swift coalition victory in Iraq to further explore its international margin of manoeuvre,[40] and subsequent Peking

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35 *Reuters*, September 29, 2004, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, September 29, 2004.

36 *The New York Times*, December 8, 2003 (online).

37 In this context, the PRC until about 1965 participated in the early stages of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and otherwise supplied the DPRK with conventional weapons, albeit in much smaller quantities and at a lower level of sophistication than the Soviet Union. *Österreichische Militärzeitschrift*, No. 3 (1994,) pp. 300–304; Yong-Sup HAN, "China's Leverages over North Korea," *Korean and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 1994,) pp. 233–49.

38 *Yonhap*, April 12, 1993, as quoted in *Deutsche Welle Monitoring Service*, April 14, 1993.

39 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 26, 1993, as quoted in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/1597/A2/6, January 27, 1993.

40 Taiwan also appeared likely to benefit from the U.S.-Japanese missile defense program.

attempts to link China's cooperation on North Korea to U.S. concessions over Taiwan have come to nothing. Lastly, North Korea's return to self-isolation would imply steadily increasing amounts of PRC assistance while causing strain on the South Korean economy and driving Seoul back into Washington's embrace.

Peking's new diplomatic activism has thus been more defensive than betrays the eye. At the same time, the Six Party format has to a certain extent isolated Washington rather than Pyongyang, and turned into a regional organization it could contribute to the gradual reshaping of the Northeast Asian power balance that China desires.[41] For that to happen, the PRC has constantly supported South Korea's policies of détente and has accepted regional roles to be played by Moscow and Tôkyô in the conviction that neither of the two will be able to deny China a leading role in the long term.[42] What remains is the almost traditional unpredictability of the U.S. and the latently suicidal tendencies of the North Korean leader. In the short term, Peking thus finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place with both Washington and Kim Chong-il requiring reassurances. Whether the short-term can be prolonged depends not least on the PRC's own internal stability and delicate balancing act between economic growth and nationalism.[43]

China's margin of manoeuvre therefore remains limited. By basically privileging DPRK proposals over the U.S. demand for a "complete, verifiable, and irreversible" (nuclear) disarmament (CVID,) Peking has tied its hands on the HEU issue that not only Washington, but also Tôkyô and even Seoul have qualified to be crucial. At the same time, any negotiated solution will leave Pyongyang time to stabilize by either building more nuclear weapons or gradually opening its economy to the outside world. Given its own experience and its support for peaceful gradualism, China would certainly prefer the second option.

[41] According to reports, China has suggested to institutionalize the Six Party Talks. ZHU, "China's Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Issue," p. 7.

[42] By contributing to a loosening of the U.S.-ROK alliance, however, the PRC risks to encourage a parallel strengthening of U.S.-Japan military ties.

[43] Incidentally, Liaoning and Jilin provinces where the Korean minority lives are part of the PRC's industrial "rust belt" that has witnessed a great number of social unrest in recent years.

Some "Scenarios" and Endgames in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: An American Perspective

Nicholas EBERSTADT
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Why "Scenarios?"

This paper presents some alternative "scenarios" for future outcomes for what by now seems to have become a perennial feature of the Korean geopolitical landscape: the nuclear proliferation threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).

The nature and method of the "scenario-building" exercise stand in fundamental distinction to those of the detailed strategic assessment.

Whereas the latter relies upon an intensive and careful review of what are often minutiae to discern state actors' capabilities and intentions, the former *posits* those same intentions and capabilities, describing them in broad and deliberately stylized strokes.

Where detailed strategic assessments attempt to indicate the range of possible outcomes, and to assign at least implicit probabilities to these alternatives, scenario-building is meant to be insensitive to outcome probability.[1]

The purpose of this necessarily speculative approach, instead, is to focus upon *plausible* outcomes, irrespective of their seeming likelihood, in the hope of stimulating further thought about, and increased attention to, under-contemplated strategic problems and opportunities (including underappreciated linkages, dynamics, and constraints that may affect the motion of state actors in currently unfamiliar circumstances).

A Précis of Motivations and Objectives in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Principal State Actors

If constructing the scenarios for the ongoing North Korean nuclear drama is in some sense an act of controlled creative fiction, it is then incumbent on us to identify and describe the indispensable dramatis personae.

In this particular drama, the principal actors are state actors—specifically, all six governments currently engaged in the so-called Six Party Talks. Other characters may

[1] As one past master of the genre has explained, "This type of scenario planning relies not on probability but on qualitative causal thinking." Kees VAN DER HEIJDER, *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1996, p. 3. The art of "alternative futures" scenario-building for geostrategy is usually traced back the innovate work of Herman KAHN and his colleagues in the late 1950s and 1960s (and especially to his 1967 study *Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next 33 Years*), and today is often associated today with the approach encouraged by Andrew W. Marshall and the U.S. Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment.

also be imagined to play roles—the European Union and the United Nations (broadly construed) come particularly to mind in this regard—but their parts are under most plausible storylines distinctly smaller and less important than for the six main leads.

Designing scenarios forces us to simplify—indeed, to oversimplify—the motivations, objectives, and strategies of the actors in our drama. Yet so long as these simplifications are explicitly outlined and born readily in mind, their schematic value to clearer thinking can outweigh their inescapable violence to real-life subtleties and nuances.

The overall strategic situations facing the six state actors discussed below, and the grand strategies of each of these states (to the extent each can be seen as operating under the influence of such a design) are matters we will not address here in any detail. The précis below, instead, attempts to highlight some of the particular considerations that should be kept in mind as we attempt to anticipate the behavior of the principal characters in possible future chapters of this North Korean nuclear drama. We will introduce our actors in what we believe to be ascending order of their importance to the drama:

The Russian Federation, today and over the foreseeable future, views the North Korean nuclear question through the context of Moscow's immensely reduced post-Cold War circumstances, and the state's efforts, over the course of what has proved to be a prolonged and difficult domestic transition, to maintain or regain international influence.

In the early 1990s—in a total reversal from arrangements over the previous five decades—Russia was almost completely frozen out of Great Power diplomatic and security deliberations over Korean questions. Russian governments—today and in all of our imagined future scenarios—will view it as imperative to reintroduce Russia as a "player" in Korean affairs, not simply to protect Russian interests in what objectively qualifies as a high-tension and potentially volatile spot on the country's border, but also to gain leverage in Moscow's dealings with Tôkyô, Beijing, and Washington.

We will presume that Russia's approach to Korean security problems will continue to be colored by its newfound post-communist ideology of "multipolarity," as has been the case during the last half of the presidency of Boris Yeltsin and all of the tenure of Vladimir Putin. Under such thinking, the essential importance of countering U.S. international power ("unipolarity") dictates the making of tradeoffs and the taking of risks that would not seem to make sense in a less America-phobic calculus.

The imperative of returning to the Korean stage, and the desirability of offsetting or compromising U.S. predominance, help to explain otherwise curious aspects of Russia's Korea policy over recent years: the distasteful and highly public cultivation by President Putin of a personal relationship with North Korean dictator Kim Chong-il; the bizarre Russian proposal to "solve" the North Korean nuclear missile problem by launching North Korea's "peaceful satellites" from third countries; the Russian government's episodic declarations that it does not believe the DPRK has nuclear capabilities; and the reported under-the-table Russian payment of $10 million to Pyongyang to attend the February 2004 round of the Six Party Talks. We will assume that such behavior will continue to characterize Russian diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula. But we will also assume that Russian influence in the drama will be conspicuously limited by the state's lack of economic and military resources.

Japan, today and through the foreseeable future, will regard North Korea as its most pressing security problem, and the North Korean nuclear issue as the most acute of the

many problems that Pyongyang poses to it. Despite its immense wealth and tremendous industrial power, however, Tôkyô's options for dealing with this potentially direct threat remain extraordinarily limited, for historical reasons that need not be detailed here.

