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Foreword

I am very pleased that after long and intensive preparation and collaboration with all partners involved this conference on Human Security and Development Assistance could be realized.

The change of the international role of Japan and Germany has intensified the need for mutual exchange on regional and global issues. The growing responsibility of both countries to contribute to their solution requires close bilateral and multilateral consultations. We can build upon basic common interests, in particular in United Nations policy areas such as disarmament and human rights, or development issues. These subjects are part of the strategy paper "Germany and Japan in the 21st Century – 7 Pillars of Cooperation," signed by both governments five years ago.

Since Germany and Japan both pursue an active agenda for development issues, the Japanese-German Center Berlin (Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin, JDZB) held quite a few conferences in this field in the past few years, the last one in preparation of the Tokyo National Conference on African Development TICAD III in the fall of 2003. We are also in the middle of a series of conferences on the development and security in Central Asia, which we jointly organize with the National Institute for Research and Advancement (NIRA) in the area. So convening on the topic of human security falls in this line.

For a long period, international security policy has focused on the security of states or between states, touching mainly on questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Since the dramatic change of the world order at the beginning of the 1990s, however, the nature of conflicts has undergone changes. Most conflicts today occur within states. More often than not civilians are no longer incidental victims of war, but the deliberate target of armed actors. Confronted with these new challenges, many governments as well as international organizations have begun to take a broader approach to the concept of security.

This broader perspective of human security aims at developing new political strategies to better protect the civilian population exposed to conflicts and dangers in a changed world, to better enable them to cope with their needs stemming from bad governance, poverty, or environmental damage. The focus is mainly on aspects relating to violence ("freedom from fear") but in a broader sense on all aspects of human development ("freedom from need") as well. Rather than offering a ready definition of what human security should encompass, the idea is to take a coherent view of separate and distinct problems and integrate different approaches that so far are often being dealt with separately and by separate actors and institutions.

Within the JDZB's aim of promoting scientific and academic exchange between Germany and Japan, this conference also contributes to strengthening the excellent ties between the German Development Agency (GTZ) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and to developing coordination projects between them.

I would like to thank Mr. Schmidt and GTZ for their contribution to this conference, as well as, above all, JICA, the Bonn International Conversion Center, and the Embassy of Japan for their support.

Angelika VIETS
Secretary General
Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin (JDZB)

Summary of Proceedings

On 1st May 2003 Ms. Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen, the Co-Chairs of the Commission on Human Security, which was established through an initiative of the Government of Japan, presented the Commission's Final Report "Human Security Now" to the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The report advocates a markedly broad, comprehensive understanding of human security. By emphasizing the spectrum of life-endangering threats to individuals worldwide, it does not solely confine itself to the more traditional notion of security as the absence of military violence or threat, but also includes more dynamic aspects such as peace-building, human rights, poverty reduction, education and health. Hence, the commission's report places human security at the core of all political intervention aiming to improve people's livelihood. This, naturally, includes development assistance. While its comprehensive prescriptions and analysis are thus, to a large extent, concomitant to the historical development discourse, some elements differ, however. In particular, the injection of the traditional security dimension into the development field, as well as the specific priority given to the reduction of fundamental threats to people's existence are important additions to the debate about the future priorities of development assistance.

Human security remains a new and contested concept. There is considerable argument over its proper definition and potential usefulness. The particular evolution and future relevance of the concept will largely depend on its ability to contribute to both the formulation and practical implementation of development policy. The debate on the relationship between development and security that was stimulated by "Human Security Now" is in full swing worldwide, particularly in countries where both notions had traditionally been kept apart. However, the implications of this discourse for development assistance are contentious. In the wake of this debate, it therefore seemed worthwhile to study the Human Security Commission's all-embracing thematic approach and critically evaluate its ramifications and prescriptions for development policy.