Although we will presume that Japan continues to progress toward what we might call "normal nation status," that journey in our scenarios will continue at its familiar and painfully slow pace, and the destination will not be reached in our imagined futures. Instead, Japan will remain fundamentally dependent upon its relationship with United States for military protection and international security. This will remain true even if Japan continues to develop more robust national defense capabilities, and evidences a greater degree of assertiveness in its still-timid defense and security policy. The reason this awkward arrangement has been able to work—and we assume, will continue to work through the foreseeable future—is that, on the whole, Japan's international security interests actually coincide quite closely with those of the United States (far more closely, indeed, than with Japan's other Pacific Great Power neighbors).

Although the proposition that Tôkyô currently operates under a grand strategy would seem highly debatable to many observers, there is much less contention about Japan's security tactics—and in particular, Japan's proclivity for "security hedging." Given what Tôkyô often perceives as an asymmetry between U.S. and Japanese national and security interests, Japan often attempts to minimize its international exposure to risk by diverging from its presumed "follower" role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, while at the same time emphasizing the importance of that alliance and Washington's obligations under it. This "hedging while moving toward normal nation status" approach is exemplified in Japan's dealings with North Korea: In recent years, for example, Tôkyô has for the first time since the end of World War II fired shots in anger (at unmarked North Korean vessels penetrating Japanese maritime boundaries) and has moved forward on a still-controversial theater missile defense (TMD) initiative, but Prime Minister Junichirô Koizumi has also made "surprise" visits to North Korea (unbeknownst to Washington during their planning phases) in search of breakthroughs in Japan-DPRK relations.

The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is arguably the state for which stakes are highest in the North Korean nuclear crisis, given on the one hand the precarious nature of the long Korean War armistice and the proximity of so many South Korean targets (not least the capital city of Seoul) to North Korea's diverse offensive military forces, and on the other the still widely cherished hope of an eventual peaceful and voluntary reunification of the divided Korean nation.

By some measures—for example, economic diplomacy (aid, trade, and envisioned investment projects)—South Korea would also seem to be more deeply engaged with North Korea than any other government in the contemporary world. Yet despite the obvious importance to Seoul of defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis and the considerable resources the government is applying to its North Korea problem, South Korea stands today as a country without a coherent strategy for coping with its North Korea problem.[2]

[2] The strategic incoherence of the sunshine approach was highlighted by inconvenient revelations in the wake of the historic Pyongyang Summit of June 2000—the first-ever meeting for the heads of state of divided Korea, a watershed event that purportedly underscored the promise of the sunshine policy. For one thing, it turned out that the South Korean government had in fact secured the summit through secret and illegal transfers of South Korean taxpayer funds to Kim Chong-il's overseas bank accounts—a transaction not exactly in keeping with the public proclamations that the sunshine policy

The immediate explanation for this lacuna is the ROK's embrace—or rather its misapplication—of the "sunshine theory" of reconciliation with the DPRK since its promulgation in 1998. (The "sunshine" policy has gone by a succession of official names since 1998, but the underlying premises have remained essentially unchanged.)

In practice, merchandizing the sunshine theory in an open and competitive domestic political environment has made it necessary for "sunshine governments," and the political parties supporting them, to argue that the DPRK is becoming progressively less threatening to South Korean interests—but this assertion naturally invites skeptical scrutiny of Seoul's close military alliance with the United States, insofar as that treaty relationship is formally premised upon, and structured to defending against, a presumptive North Korean threat.

By substituting such wishful thinking for actual strategic calculation, the sunshine theory has consequently at one and the same time failed to generate any tangible security concessions for Seoul from Pyongyang, while straining Seoul's vital security alliance with Washington.

At this writing, Seoul's capacity to calculate strategically about its North Korea options looks to be impaired still further by two inchoate but nonetheless tangible and possibly thickening strands of popular and policy sentiment.

The first is *minjok* or "race" thinking: the notion that South Korea's ties of consanguinity with brethren in the North is so fundamental a bond that it should be taken into account everywhere, even in the formulation of national security policy. (By implication, *minjok*-thinking counterposes the presumed identity of North and South Korean interests against what might be called the nonethnic and thus presumptively contingent "elective affinities" of shared political values that join the United States and the ROK in their alliance.)

The second is the rise of the slogan of "independent defense policy"—on its face, an entirely unobjectionable notion for any sovereign government, but in its current context, code language for "less defense cooperation with Washington while still insisting on Washington's obligation to defend us."

South Korean society appears to be very deeply—and almost evenly—divided over North Korea policy. These deep fissures,[3] and the internal contradictions of the sunshine policy, suggest the possibility of big changes of approach for South Korea during the period under consideration in our scenarios.

China will be assumed to regard the North Korean nuclear crisis through the overlapping but distinct lenses of long historical memory, Great Power ambition, and competing domestic political interests—although not necessarily in that order.

By historical tradition and imperial logic of the old East Asian order, the Korean Peninsula was within the Chinese tributary system; the forcible wrenching of Korea out of that system in the late 19th century proved to be not only a fateful revelation of

was enticing Pyongyang into new ways of thinking and acting. Moreover, as we now know, during the year 2000 heyday of the sunshine euphoria, the DPRK was also furtively pursuing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program for the development of nuclear weapons—a program that had been made that much easier to finance thanks to South Korea's illicit official summit-purchasing subventions. "Sunshine" arguably was indeed transforming the North—but not in the manner the architects of the policy envisioned.

[3] Which seem to run along generational and educational fault lines.

China's terrible weakness at that time, but an omen of further misfortunes and humiliations that would befall the nation over the following generations.

Thousands of years of memory weigh on Chinese thinking about Korea. And in China, the lesson this history is believed to teach is that the Middle Kingdom is safer when the peninsula is within Beijing's orbit.[4]

Over the past decade and a half, China has managed to situate itself more advantageously in Korean affairs than at any point since the 19th century. China maintains diplomatic relations with both governments in divided Korea, and both Korean states vie for China's attention and goodwill. While South Korea provides investment, technology, and foreign markets for China's dynamic and evolving economy, North Korea provides a socialist buffer along China's northeast border—and also confers China with both strategic and operational depth in its competition with the United States. This "strategic depth" helps China to limit U.S. influence in Northeast Asia by forcing Washington to concentrate on North Korea problems. China also gains "operational depth" from the DPRK insofar as the U.S. military must immediately face a million-strong army equipped with weapons of mass destruction in a territory that separates the U.S. forces in the ROK and Japan from the Chinese border on the Yalu River.

At the same time, Beijing's exposure to risk from North Korean nuclear program is considerable—vastly higher, for example, than Russia's. North Korea's nuclear program threatens to undermine Chinese strategic, diplomatic, and economic gains—potentially quite severely. Consequently (and much to its evident displeasure) Beijing finds itself obligated to support the DPRK through ongoing annual aid transfers. And the "lips to teeth," "blood to blood" relationship forged with North Korean leadership during the Korean War has little resonance on Beijing today: in terms of both personnel and interests, that was a different North Korea—and a *very* different China. Although Chinese military and security circles may still harbor some loyalty to DPRK leadership, China's business interests are more likely to view the Kim Chong-il circle and its nuclear adventures with cold detachment—if not as an unalloyed liability to their interests.

For now China's leadership seems to have embraced a "muddle through" approach to the North Korean nuclear crisis—a path that permits the deferral of many important but difficult decisions, at least for a while. Given the contending considerations, decision-making centers, and policy objectives that animate the complex evolving polity that is contemporary China, we may expect Beijing's approach to the North Korean nuclear crisis to be constrained, cautious, and somewhat contradictory—or at least to be so until events force that posture to change. But we may also expect the Chinese approach to the nuclear crisis to be characterized by a bit of "better Washington should fail a bit" sentiment—sometimes even when the consequences of acting upon such sentiment seem to be inconsistent with China's own immediate goals.

The United States brings more force to bear in the North Korean nuclear drama than any other actor—and would likewise seem, at least on paper, to have most freedom to maneuver. These assets and advantages, however, require a strategy if they are to be utilized—and as remarkable though it may be, there is little reason today to believe the

[4] Indeed, the recently revived claim of Chinese suzerainty over "Koguryo," the ancient territory encompassing most of modern-day Korea, now echoing through Chinese cultural and academic circles, should be understood as immensely revealing of Chinese long-term attitudes toward the Korea question.

United States has developed any coherent and consistent strategy for dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis since September 11, 2001.

There is, to be sure, good reason to think that the September 11 attacks have profoundly altered America's international threat perception and security posture. In the ongoing global war on terror, the United States has demonstrated a newfound inclination to strike preemptively at clear and present dangers—and a willingness to do so unilaterally, or even in opposition to the sense of the international community, if need be.

A lower threshold for security response, nevertheless, cannot substitute for security strategy itself. While Washington has evidenced an unmistakable *attitude* toward Kim Chong-il and his nuclear designs (e.g., unfavorable), its envisioned *strategy* for dealing with North Korean troubles is rather less obvious.

Although the administration of George W. Bush has made clear its disdain for the conciliatory approach to Pyongyang taken by President Bill Clinton, it has offered very little indication of what should replace it. To date, the Bush administration's most proactive response to the North Korean nuclear crisis has been the creation of a multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for interdicting DPRK contraband abroad (an effort, it should be noted, that South Korea has declined to join).

Otherwise, the administration's record on North Korean affairs has a reactive, almost passive-aggressive mien: it has almost defiantly resisted pressure for bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang; affected an attitude of unconcern about North Korean threats to proceed with plutonium processing; conspicuously changed the Clinton administration terminology for North Korea from a "state of concern" to a member of an "axis of evil;" and announced the transfer and eventual redeployment of roughly one third of the current U.S. forces in South Korea over the coming years.

Although opprobrium may fall on the George W. Bush administration for this strategic lacuna, we would argue the failing is not specific to one White House alone—and thus by implication amenable to easy electoral correction. Whereas the previous administration did have a North Korea policy (actually, at least four of them[5]) none of them succeeded in reducing the real existing North Korean nuclear threat.[6] It is not self evident that a lack of strategy is inferior to a bad strategy. North Korean nuclear proliferation proved a thorny problem for successive U.S. administrations because there do not seem to be any low-cost solutions to it. We assume this reality will continue through the foreseeable future.

The DPRK, of course, is the actor at the very center of this drama. Accurately approximating Pyongyang's thinking about its nuclear weapons programs and their uses is therefore an issue upon which the entire utility of this exercise turns. Yet we must note that the DPRK remains a remarkably poorly understood state in the world beyond its borders: not least due to Pyongyang's own longstanding efforts to deprive the outside

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5 Nicholas EBERSTADT, "North Korea: Beyond Appeasement," in Robert W. KAGAN and William KRISTOL, eds., *Present Dangers: Danger and Opportunity in American Foreign Policy*, New York: Encounter Books, 2000.

6 The architects of the Clinton administration's policies toward North Korea, it should be noted, argue strongly to the contrary. See Madeline ALBRIGHT, *Madame Secretary*, New York: Miramax, 2003; Joel S. WIT, Daniel B. PONEMAN and Robert L. GALLUCCI, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

world of the information by which independent analysts could draw their own conclusions about that government's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions.

That being said, we can venture to describe the perimeters that bound Pyongyang's outlook on its own nuclear effort by mentioning some of the distinguishing facts that characterize this government's unique polity:

First: the North Korean system is unquestionably the most nearly successful attempt at complete totalitarian rule on the planet today.

Second, the North Korean system fuses a Stalinist administrative control structure to an Asian-style dynastic structure affirming hereditary succession, proclaiming the infallibility of the ruler through a suffocating cult of personality, and enforcing its survival and success internally through the most pervasive security control system yet known to man.

Third, the North Korean centrally planned economy is badly broken, and has been in a severe slump since the cessation of Soviet bloc aid and subsidized trade with the end of the Cold War, but North Korean leadership has resolutely refused to embrace potentially revitalizing economic reform measures on the explicit rationale that such "ideological and cultural infiltration" led to the downfall of Soviet and Eastern European socialism.[7]

Fourth, the DPRK operates as a hyper-militarized society and economy, champions a policy of "military first politics," and officially insists that military strength is the key to achieving national wealth.

Fifth, evidence suggests the North Korean government has been doggedly pursuing its nuclear weapons program for nearly four decades—since the mid-1960s—and that the program has a sufficiently high priority that it was funded even during the great North Korean famine of the mid-1990s, when hundreds of thousands of North Koreans perished because their government failed to allocate resources to emergency food relief.

Finally, although outsiders often discount such talk, the DPRK continues to proclaim that its highest goal is the reunification of the Korean nation under an "independent" state—and continues to denounce the South Korean system as a illegitimate police state under the thumb of "imperialist" (U.S.) forces.

Pyongyang's Nuclear Quest: A Permanent "Unstable Equilibrium" Scenario?

"Scenario building" requires us, at the outset, to take some measure of the dynamics of the phenomenon under consideration. For our purposes, the very first question to be considered should be: why can't the North Korean nuclear crisis go on forever?

[7] Some students of the DPRK economy argue that the new economic measures Pyongyang implemented in July 2002 may presage a conscious and deliberate movement toward significant and systemic economic reform. For cautiously optimistic assessments in this genre, see Marcus NOLAND, "West-Bound Train Leaving The Station: Pyongyang On The Reform Track," October 2002; Ruediger FRANK, "A Socialist Market Economy In North Korea? Systemic Restrictions and A Quantitative Analysis," unpublished paper, Columbia University, 2003, and Ruediger FRANK, "North Korea: 'Gigantic Chance' and a Systemic Change," *NAPSNET Policy Forum Online PFO 3–31*, May 9, 2003. Others, however, offer a more skeptical interpretation of the portent of recent economic changes in North Korea; see, for example, Nicholas EBERSTADT, "The Persistence of North Korea", *Policy Review*, November/December 2004.

While Pyongyang's current nuclear drama may be heavily freighted with potentially far-reaching strategic consequence for Northeast Asia, the greater Asian-Pacific region (or even, as some would argue, for the entire world stage), and while the DPRK has been notorious since at least June 1950 (i.e., its launch of the Korean War) for its heavy reliance on strategic deception in defense and foreign policy, it would be difficult for any observer to maintain that the North Korean nuclear crisis bears any of the defining characteristics of a classic "strategic surprise."

Quite the contrary: The DPRK's quest to acquire nuclear weaponry, and the confrontations with the international community that have arisen in the course of that quest, are not exactly "breaking news." International claxons have been sounding over the North Korean nuclear program for well over a decade—since at least March 1993, when Kim Chong-il first announced the intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and mobilized the military into a declared "semi-state of war" to underscore the seriousness of the announcement. And international nuclear negotiations with North Korea have been under way for nearly a decade and a half—since Seoul's Nordpolitik-inspired 1990 premier-level talks with Pyongyang that culminated in the year-end 1991 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Looking back at this continuing spectacle from the vantage point of late June 2004—after the third and most recent round of Six Party Talks between China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and the DPRK that was convened to negotiate a "breakthrough" to the DPRK nuclear impasse—one may be struck less by the sudden shocks in the unfolding saga than by its almost plodding continuities. To be sure: The saga has included moments of unexpected revelations and distinctly unpleasant shocks for most of the state actors involved in the tale. More than once it has looked as if the North Korean nuclear crisis would escalate into a military confrontation—presaging the possibility of strategic discontinuities of the first order in the immediate region, and beyond. And yet, as of this writing, North Korea's prolonged dispute with the outside world over the DPRK quest for nuclear options can be seen as marked a sort of regularity—almost a predictability—and characterized by some gradual but unmistakable structural trends.