On the occasion of its 20-year anniversary, the Japanese German Center Berlin (JDZB) organized a conference entitled "Human Security and Development Assistance," which was supported by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). The conference took place on 28/29 April in Berlin. Its principal aim was to explore and discuss the practical relevance of the concept of human security when applied to the formulation and implementation of development policy, particularly in conflict-ridden countries. For this purpose, the JDZB invited eminent persons from the international community, including Mme. Sadako Ogata, President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and former Co-Chair of the United Nation's Commission on Human Security, as well as experienced field-practitioners from different development agencies and knowledgeable experts from academia. The conference itself was divided into three plenary sessions. Following a keynote address by Mme. Ogata, the first session attempted to present a short and concise review of the main arguments currently pervading the debate on human security. Panelists included representatives from JICA, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Foreign Office, as well as Ms. Mary Racelis from the University of Manila, member of the

United Nations' Commission on UN-Civil Society Relations. The second and third sessions concentrated on particular case studies of conflict situations, namely Afghanistan and Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, the experience, possible advantages and challenges of using the concept of human security in particular settings were explored with reference to concrete examples. Again, the panels consisted of experienced staff from JICA, the BMZ and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), as well as academics from the security and development field.

After a Welcome Address by State Secretary Jürgen Chrobog from the Federal Foreign Office and some Opening Remarks by Mr. Wolfgang Schmitt, Director of the GTZ, Mme. Ogata gave an introduction into some of the key elements contained in the concept of human security as outlined by the Commission on Human Security in its Final Report "Human Security Now." As Mme. Ogata pointed out, it endorses an understanding of international security, which not only takes into account the "state" as its traditional referent object, but also emphasizes the spectrum of life-endangering threats to people worldwide. Such notion of "human" security has to adopt a far more comprehensive approach to the identification of threats and dangers. In other words, it cannot simply concern itself with the absence of military violence, but also needs to consider more dynamic aspects, for example peace-building, human rights, poverty reduction, education and health. Mme. Ogata particularly stressed the practical applicability of such an expanded security framework, which was especially crafted to serve as "an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation." To this end, it rests upon two mutually reinforcing concepts. The first can be described as "protection." Embracing a more traditional understanding of security, which alludes to the structures and institutions needed to shield people from violence, this concept implies a "top-down" approach. Measures will therefore include a strengthening of the rule of law, the establishment of accountable and transparent state institutions, as well as the promotion of democratic governance structures. The second concept, on the other hand, which Mme. Ogata referred to as "empowerment," highlights the central importance of people "as actors and participants in defining and implementing their strengths and aspirations." In contrast to mere protection, the empowerment of people and communities works from the "bottom-up." "While people protected may exercise choices, only people empowered can make better choices, and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities." This twin approach of protection and empowerment is particularly useful for capturing the vast range of development assistance measures often required during transition phases from war to peace, namely an equal attention to institution building and community empowerment. This, according to Mme. Ogata, has in fact been the "most significant" contribution of human security to the planning and implementation of international development policy to date. By way of example, she mentioned development cooperation in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which would be discussed in more detail at a later stage of the conference.

The first session began with a brief discussion of the concept of "human security" by Tobias Debiel from the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) at the University of Duisburg. Tracing the evolution of different notions of security over the post Cold War period, he pointed out that the idea of "human security" has provoked a lot of criticism with regard to its analytical ambiguity and political appropriateness. Indeed, for the time being it might be premature to talk about "mainstreaming" human security before its precise meaning is not clearly established. In particular, Mr. Debiel drew attention to differing definitions of human security as either incorporating both

"freedom from fear" and "freedom from want," and thus covering a very broad range of development and security issues, or simply focussing on "freedom from fear." Whereas the former concept is put forward in the "Human Security Now" report, the latter is advocated by the Canadian Human Security Network. Closer to the traditional confines of security studies, it describes a more narrow approach, which would simply refer to an individual's degree of protection from external aggression and violence. Finally, Mr. Debiel contended that while such a more specific understanding may add more analytical value to the academic debate, the holistic conception as introduced by Mme. Ogata may be better suited to serve as a political *leitmotif* for concerted foreign and development policy-projects. However, he stressed the importance of accepting a "threshold" approach to an all-encompassing concept of human security, which seeks to identify regions or states where people are confronted with multiple threats to their lives and livelihoods.