Over the course of roughly a decade and a half of intermittent negotiations and bared-fang face-offs, the DPRK has, slowly but systematically: (1) unburdened itself of all international treaty and diplomatic commitments that might restrain its emergence as a declared nuclear state; (2) developed multiple and thus redundant programs for the production of fissile material (irrespective of any formal obligations to the contrary); (3) pressed those programs forward for the continuing secret accumulation of weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium; and, (4) not least important, succeeded in enmeshing all the state actors in the region in a negotiating process that to date established a de facto exchange of foreign economic resources for a slowdown, or suspension, of the DPRK nuclear effort (but not the elimination of the program itself).

The relative steadiness of these trends in DPRK nuclear proliferation are all the more noteworthy when one considers the changes in the international environment that North Korean leadership faced over these years. The North Korean nuclear crisis has thus far played out on the watch of three different presidents of the United States and four separate presidents of the Republic of Korea. Those administrations exhibited strikingly varied dispositions toward the North Korean state, and an almost experimental diversity of attitudes for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. And the

fact that North Korea's greatest nuclear advances to date have occurred under the aegis of the George W. Bush administration—arguably the U.S. government most explicitly hostile to Pyongyang's international policies and purposes of any yet elected—should underscore the fact that North Korea's achievements in this ongoing "crisis" have not been adventitious.

To this writing, in other words, it is possible to argue that the North Korean nuclear crisis has actually been a continuing, but highly delicate, balance—"an unstable equilibrium" whose primary operational condition (and perhaps also whose necessary first condition) has been the progressive expansion of DPRK room for nuclear maneuver. If this is indeed the case, why couldn't this unstable equilibrium continue for another 15—or for that matter, another 50—years?

We cannot dismiss the proposition the North Korean nuclear drama may continue, in fits and starts, more or less along the by now familiar trajectory for some time to come—perhaps even for years into the future. What seems entirely implausible, however, is to imagine that modus operandi as a final outcome in and of itself, rather than a transitional phase on the way to an endgame or outcome.

There are a number of general factors that could decisively unsettle the existing unstable equilibrium demonstrated in the overall process, and thereby move the North Korean nuclear crisis into a new and qualitatively different phase:

- One would be a dramatic internal change within the North Korean system—a shift that altered the state's objectives, or cohesion, or both. A non-exhaustive list of such variants would include the sudden unexpected death of "Dear Leader" Kim Chong-il; a coup or putsch that transferred power out of the hands of the Kim dynasty; an open power struggle among different elements of North Korea's leadership, including military leadership; a breakdown in the authority of the leadership over portions of the government or regions of the nation; or full-fledged state disintegration or collapse.

- Another would be reactions or interventions by outside actors, prompted directly by the changing circumstances of the ongoing DPRK nuclear drama. Here the most likely potential actors would be the five neighboring states already involved in nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang—Washington, Beijing, Seoul, Tôkyô, and Moscow—although one cannot rule out the possibility that other governments (such as the European Union) or nonstate actors (the International Atomic Energy Agency, World Bank, UN Security Council) might be in the forefront of action. Two completely different "paths" of reactions/interventions could be envisioned for ending the North Korean nuclear crisis, as we have known it to date. The first path might be described as "successful appeasement diplomacy:" it would entail the offering of incentives and benefits to Pyongyang in return for a voluntary, credible, and sustained denuclearization. The other path could be seen as "successful coercive diplomacy:" this one would entail penalties and pressures—including possibly military pressures—that would eliminate the DPRK's nuclear options, with or without Pyongyang's acquiescence.

- Still another factor that could move the North Korean nuclear crisis into a fundamentally new phase would be Pyongyang's own tightly embraced nuclear security strategy. Presumably North Korea's costly, defiant, and unrelenting effort to acquire

> nuclear weapons has been informed by something more profound than the perceived ornamental value of these devices. A credible nuclear option alters the realm of the possible in a government’s relations with other states—and an increasingly credible nuclear option extends those boundaries progressively. With a gradual accumulation of nuclear assets, the North Korean government might be emboldened to press for preexisting international and peninsular objectives with less restraint and more abandon. It is also possible to imagine that once some particular notional threshold of nuclear arsenal holdings is achieved, the North Korean government would no longer perceive itself as being deterred by the deterrence policies of the United States and her allies—inviting a new set of gambles that could set in motion major changes in the security terrain of Northeast Asia.

The factors identified above are by no means an all-inclusive itemization of phenomena that might propel the North Korean nuclear drama into a new phase (although these adduced examples arguably illustrate some of the most plausible ways in which the semi-stability of the ongoing nuclear crisis might be derailed). They should, however, underscore the fact that the DPRK nuclear crisis cannot be viewed as an indefinite, self-perpetuating status quo—not least because the gathering weight of events generated by that crisis ineluctably tends to undermine the very dynamics that have made for semi-stability and semi-permanence on this ongoing drama. The North Korean nuclear crisis, in other words, is better understood as a process than as an outcome. In the following pages, we will consider some of the outcomes the process could presage.

A Negotiated Settlement to the Nuclear Crisis?

If the status quo does not continue indefinitely, unquestionably the most desirable family of scenarios, from the standpoint of Pyongyang’s Six Party interlocutors, would be a negotiation process that resulted in a credible permanent dismantling of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, perhaps in exchange for financial, diplomatic, or security incentives.

Variants of this family of scenarios would entail a bargaining process with one or more of North Korea’s neighbors (with the United States as the indispensable partner on the other side of the table), and Pyongyang trading pledges for a verifiable opening, shutdown, and ultimate scrapping of the diverse components of its nuclear development portfolio in return for some—or perhaps all—of the following: (1) direct financial aid (including possibly trade credits) from some or all of North Korea’s neighbors, and maybe other bilateral aid as well (e.g., the EU); (2) entry into and grants or concessional loans from such international financial institutions as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund; (3) aid-supported infrastructure development projects for the DPRK in such illustrative sectors as power, transport, and mining; (4) normalization of diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Washington (and perhaps Tôkyô); and (5) some variant of a security assurance for Pyongyang from the United States and its allies.

An even more expansive scenario could envision a comprehensive settlement of other security problems posed by North Korea in one grand bargain. Other items that

might be included here would be Pyongyang's other programs for weapons of mass destruction, or WMD (biological, chemical, ballistic missile); pullback and build-down of the enormous forward-deployed North Korean People's Army; a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War; and diplomatic cross-recognition by the DPRK and the ROK.[8] The allaying of these additional Western security concerns would presumably be exchanged for additional international concessions—security, financial, or diplomatic.

Although the distribution of costs and benefits among North Korea's five neighbors would of course depend upon the particulars of the deals envisioned, the family of negotiated settlement scenarios is one in which all of Pyongyang's Northeast Asian neighbors "win." That is to say, for all the countries in the region, the security environment becomes immediately less risk, and the business environment becomes immediately more attractive.

Major projects to integrate the regional and global economy—such as the oft-discussed Korean spur to the Trans-Siberian Railway or possible energy pipelines linking Russia, Korea, and Japan—suddenly would become commercially viable, with potentially enormous positive spillover effects. Credible North Korean denuclearization would also presumably result in a peace dividend due to lower defense expenditures on defense sufficiency criteria. From a financial standpoint, even if the payoff to Pyongyang were astronomical—in the tens of billions of dollars (more than the estimated annual output of the DPRK)—the "deal" could easily pay for itself.

To be sure, there are a number of more complicated longer-term issues that emerge from this family of scenarios. For one thing, a buyout of an inveterate and defiant proliferator would surely make the task of enforcing nuclear nonproliferation in other regions more problematic: Given America's global role and responsibilities, that cost would fall most heavily on Washington. A North Korean nuclear settlement would, similarly, cast a spotlight on Japan's theater missile defense program: Chinese authorities might well inquire whether Tôkyô was continuing with the program despite the end of the North Korean nuclear threat—and if so, why? And of course the resolution of the North Korean nuclear threat—a problem of common (but not identical) concern to Beijing and Washington—would necessarily bring the U.S.-China strategic competition for influence in the Korean Peninsula into sharper and more immediate relief, begging in particular the question of the viability of the U.S.-ROK military alliance.