The subsequent panel discussion confirmed the significance of many aspects already raised by Mme. Ogata. There was an overall consensus that the value of the concept of human security needs to be measured by the extent to which it can be translated into practical development work "on the ground." One way of assuring such practicability is to not only focus on "protective" issues, but to anchor human security at the grassroot level via the empowerment of people. Empowerment highlights the importance of civil society groups and local communities for realizing human security. Indeed, it was repeatedly stated that the initiative for development action needs to be "homegrown." That is, human security cannot be externally imposed by development donors. Rather, people have to be enabled to identify their own security concerns. However, there was some disagreement as to whether the "top-down" or the "bottom-up" approach to human security should be given priority. Whereas some argued that local empowerment had been neglected in the past, others maintained that a more state-centered policy – as it is for example spelt out in the German Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention – might be more useful, since the realization of human security requires strong institutional structures.

Furthermore, the similarities and overlaps between the concept of human security and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were alluded to. In fact, although the MDGs describe results rather than priorities, they do lay out some of the "minimum core conditions for a secure livelihood" and may thus be of some help in defining a "threshold" for human security as suggested by Tobias Debiel. Finally, it was made clear that the realization of both the MDGs as well as human security must be perceived and pursued as a "political" process, which extends way beyond the traditional areas of development cooperation. Partnership is therefore central to facilitating a comprehensive concept of human security. The scope of cooperation needs to be deepened, not only between donors and recipients, but also between international governmental organizations and local civil society groups, and – not least – between development agencies themselves.

At the outset of the second panel, Conrad Schetter from the Center for Development Research (ZEF) gave a brief presentation on the activities of the international community to improve human security in Afghanistan since the collapse of the Taliban regime in Autumn 2001. In particular, he analyzed some of the concrete means employed by donor organizations to empower and protect the Afghan people. Whereas the presentation concluded that the concept of human security is helpful in that it may serve as a "barometer" of the overall security situation in a given country, thereby high-

lighting the complex relation between different dimensions of security, some problems remain. First, the concept contains no concrete recommendations as to how the processes of empowerment and protection should take place in a complex conflict situation as we find it in Afghanistan. For example, it is not clear which actors in the Afghan society should be supported. Second, Mr. Schetter agreed with Tobias Debiel that the question of priority-setting is still not solved. This is all the more problematic when contradictions between the different dimensions of security arise. Improvement in one security dimension may provoke disadvantages in other security dimensions. As an example, Mr. Schetter referred to the drug economy of Afghanistan, which supports the economic security for large parts of the population but at the same time hampers other security dimensions.

As it was remarked in the following panel discussion, Afghanistan is a "test case" for realizing human security. It is hoped that the concept will be elaborated and enriched in the ongoing reconstruction efforts. Representatives from GTZ and the Japanese Foreign Office respectively outlined their particular achievements with regard to facilitating development and security in Afghanistan. Interestingly, when the GTZ first arrived in Afghanistan in 2001, it was not aware of the concept of human security as outlined in the "Human Security Now" report. Yet, its work was very much in line with the range of provisions contained therein. "Human security," it was pointed out, "simply makes sense." In many regards the particular development strategy referred to by Mme. Ogata has thus already been put into concrete practice. Measures taken by JICA, for example, combine a "bottom-up" approach based on community level development with a "top-down" approach aimed at strengthening the national government and regional economy. As one panelist stated, however, the situation in Afghanistan might be better now had the concept of human security been integrated into development work from the very beginning, since this could have provided for a far more effective framework to coordinate the division of labor between different donor organizations.