All of these subsidiary consequences of the best-case family of outcomes deserve much more consideration than they have been accorded to date. Yet when all is said and done, a negotiated final settlement to the North Korean nuclear crisis improves the immediate- and medium-term security environment for all of the DPRK's neighbors, almost irrespective of the price exacted for the deal.

This may help to explain why a negotiated solution to the nuclear drama looks so attractive to the five states that have coaxed Pyongyang into the Six Party Talks. The problem with the scenario, however, is not the appeal of a win-win formula for Moscow, Tôkyô, Seoul, Beijing, and Washington, but rather the hardly trivial question of why the real existing North Korean government should ever agree to a full, credible, and permanent end to its longstanding quest to become a nuclear power. Although a

[8] Many but not all of these additional components were imagined as elements of an overall security resolution for the Korean Peninsula in schemas advanced by the South Korean and U.S. governments in the late 1990s, under the sunshine policy and the "Perry process," named after then Secretary of Defense William Perry.

genuine nuclear settlement may be in the interest of all of North Korea's neighbors, the calculus may look rather different from Pyongyang's vantage point.

Western-schooled diplomatists and game-theory seminarians, for beginners, posit the desirability of win-win solutions. Yet it is by no means obvious that North Korea's leadership regards win-win solutions as superior to "win-lose" solutions. Quite the contrary: the DPRK's penchant for "we win while you lose" outcomes is long evident in a variety of forums—not the least of these being international business negotiations, where North Korean bargainers have long behaved as if leaving a single penny of profit on the table for the other side is a mark of shame against their nation.[9]

Beyond Pyongyang's evident distaste for win-win bargaining, there is the pregnant question of why Pyongyang should ever consider an outcome that deprives its leadership of nuclear weapon capabilities and the attendant options of nuclear diplomacy as a "win," no matter what the price exacted in exchange.

Nuclear weapons are a great equalizer in international relations—a point the North Korean leadership has surely learned from first-hand experience during its past decade and more of nuclear negotiations with the Great Powers that surround it. If the DPRK did not have nuclear weapons (or the potential to acquire them), the country's international importance would more closely conform to its economic significance—hardly an appetizing proposition for North Korea's rulers. Forswearing nuclear weapons, furthermore, would be tantamount to relinquishing Pyongyang's last material instrument for effecting a Korean unification on its own terms; voluntarily surrendering the goal of "independent Korean reunification" might not only seem despicable to North Korea's leadership, but positively subversive of its own domestic authority. Trading away the nuclear option, to make matters worse, would be to raise the specter of financing the DPRK's international accounts on the basis of ordinary commercial intercourse instead of international military extortion—and since Pyongyang appears to view globalization as fundamentally destabilizing to the regime, such a transaction would, according North Korean doctrine, verge on the suicidal.

For these many reasons, the family of scenarios involving a peaceful and voluntary negotiated settlement to the North Korean nuclear crisis—despite the seeming logic and allure of such an outcome—must also be seen as basically implausible. The trouble is that international negotiations must engage the real existing Pyongyang leadership—not a dreamworld North Korean government imagined into existence for our own comfort and convenience. Unless and until there is a change of government in Pyongyang, the family of negotiated solution scenarios must be treated as fantastically remote endgames for the North Korean nuclear crisis.

The family of negotiated settlement scenarios highlights a particularly important aspect of the current North Korean nuclear crisis. Without overstating the case, it would appear that none of the governments negotiating with North Korea today have developed a fallback strategy in the event that they are unable to reach a peaceful settlement with Pyongyang. North Korea, on the other hand, may be the only government in the nuclear drama with a coherent strategy—and part of that strategy may be to make negotiations for voluntary and peaceful denuclearization fail.

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[9] While contemporary Western sensibilities are unfamiliar and uncomfortable with "win-lose" negotiations, there is nothing intrinsically irrational or unethical in that posture: indeed, if one regards one's adversaries as dangerous and evil, it might be foolish, or even immoral, to insist on anything other than "win-lose" outcomes!

This is a striking and portentous asymmetry—and one that confers surprising advantage upon the DPRK, a state that one would ordinarily expect to find severely hobbled by its own myriad shortcomings in any international contest.

Some Alternative Scenarios for the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

If the status quo is unlikely to continue indefinitely and a peaceful voluntary negotiated settlement is even less plausible, we may consider some alternative scenarios for possible futures. Without at all presuming to be comprehensive, we can illustrate a range of alternative outcomes by concentrating upon four kinds of scenarios:

1) DPRK "virtual nuclear breakout;"
2) Full-fledged nuclear ballistic "breakout;"
3) North Korean internal regime collapse;
4) DPRK nuclear diplomacy leading to military conflict with one or more neighbor.

While recognizing that these four families of scenarios are not entirely distinct and independent from one another—alternative (1), for example, could progress on to alternative (2), and then to alternatives (3) or (4)—there is some merit in considering each separately.

Virtual Nuclear Breakout

In this family of scenarios, North Korea agrees to episodic discussions or negotiation sessions with its Northeast Asian neighbors and perhaps other actors, but it continues to reprocess plutonium and to process highly enriched uranium, and while adopting a "neither confirm nor deny" line on its nuclear capabilities, increasingly assumes the stance of a state that can utilize nuclear diplomacy—and even issue nuclear ultimatums.

Many variations of this general scenario could be envisioned. To spin out just one:

> The North Korean government, after several more rounds of inconclusive and contentious Six Party Talks, declares that the talks are failing because Washington wants them to fail—and Washington wants them to fail because it is has its own hidden agenda, a preemptive strike against the DPRK. Pyongyang warns that it has been working feverishly on its own "peace deterrent" to protect Koreans—North and South—precisely against these sorts of reckless machinations—and reminds audiences in South Korea and Japan that no spot used as a staging base by the United States in its aggressive adventures will go unspared from the resulting devastation. Pyongyang further identifies a number of particular U.S. air and C4I units in South Korea as the designated instruments of the planned U.S. surprise attack, and warns that unless these are removed and returned to the United States, it will be forced to take all necessary measures for the nation's self-defense. Being peace-loving and patient, Pyongyang explains, it will give Wash-

> ington a chance to agree to remove the offending units on its own—but if the DPRK does not receive a positive response, it will have to underscore the gravity of this “American-manufactured crisis” through “a demonstration of the fearsome defensive power of our people’s forces.”

This family of scenarios, we should note, comports closely with the “unstable equilibrium” already described above—while this set of alternative futures looks more like transitional stages than like stable outcomes, it is useful to explore nonetheless.

From this family of scenarios, the overarching outcome (that is to say, the most important tendency emerging virtually irrespective of particular scenario variants) is the corrosive strain inflicted on the U.S.-ROK military alliance by a North Korean posture of aggressive nuclear ambiguity. In the face of a gradually accumulating DPRK nuclear capability and an escalating North Korean campaign of implied nuclear menace—but absent any concrete proof of hostile intent toward the South through acts of violence or aggression—a South Korean populace already deeply divided over the question of whether Pyongyang truly presents a security threat will be impelled to focus on the shortcomings of the security relationship with the United States—and in particular, on the asymmetries in that relationship that may seem to expose South Korea to disproportionate risks from forces beyond the ROK’s control (i.e., the U.S.-DPRK standoff). A prolonged and intensified war of nerves over the DPRK nuclear program, in short, could plausibly be expected to degrade public support in South Korea for the Mutual Defense Treaty and the U.S. forces in Korea still further. Indeed, although this may not necessarily be the most likely outcome, it is by no means implausible to think of an alternative future in which the North Korean nuclear crisis serves as a driver for the dissolution of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance.