Security concerns remain a huge problem in Afghanistan. The future success of Afghan development will depend, to a large degree, upon ensuring overall security in the country. Hence, panelists agreed that efforts in security sector and judicial reform should be facilitated. Also, the so-called "Provisional Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs) were mentioned as a possible method to address this problem. All in all, and despite some progress, the reality on the ground remains grim. Much work is still to be done. In particular, the discussion centered on the questions of how to improve the situation of women in Afghanistan and how to tackle the problem of the drug economy.

The final panel dealt with the concept of human security in conflict-ridden regions of Africa. Kwesi Aning remarked that the idea of human security has a long tradition within African policy, indeed reaching back to the liberation movements of the 1960s. Presently, there are many organizations and initiatives attempting to address issues related to human security, as for example the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). However, the main obstacle is encountered in the nature of many undemocratic African states, which are "strong in intimidating and threatening, but weak in social service provision." Here, Kwesi Aning stressed the importance of pursuing a governance agenda that challenges authoritarian state structures by putting people at its center within a sub-regional rather than national framework. Furthermore, a great chance to facilitate change toward increased levels of human security is presented by transitions from war to peace. Kwesi Aning agreed with the representatives from JICA that such situations demanded an "holistic" approach on behalf of international

development organizations. However, he particularly stressed the need for security sector reform in post-conflict reconstruction processes.

By and large, the panelists agreed with the overall assessment of Kwesi Aning that the international community still appears too obsessed with a state-centered approach to development. Development assistance to Rwanda just prior to the 1994 genocide was mentioned as an example. However, it was also stated that over the last couple of years development work related to peace building and crises prevention, especially on the African continent, has diversified to a significant extent. For example, not least the support given to regional and sub-regional organizations has added a new dimension. During the following discussion both JICA and the GTZ gave an overview of the broad range of assistance measures they are providing to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These are situated on a regional, national, and local level and include many aspects mentioned in the "Human Security Now" report.

The conference ended with a wrap up of the main findings, again underlining the importance of integrating a comprehensive understanding of security into a practical development approach, and a final keynote address by Mr. Mutahi Kagwe, Member of Parliament in the Kenyan National Assembly. He particularly focussed on the challenges for development assistance arising from a holistic perspective of human security. Industrialized countries, including Germany and Japan, needed to face up to their new responsibilities , which indeed are also in their own economic interest. A peaceful and economically stronger Africa could be an important trading partner. Helping Africa is thus not only to the benefit of African people but also to people worldwide.

(Marc von Boemcken, BICC)

Keynote Address

Sadako OGATA, JICA

Ms. Viets (Japanese-German Center), Mr. Chrobog (State Secretary), Mr. Schmitt (GTZ), Dear friends and colleagues in Germany, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today, more than ever, a new consensus on security thinking is urgently required. In the past, security threats were assumed to emanate from external sources. State security focused mainly on protecting the state – its boundaries, people, institutions and values – from external attacks. In recent years, our understanding of security has dramatically changed to include the dangers derived from people living in chronic poverty and environmental degradation, suffering from infectious diseases, notably HIV/AIDS, threatened by transnational crime and terrorism, and exposed to violence and conflicts.

Globalization process has deeply transformed relationships between and within states. Money, goods, information and people move fast across and within borders. Not even the strongest states can fully meet the multiple security needs of the people living within their borders. All states and societies depend on the acts or omissions of others for the security of their people, even for their survival. States can no longer be the sole or even main referent of security. Consequently, the realities of our changing world require the broadening of the concept of state security to address human security.

From 2001 to 2003, I had the pleasure to co-chair the Commission on Human Security together with Professor Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics and professor at Harvard University. The idea of an independent Commission on Human Security was launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan advocated the building of a world which embodied the twin ideals of "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" dating back to President Roosevelt's four freedoms. The Japanese government also was keen to advance the concept of "human security." Amartya Sen and I were commissioned by the Secretary-General and Prime Minister Mori of Japan to examine the full range of security threats and to recommend measures to prevent and to counteract.

The interest in promoting a more human approach to security was not altogether new. Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan had appealed to the need of focusing on social safety nets as means to ensure "human security," in response to the disastrous effects caused by the Asian monetary crisis of 1997. The human development approach pioneered by Mahbub ul Haq, had helped shift development attention to the quality of human lives and spread the message widely through the UNDP Human Development Report. Several governments led by Canada had organized the Human Security Network to address varied symptoms – from land mines to child soldiers – that undermined human security. My own commitment to the promotion of human security derived from my experience through the l990s as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees mandated to protect people fleeing persecution, massive violence and conflict very often within their borders.

Mandated "to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation," the Commission on Human Security decided

to focus on the security of people, particularly those who are under critical and pervasive threats – victims of conflicts and those left in abject poverty. To attain the goals of ensuring human security, the Commission proposed a framework for action based upon the protection and empowerment of people. It emphasized that neither of these can be dealt with in isolation as they are mutually reinforcing.

Protection refers to the norms, processes, and institutions required to shield people from threats. It implies a "top-down" approach, such as strengthening the rule of law, accountable and transparent institutions, and democratic governance structures. States have the primary responsibility to implement a protective infrastructure. Empowerment, on the other hand, emphasizes people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their strength and aspirations. This implies a "bottom-up" approach. While people protected may exercise choices, only people empowered can make better choices, and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities.

The Commission examined a broad range of issues and situations. It held public hearings in South Africa and outreach consultations in the Central Asian republics. After a year and a half of concentrated work, it made several policy recommendations of substantial relevance. With regard to the situation of people in conflict situation, it focused on the protection of civilians, emphasized firmer application of human rights and humanitarian law and the need to explore more fully the question of citizenship. With regard to migration, it recommended the development of a normative framework as well as practical measures to adjust state interests with the protection of migrants. It emphasized the importance of actively addressing the transition phase from war to peace with greater concentration on institution building and community empowerment. Noting the lack of financial resources directed to cover early post-conflict requirements, the Commission proposed the setting up of a human security trust fund to cover the vast and varied needs. On health care and education, the Commission made major efforts to explore ways to realize universal access to health care and basic education. Basic education especially for girls was upheld as a policy priority if we were to fulfill the empowerment agenda for human security. Curricula in all schools were to cultivate mutual respect and diversity with a view to foster global identities.

The Commission was not alone in advancing policy proposals of the kind that I have just enumerated. In fact the international community was searching for better approaches to carry out post-conflict reconstruction, to reach Millennium Development Goals and to adjust international cooperation to meet the needs of the globalizing world. The report of the Commission was well received and has now been published in six languages – English, Japanese, Spanish, French, Arabic and Russian and I hope the German version will follow shortly. Its recommendations have been reflected in the guidelines to evaluate and determine projects to be funded by the United Nations Human Security Trust Fund.

To me what is most significant is the fact that the concept of human security has had some influence on the planning and implementation of international action. The protection-empowerment framework is embodied in the functioning of any well governed state. It is the framework for state-building, and provides crucial insights into the endeavors of states and societies in transition from war to peace. This framework has proven relevant in the peace-building of Afghanistan, and will be guiding the process in Iraq, Sudan and many others to come.

Allow me to make a few comments on Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which you will be discussing later in this seminar.

The peace building process in Afghanistan offers an example of how the two-pronged human security approach was applied in practice. Having suffered more than twenty years of conflict and persistent drought, Afghanistan ranked the lowest in the world by any measure of development. The interim government was established in December 2001, and the Presidential election was successfully carried out three years later. The international community made major efforts to rebuild the country, through a series of reconstruction conferences and active resource mobilization. While governing capacities were strengthened at the state level, reconstruction of schools, health facilities and water supplies advanced at community levels. While Afghan army and police were being trained, more than 3.8 million refugees returned home and five million children, including girls, went back to school. The humanitarian and development agencies collaborated to realize a seamless transition, while the Afghan government was keen to exercise its ownership.