The response in Japan, on the other hand, is likely to be quite different. With a mounting North Korean nuclear threat and a fraying U.S.-ROK alliance, “hedging” becomes a national security tactic of increasingly dubious utility. Virtual nuclear breakout, instead, could plausibly be envisioned under any number of subsidiary scenarios to press Tôkyô and Washington closer together—to mold the relationship into something more genuinely resembling an alliance—while at the same time encouraging an evolution in Japan’s own defense and security policy in the direction of greater capabilities and fewer unique self-imposed post-World War II constraints. We can imagine that the Japanese government’s, and the Japanese public’s, attention to cultivating the U.S.-Japan security partnership and augmenting the nation’s own defense efforts would be affected by the country’s North Korea threat perception—but it could be affected independently, and perhaps even more acutely, by a severe downturn in the state of the U.S.-ROK military alliance.

Moscow and Beijing’s roles in this family of scenarios are less central to the main action, and—at least in the case of China—possibly more ambiguous. Under the thrall of multipolarity, the Russian Federation might be plausibly expected to affect an air of detachment to a DPRK virtual nuclear breakout: for this not-entirely-disinterested bystander, a weakening of the U.S.-ROK relationship and a “harmless” ratcheting up of North Korean nuclear tensions might be reckoned to present more opportunities than drawbacks. For China, the calculus may be more complex. It is easy enough to see Beijing’s appreciation of a scenario where the U.S.-ROK military relationship came under mounting stress from nonviolent DPRK nuclear diplomacy: China’s immediate

influence as a crisis broker would almost necessarily increase, and its prospects for enhanced longer-term authority in the Korean Peninsula might also be strengthened.

An outright rupture of the U.S.-ROK military alliance, by contrast, could present Beijing with some surprisingly unattractive options and choices. Absent the U.S.-ROK military alliance, China would be almost impelled to shoulder a much heavier and more conspicuous obligation with respect to restraining and deterring North Korean adventurism—forcing China toward a more formal opposition to Pyongyang's external policies and sharply reducing Beijing's room for maneuver on the Korean Peninsula. A breakdown in the U.S.-ROK military alliance—especially a sudden breakdown—would likely have pronounced adverse economic reverberations throughout the Northeast Asia region; it is hard to imagine how China would manage to avoid the consequence of such shocks. From Beijing's standpoint, a North Korean war of nuclear nerves that enervates the U.S.-ROK alliances may be desirable, and would require no countermanding Chinese initiatives; but a crisis that threatens to destroy that alliance might argue for remediating Chinese initiatives.

For Pyongyang, finally, the virtual nuclear breakout scenario would seem to offer the prospect of relatively high rewards for relatively low risks. For the DPRK, in other words, the path to virtual nuclear breakout looks relatively attractive—a fact that may help to explain why North Korea to date has evidently embraced a game plan consistent with this family of scenarios.

Full-Fledged North Korean Nuclear Breakout

In this family of scenarios, the driving event is an unambiguous North Korean demonstration of its nuclear capabilities—for example, the underground detonation of a nuclear device. The context of the nuclear test would also seem to be important to outcomes from this family of scenarios: that is to say, whether the explosion occurred at a moment of heightened peninsular tensions or in a period of relative calm; whether the DPRK issued declaratory threats after the detonation, or simply let outside observers uncover the event and parse its implications; whether Sino-U.S. relations were relatively cooperative or relatively disputatious; and so on.

Unlike the virtual nuclear breakout family of scenarios, plausible scenarios for a full-fledged North Korean nuclear breakout would not appear to be closely bounded. To the contrary, the set of plausibly written alternative futures triggered by this driving event would appear extremely wide, and indeed wholly discontinuous. On the one hand, a storyline could be written whereby a North Korean nuclear test is followed by rancorous and recriminatory U.S. deliberations with other members of the Six Party Talks, and sets in motion a cascade of events (entailing both diplomatic interactions and local political manifestations) that bring the U.S.-ROK alliance to an end. On the other, a plausible scenario could also be devised in which a North Korean nuclear test catalyzes North Korea's neighbors into cooperatively embracing a policy of containment and isolation toward North Korea, with denuclearization or regime change in North Korea set as the policy's objectives.

The sharply divergent outcomes that might be envisioned under this family of scenarios reflect the wide range of plausible responses for three of the crucial actors in the drama: Seoul, Beijing, and Washington:

(1) Although the ROK has been wedded to what amounts to an appeasement policy toward Pyongyang since 1998, South Korean public sentiment about this policy is deeply divided—and a shocking unilateral display of menacing North Korean behavior could, under certain conditions, decisively discredit both the sunshine approach and the political leadership that championed it.

(2) Beijing, for its part, could be envisioned acquiescing in and accommodating to the advent of a nuclear North Korea (ending today's muddling-through approach to the North Korean nuclear drama in denouement), or, alternatively, reacting sharply and forcefully to contain the damage of this hazardous new development on the Chinese border. In this group of scenarios, three considerations for Beijing could weigh strongly toward the latter: (a) the degree to which a North Korean nuclear event is perceived as a failure for Chinese policy and a setback to Chinese regional credibility; (b) the degree to which a North Korean nuclear test, and other states' responses to it, are perceived as degrading China's own security environment; and (c) the magnitude of the anticipated financial costs that the Chinese economy would suffer due to regional and international anxieties over the breakout.

(3) As for Washington, while the most likely response to a North Korean nuclear test might seem to be a revitalization of what is now a largely dormant North Korea policy, it is also possible to imagine scenarios where the U.S. response is minimal—or is widely judged to be inadequate. (In such scenarios the United States might be preoccupied by other threats or problems in its ongoing global war on terrorism—or alternatively, it might actually be deterred by North Korea's "peace deterrent.") But by raising questions about the value of America's security commitment, an inadequate U.S. response to North Korean nuclear breakout would place the U.S.-ROK military alliance under tremendous—perhaps unbearable—pressure, and might have insidious consequences for the U.S. alliance with Japan as well.

From North Korea's standpoint, the breakout scenario could lead to great strategic returns (including a seriously weakened U.S. presence in Northeast Asia and a more vulnerable and tractable South Korea), but it could also result in a vastly more menacing constellation within its neighborhood, with none of the five neighboring states willing to support the regime and several newly committed to the regime's demise. Although a decision to "go nuclear" would pose serious difficulties to all of North Korea's neighbors, the high risk/high reward nature of that gamble suggests that it might be a difficult choice for the DPRK regime as well. Unless the regime were quite confident that it would face little chance of adverse reactions from Seoul, Beijing *and* Washington, opting for "breakout" over "virtual breakout" would look to be a strategic miscalculation.

DPRK Internal Regime Collapse

In this family of scenarios, currently existing but significantly intensified tensions and contradictions within the DPRK itself would bring the North Korean system to a breaking point, where the Kim Chong-il regime was no longer in control of the territory of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Here the driver is regime disintegration—some permutations of which have already been described above.

For obvious reasons, the outcomes in this family of scenarios comport closely with alternative futures other analysts have sketched out in thinking out Korean

unification.[10] (With North Korean regime collapse, indeed, most storylines end with an absorption of northern Korea by the ROK and an eventual Korean reunification: the variations here many involve just how violent, turbulent, and costly the path from collapse to unification turns out to be.) In all of these scenarios, however, end of the North Korean state means the end of the North Korean nuclear crisis, insofar as the presumptive legatee, the Republic of Korea, is a committed signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and has publicly forsworn the possibility of developing nuclear weapons.

The specifics of the regime collapse storyline, furthermore, could presage a multiplicity of plausible post-DPRK security environments in Northeast Asia. Very different sorts of outcomes, for example, would be envisioned for a North Korean regime collapse where the United States and China worked closely together to minimize attendant regional security risks—or where instead friction and mutual mistrust seriously limited the scope of coordinated Sino-U.S. cooperation. Analogously, the post-DPRK security environment in Northeast Asia could be starkly colored by (1) the extent to which North Korean regime collapse involves a military conflict among warring Korean Peoples' Army (KPA) factions; (2) the extent of spillover from such fighting into neighboring countries; (3) the level of military force (and military losses) that North Korea's neighbors were obliged to sustain to restore calm in northern Korea, and (4) the question of whether elements in the collapsing North Korean regime threatened the use of nuclear weapons—or actually attempted the use of nuclear weaponry—during the endgame.

Depending upon the answers to these particulars, the security and development architecture for a post-DPRK Korean Peninsula could look surprisingly promising—or it could seem dangerously bleak.

Under the most auspicious of circumstances, we might envision a North Korean state collapse that involved little in the way of organized violence; that was met by a swift and deliberate peacekeeping response by the United States and its Northeast Asian allies in consultation with China; that demobilized KPA military forces in an orderly manner and fully accounted for the erstwhile DPRK's nuclear assets; that set in motion the legal and administrative process under which northern Korea would join the Republic of Korea under Articles 2 and 3 of the ROK constitution; that maintained and strengthened the U.S.-ROK-Japan political-military alliance; and that prepared the way for market-oriented economic reconstruction of the northern part of Korea. Such a scenario would replicate—as closely as might be imagined under contemporary Northeast Asian conditions—the remarkably successful reunification of divided Germany in 1989–90.

But many less happy, more complicated and no less plausible alternative futures can also be devised within this basic schema. To offer just one:

> Kim Chong-il's sudden and unexpected death leads to a power struggle within the regime, with key figures in the military and the security services unwilling to submit to the court-in-waiting that will govern for only-partly-groomed heir-apparent Kim Jong Chul. The struggle cannot be resolved politically within the confines of Pyongyang, and within a week devolves into a military contest

[10] See, for example, Jonathan D. POLLACK and Chung Min LEE, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999, ch 4.

between Kim dynasty loyalists and the rebels over battlefields within North Korea. As this fast-moving spectacle unfolds, North Korea’s neighbors nervously watch but carefully avoid any actions that might be interpreted as intervention in Pyongyang, inviting some retaliatory response by the vestiges of the KPA command. China, however, quickly mobilizes a major military cordon sanitaire contingent along the Yalu without informing the United States, its allies, or Russia. In a fateful incident whose actual events historians are still trying to reconstruct, warring KPA units in Chagang province seem to have accidentally launched a barrage that hit a Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army unit, resulting in numerous deaths. China responds by returning fire; soon Chinese forces have begun to enter North Korea. Beijing announces that it has entered North Korea to protect Chinese citizens from the intolerable dangers the North Korean situation now poses and to restore order in the DPRK. The Chinese government also lets it be known that it has informed both sides in the North Korean civil war that any nonconventional assault on China’s peacekeeping operation will be met by a more massive response of the same nature. As Chinese forces move into North Korea and toward Pyongyang, confusion and chaos within northern Korea spread; transportation routes are clogged with migrants and refugees. Fearing total loss of control of their state, both sides in the civil war warn Washington, Seoul, and Tôkyô that a Western incursion will invite a nuclear response. The nuclear threat triggers an emergency conference between top leaders in the three countries; they agree the situation has become too dangerous to wait any longer. U.S. airpower is launched to suppress forward-deployed KPA artillery and SCUD missile positions; other strikes incapacitate the DPRK’s known Nodong and Taepodong missile sites. With U.S. assistance, ROK army units leapfrog to Pyongyang, which is secured after some bitter fighting. Seoul is hit by conventional artillery, causing mass casualties. A U.S. base in Japan and a Japanese city are also hit by nonnuclear Nodong missiles, causing little damage, but creating temporary mass panic. At the end of the month, ROK and U.S. forces (with Japanese overseas support) have secured approximately two-thirds of northern Korea; Chinese forces occupy another fifth, with the remainder still a sort of no man’s land. U.S.-ROK intelligence believes the DPRK may have as many as a dozen nuclear devices and half a dozen surreptitious nuclear facilities; they have, however, come into possession of just two of the former and three of the latter. The Kim family and court have fled to China, where they have been accorded the perquisites of a state-in-exile. The United States, ROK, and Japan have adopted the position that the DPRK is no longer a government, and that all northern Korea is legally the dominion of the Republic of Korea. China however insists that the DPRK is still a sovereign state, and that international law impels recognition of Kim Cong-chul as its leader. Moscow helpfully suggests that the matter should be decided by the United Nations. From Rome, the World Food Program announces that North Korea is on the verge of another mass famine.

Military Conflict between DPRK and Neighbors Due to DPRK Nuclear Diplomacy

As we have just argued, one possible outcome of a North Korean collapse scenario could be a military conflict in the Korean Peninsula. This should underscore the simple fact that a military conflict in and around Korea might be directly precipitated by

progressive escalations in Pyongyang's nuclear diplomacy, but there are other plausible paths that lead to armed conflict in and around North Korea as well. Nevertheless, a military conflict triggered by North Korean nuclear brinkmanship constitutes a nightmare scenario for all of Pyongyang's Northeast Asian neighbors. It is well then to consider some of the implications that emerge from this set of nightmares.

A veritable panoply of distinctive permutations could be developed within this family of scenarios, depending upon context (e.g., the way in which hostilities erupt and the state actors become embroiled). Many of these diverse contingencies, however, might be more appropriately drawn out through war games than the present exercise, since their lessons and insights may be more relevant to military tactics and doctrine than to geostrategy.

Two renditions from this large family of scenarios, nonetheless, may be used here to illustrate some of the alternative futures for the North Korean nuclear drama that may be worthy of further contemplation.

A) *A U.S. Preemptive Strike*. Is U.S. preemptive military action a plausible alternative future for the North Korean nuclear crisis? Let us try to devise one:

> In this variant, the U.S. government gathers what is judged to be highly reliable intelligence that Pyongyang has secretly agreed to sell components of a small nuclear device to an international terrorist organization. (The reported deal follows another round of acrimonious nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang—this one terminated by dark comments from Pyongyang's representative about the DPRK's "sovereign right" to continue nuclear development and the dire consequences for "imperialist forces" if the war blockade against North Korea should continue.) The intelligence reports that the plutonium core of the device will be loaded into a particular vessel docked in Nampo harbor within 24 hours.
>
> The U.S.-ROK military alliance is under strain, and political relations between the two capitals are marked by mutual frustration and mistrust. In Washington highly placed officials are confident that Seoul and Tôkyô do not yet have access to this time-sensitive intelligence, and they deliberate the pros and cons of sharing it. A heated argument ensues, in which a forceful case is made for not sharing the information with the allies—in particular Seoul. The unilateralist line carries the day: The talking points being that America must not let the opportunity to "cancel" the sale slip away; that the Blue House will try to veto the operation; and that in any case the South Korean national security team cannot be trusted to keep this information confidential since their group is riddled by North Korean sympathizers. U.S. leadership decides to launch a preemptive strike on Nampo, destroying the targeted vessel and neutralizing the transport facilities from the harbor. When the operation has commenced—minutes before the attack—the U.S. president telephones the ROK president and the Japanese prime minister to inform them of the operation. The vessel is destroyed, as is Nampo harbor. North Korea retaliates with a devastating artillery barrage on Seoul and a missile attack on U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan. A general war on the Korean Peninsula ensues, despite U.S.-ROK military superiority; casualties (civilian and military) are massive. At the end of the conflict, the KPA has been defeated; North Korea is completely occupied by ROK forces; and the all elements of the North Korean nuclear program have been identified and neutral-

> ized. Subsequent information indicates that the U.S. intelligence about the nuclear sale and transfer to the terrorist group via the vessel at Nampo was accurate in every respect.