I had the privilege of following Afghanistan during the conflict period as UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the peace-building process as Japanese government representative for Afghan reconstruction. I personally noted much contribution made by both Germany and Japan. I can say that Afghanistan still has a long way to go, but the peace-building process has moved both at state and society levels, combining the top-down protection and bottom-up empowerment efforts.

Meanwhile, the peace-building process by the international community in the Democratic Republic of Congo is still at a preliminary phase. Although the country has reached some stability except for the eastern part, it is still under close surveillance by the United Nations peace-keeping forces, MONUC. Preparations are underway for holding the elections in the near future. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the agency I am currently heading, is training some 500 Congolese to administer the elections and plans are being made to cooperate with MONUC in training the police.

Having had to protect and assist a large number of refugees from the neighboring countries who fled to what was then Zaire, I realize the heavy burden that fell on the government and people. The building of the national army and police requires both organizational support and training. The Democratic Republic of Congo will require major international assistance to rebuild its state institutions and capacities, both at the state and society levels. All efforts will have to be made to help the people who are coming out of long years of conflict, and are in serious need of security protection as well as assistance to cover health, education and all basic needs.

On the question of serious downturns in security threat, the Human Security Commission noted the recommendations presented by the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change presented to the UN Secretary-General last December, endorsed the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect in the event of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other large-scale killing, and in such a situation, the Security Council could authorize military action as a last resort.

In pursuing the question of military intervention, however, what is most urgently required is to plan and strengthen national and international capacity to prevent the aggravation of situations through combined means of humanitarian aid, human rights observations, police and peace-keeping presence. Humanitarian aid is a vital tool for

protecting civilian victims, and for minimizing their suffering and saving their lives, but it cannot be left to carry on the responsibility alone. Internationally, there are some welcoming signs. In Africa, for example, the African Union is attempting to mobilize its observer and peace-keeping capacity, and the European Union is studying to increase the security of individuals through a bottom-up human security approach to deal with the situation of severe physical insecurity.

I wish to report also on how Japan has been following up its early commitment to focus on human security. In addition to contributing to the UN Human Security Trust Fund that broadly implements the recommendations of the Commission, it has incorporated the principle to its international development assistance policy. It incorporated the concept in its ODA Charter revised in 2003, and redrafted in the ODA mid-term policy this year. Currently JICA, the implementing agency of official development assistance, is working on ways to operationalize the concept more concretely. It has adopted program guidelines consisting of seven points against which project proposals should be checked. Altogether, the purpose is to ensure that assistance reaches the needy people, particularly the vulnerable, and empower them to achieve self-reliance. As far as targeting assistance to the people is concerned, particularly the poor and the vulnerable, there should be little difficulty with any recipient government.

In concluding, let me congratulate you again for the 20th Anniversary of the Japanese-German Center and thank you for inviting me to speak at this symposium on Human Security and Development Assistance. It is indeed timely to hold discussions on human security here in Berlin, not only to promote the concept of human security, but also more importantly to discuss ways to implement the concept. Taking this occasion, JICA looks forward to hold further discussions with GTZ to explore ways to jointly promote human security in places where the two agencies can make a difference to the people.

Thank you very much.

Mainstreaming Human Security?
Concepts and Implications for Development Assistance

Opening Presentation for the Panel Discussion 1

Tobias DEBIEL, INEF

"Mainstreaming Human Security" is a challenging topic. It presupposes that we know what human security is about and that we have a common understanding of this rather new topic. As the organizers have pointed out in their concept paper, human security remains a contested idea.

We are currently faced with an ever-increasing and broad range of concepts of "human security." On the one hand, from a development perspective one usually refers to a broad definition originally put forward by UNDP in 1994.[1] This concept has been deepened and further elaborated upon by the Commission on Human Security in 2003, which was co-chaired by Mme. Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen[2].