Chilling, perhaps—but is it plausible? Although the scenario is framed in a manner seemingly favorable to a preemptive U.S. action ("red line" proliferation, accurate intelligence on the transaction, time sensitivity), the scenario itself glides over some of the thorniest issues that would arise from a unilateral U.S. strike against North Korea: namely, the consequences for America's relations with its Northeast Asian allies and the rest of the international community. A U.S. attack against North Korea, undertaken without the knowledge or consent of the South Korean government, would very plausibly signal the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance—and the same could be imagined for the U.S.-Japan alliance as well. Among the myriad casualties for cosmopolitan Seoul in this scenario, moreover, would be untold numbers of civilians from China, Russia, the European Union, Australia, Canada—and the United States.

Even if Beijing and Moscow regarded the U.S. strike as casus belli, the diplomatic fallout from the devastation could be unlike anything the United States had previously faced: the possibility that America could be a pariah state at the end of this adventure does not look entirely fanciful. None of this is to suggest that U.S. preemptive action in the North Korean nuclear drama should be regarded as entirely unthinkable; it is instead to emphasize the extraordinarily grave costs that would be expected from unilateral preemptive U.S. action.

B) *A Preemptive North Korean Strike.* Half a century of U.S. military policy in the Korean Peninsula has been devoted to deterring North Korea from military action—but is it possible that the North Korean nuclear drama will afford Pyongyang an option for deterring Washington? Herewith a script for just such a scenario:

> Some time in the relatively near future, Pyongyang calculates that the United States will no longer be capable of retaliating against a show of KPA force against the U.S.-ROK alliance. The DPRK has amassed an arsenal of two dozen nuclear weapons and several hundred Nodongs capable of hitting any U.S. base in Northeast Asia; Pyongyang has also tested an experimental Taepodong theoretically capable of reaching the continental United States. U.S. intelligence has an accurate assessment of these capabilities. The U.S.-ROK relationship, meanwhile, continues to hit new lows. A public opinion poll in South Korean reports that 70% of voting age citizens and 85% of college students see the president of the United States as a greater threat than Kim Chong-il to South Korean international security. Mistrust and tension seem evident at all levels of the official U.S.-ROK relationship, and now is even apparent in some aspects of U.S.-ROK military interoperation. Late one hot August night, huge explosions resound from the DPRK's Yongbyon nuclear facility. Almost immediately thereafter, North Korean media go into emergency broadcast mode, declaring that Yongbyon has been hit by a U.S. attack. Just minutes after the announcement, a salvo of several hundred artillery shells lands on and around the U.S. 8th Army Yongsan Garrison in the heart of Seoul. Within fifteen minutes of the Yongbyon explosions, a statement from North Korean leadership is broadcast through all North Korean media: Imperialist aggressors have struck our Yongbyon nuclear complex—and we have

> in response destroyed the imperialist headquarters that authored the aggression. The nation is now mobilized against the imminent imperialist invasion—and we will meet the aggressors' attacks blow for blow. The enemy should know it has no rear area that is safe from the North Korean People's Army. Panic sweeps South Korea. As the confusion subsides at UNC/CFC headquarters, the facts of the situation become clear: DPRK has staged its own explosions at Yongbyon; the "retaliatory" DPRK artillery barrages were tightly trained on Yongsan, causing serious damage to the base, but relatively little in surrounding civilian areas. Almost all of the casualties from the salvo are Americans or South Koreans in the employ of the U.S. military. North Korea's KPA stands at full war mobilization but does not initiate any additional engagements. U.S. forces are ordered to hold fire pending further orders from the commander in chief. In South Korea rumors are sweeping the media that the Yongbyon explosions were the first phase of a secret U.S. preemptive "regime change" operation against North Korea; some internet reports assert that Washington's secret plan has discounted a possible North Korean nuclear strike on Seoul as an acceptable risk for the plan. The Blue House remains in constant communication with the White House, and remains in steady contact with other capitals as well; the ROK National Assembly goes into emergency session with steady closed-door briefings and updates. As the day progresses, the ROK president delivers a brief nationally televised speech in which he categorically assures the country that there is not a shred of evidence to that the Yongbyon incident was a U.S. strike—but rather, that every bit of evidence about this catastrophic tragedy leads to Pyongyang's own door. Twenty-four hours after the assault on Yongsan, both South Korean and international public opinion is moving toward a recognition of the true facts of the case; many international leaders, including the governments of China and Russia, are denouncing DPRK for its deceptive surprise attack. But U.S., ROK and Japanese leaders are faced with a dilemma: how to respond? A military reprisal against the DPRK might well lead to escalation—and at every level of potential surgical reprisal, the KPA command is capable of an equivalent, or more punishing, counterattack. The U.S.-allied response could easily lead to a general war on the peninsula—and though the United States and its allies are likely to prevail in relatively short order, the collateral (mainly Korean) causalities from the onslaught would be horrific. U.S. decision-makers also have to bear in mind the expected U.S. homeland casualties from a nuclear-tipped Taepo Dong missile, aimed for a major West Coast metropolitan area (after discounting the odds that missile defense systems will intercept it before impact). Failure to respond, on the other hand, would expose the utter hollowness of the U.S. security guarantee to South Korea (and Japan)—and would indicate without ambiguity that North Korea had indeed totally deterred the United States and its Asian allies from reacting to an incident of indefensible aggression. From then on, the credibility of the alliance would be fundamentally shattered; a U.S. force presence on Asian soil might seem to be more of a liability than an asset.

In this scenario, North Korea succeeds in establishing escalation dominance over the United States: it strikes at U.S. forces precisely because it calculates that the United States cannot afford to retaliate against a nuclear North Korea. To make matters even more interesting, a U.S. failure to respond would undermine the U.S. alliance structure

in East Asia. Just how plausible this scenario may seem, of course, is for the reader to decide.

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All in all, the discordant and discrepant variety of outcomes suggested by this exercise emphasizes the importance of attempting to think options through in advance, so as to maximize the chances of avoiding undesirable results and achieving preferred ones. There is as yet all too little evidence that careful consideration of this nature has been accorded to the alternative futures for the North Korean nuclear crisis that still lie before us—not by U.S. policy analysts, and certainly not by U.S. decision-makers.

Program for the symposium

Security Threats and Strategies of a Regional Security Policy in North East Asia

October 26 and 27, 2004

Tuesday, October 26

Angelika VIETS (JDZB) Welcome Remarks

Session 1: The Security Situation in Northeast Asia

Chair: Petra ERNSTBERGER (Member of Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee)

North Korea: Implosion, Explosion, Proliferation—What is to be Expected? An Overview
Dr. Sebastian HARNISCH (Chair for International Relations/Foreign Policy, Trier University) Trier

Comments: Selig S. HARRISON (Center for International Policy, USA) Washington D.C.
Prof. Dr. MURATA Koji (Doshisha University) Kyôto
Dr. Heinrich KREFT (Federal Foreign Office, Policy Planning) Berlin

Discussion

Session 2: How to Solve the Conflict?—The Roles of the Different Actors

Chair: Frank UMBACH (Asian-Pacific Program of the German Council on Foreign Relations) Berlin

Suggested Roles of Japan
Prof. IZUMI Hajime (University of Shizuoka) Shizuoka

The PR China and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Dr. Kay MÖLLER (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Research Unit Asia) Berlin

Some "Scenarios" and Endgames in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis—An American Perspective
Dr. Nicholas EBERSTADT (American Enterprise Institute) Washington D.C. (main points presented by F. UMBACH)

EU
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wichard WOYKE (Münster University, Institute of Political Science), Münster

Discussion, Final Remarks

Wednesday,October 27 (Public conference)

Roundtable on Regional Security Strategy in North East Asia

Chair: Dr. Theo SOMMER (Editor-at-large, DIE ZEIT) Hamburg

Welcome: Pia BUNGARTEN (FES)
Key-note: Dr. Rolf MÜTZENICH (Member of Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee) Berlin
Panelists: Prof. IZUMI Hajime (University of Shizuoka) Japan
Selig S. HARRISON (Center for International Policy, Washington D.C.) USA
Ambassador Doris HERTRAMPF (Embassy Pyongyang) North Korea
Tomasz KOZLOWSKI (Head of Task Force Asia, Council of European Union) Brussels