On the other hand, a more narrower and precise understanding of human security – defined as freedom from fear and related to threats of violence – has been developed. This concept has been promoted in particular by the Canadian and Norwegian governments and was utilized as a reference framework by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ("Responsibility to Protect")[3] as well as in the most recent Barcelona Report entitled "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe."[4]

My reading of the most recent debate is as follows: While human security was first of all promoted as a powerful idea to bridge the security-development divide, we are now observing a tendency to develop two different concepts for each segment: While the peace and security discourse concentrates on gross human rights violations and on norms, strategies and capacities to protect individuals and to prevent violent threats, the development discourse tends to understand human security as a particular form of human development. Besides the protection framework, particular stress is put on the concept of empowering people, thus complementing the traditional top-down- by a bottom-up-approach.[5]

In my following remarks, I want to explicitly argue against this bifurcation of discourses and to instead propose an integrated concept of human security. According to my assessment, the value added by referring to human security is its ability to serve as a reference framework at the security development nexus.

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1 UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York, N.Y. 1994

2 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People. New York: Commission on Human Security 2003.

3 ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Research Centre for ICISS 2001.

4 Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, on 15 September 2004 in Barcelona. London: London School of Economics 2004 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%20Security20Report%20Full.pdf> (15.04.2005)

5 Sadako Ogata/Johan Cels, Human Security – Protecting and Empowering the People, in: Global Governance, Vol. 9 (2003) No. 3, pp. 273–282.

I will proceed in five steps: First of all, I will analyze how human security has challenged and transformed the traditional security discourse. Secondly, I elaborate on how human security has enriched the human development discourse. My third point is quite decisive: Relying on the work of an innovative Canadian researcher – Taylor Owen – I argue for a threshold-based definition of human security, which may be able to settle the dispute between those who prefer a broad definition and those who favor a narrow definition of human security. In my fourth thesis I will argue that a broad but threshold-based understanding of human security is of analytic relevance for development research and development assistance in so far as it can empirically identify hot spots of human insecurity and relate different dimensions of human security to one another. The practical value of human security for development policy and assistance will be tackled in my fifth and last thesis. In particular, I want to point out three aspects:

- Human security can be a useful means to identify priorities for development assistance.
- The concept can be applied as a powerful tool for defining development goals jointly with the local population and thus for empowering people.
- Human security can serve as a political leitmotif and as a benchmark in new areas where development and security policy meet and require cooperation.

1. Human Security: Challenging and Changing the Traditional Security Discourse

Let me briefly turn to how human security has challenged and changed the security discourse. As we all know, the traditional notion of state security is outdated. There are three primary reasons for this:

- It was primarily based on inter-state conflicts and ignored intra-state violence,
- It assumes consolidated statehood and ignores the dynamics of state formation and state building,
- It neglects that even consolidated states are vulnerable to non-military threats, be it economic crises, health risks or environmental disasters.

As a consequence of these weaknesses, security studies as well as peace and conflict research broadened their definitions to include non-military threats in new concepts of extended or comprehensive security. Within this second generation of security concepts, however, the state and the international system remained the crucial points.

The innovative contribution of human security in this context was to introduce the individual as a normative and analytical category. This third generation of security concepts not only broadened the horizontal axis of security threats but went vertically beyond and below the state by focusing on those who are affected by violence in their daily lives. Introducing the human security perspective has changed the security discourse in two ways:

- Attention is now drawn to new forms of violence beyond regular fighting in wars, such as those linked to social and socio-economic problems.

- Human security tries to protect core human rights as an ultimate goal of security policy and has strongly influenced the debate on humanitarian issues and the prevention of violent conflicts.

2. Enriching the Development Discourse

Human security was first of all a challenge to traditional notions of state security, while its contribution to the development discourse remained rather insignificant for almost a decade.

Certainly, human security added new topics to the development agenda, in particular in terms of its reaction to violent conflict, political repression and the integrity of cultures. But did this produce more than a laundry list of development and security issues?

My conviction is that "Human Security Now!" solved this puzzle by stating that human security as an idea fruitfully supplements the perspectives of Human Development by directly paying attention to what are sometimes called "downside risks." Human security is thus closely connected with the concept of vulnerability. It places the spotlight on vulnerable people who are subject to "downturns in security" – be it because of global economic shocks such as during the Asian crisis of 1997–1999, natural disasters like the tsunami floods in late 2004 or because of violent conflicts.

Human security urges development assistance to be prepared for situations that require an immediate and targeted reaction. It strengthens the ideas of pro-poor development by establishing a special responsibility for vulnerable people. And by advocating a bottom-up-appoach, it stresses the necessity of looking closely at local coping mechanisms before coming up with externally prepared solutions.

3. A Threshold-Based Definition of Human Security

Both the security as well as the development debate are not in need of new terms. We are busy in mainstream "gender" and "conflict prevention" concerns; we debate the role of "civil society" and try to integrate "sustainability" in development and peacebuilding efforts. Why then should we put another burden upon us by discussing human security? According to my assessment, the strategic importance of human security lies in bridging the development-security divide by adopting security as a common frame of reference in interdisciplinary research and interministerial/interbureaucratic cooperation.

Taylor Owen, who until recently worked for the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and is now doing his PhD at Oxford University, proposed a simple, but ground-breaking solution[6]: He demands sacrifices from both, the broad and the narrow proponents by putting a hybrid definition on the table: First, he does not differentiate between threats from floods, communicable diseases or war and in so far includes the major dimension of UNDP's definition (environmental, economic, food,

[6] Taylor Owen, Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition, in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 35 (2004) No. 3, pp. 373–387.

health, personal and political threats). From this vast range of threats, however, only those that pass a life-threatening threshold are selected.

This idea of a threshold is already included in "Human Security Now!" where human security "means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive threats and situations." As a consequence, human security can be defined as the protection of physical and psychological integrity of all human beings from critical and pervasive threats, be they environmental, economic, nutritional, health-related, violence-related or political.

4. Analytical Relevance of Human Security for Development Research and Assistance

What analytical relevance does a broad but threshold-based concept of human security have for development research and assistance? I would like to highlight two points: First of all, such an approach can be applied to specific countries and may help to identify hot spots of human insecurity on the provincial and even on the local level. Collecting and generating disaggregate data and relating them to their geographical locations provides us with maps of high insecurity or vulnerability. Owen has applied his concept to Cambodia, identified thirteen threats and aggregated those using locations as a common denominator. A similar mapping exercise has been conducted by the "Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004."[7]

Secondly, an empirical, threshold-based concept of human security will provide new insights on how threats in different issue areas are inter-related and how these threats can be prevented. Over the past five years the debate on the causes of violence and insecurity has been dominated by the grievance vs. greed debate, i.e. whether wars are mainly driven by the opportunity to exploit natural resources or by the deprivation and suffering of significant parts of the population. This debate has somehow come to a stalemate: For example, the Afghanistan National Human Development Report applies both approaches to explain different phases of the war in Afghanistan. In this context, the human security concept can shed light on an issue that has been neglected so far: Why do degrees of human security differ on the local level? And how are the diverse security threats inter-related? The Cambodia study by Taylor Owen found out e.g. that extreme poverty was highly correlated with homicide and the presence of landmines.[8] Such analysis may be an eye-opener for the real threats that local populations face.

5. The Practical Value of Human Security for Development Policy and Assistance

The aforementioned points already indicate the high value that human security can potentially have for development policy and assistance. Putting the vulnerable individual first can have an impact on policy priorities. New and comprehensive development programs as they are typical for post-war-situations, could pay special attention to hot

[7] UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Security With a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities. Afghanistan National Human Development Report. New York; Kabul et al.: UNDP Afghanistan; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004; also see the opening presentation by Conrad Schetter to panel discussion 2.

[8] Taylor Owen, Measuring Human Security: A View of Cambodian Vulnerability, A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Department of Geography, The University of British Columbia), Vancouver 2003.

spots of insecurity. A mapping of these hot spots – based on collection of existing and generation of new data – could be an excellent starting point. It could give an indication of what kind of sectoral policies are needed in different regions. Sometimes, such a mapping will also hint at trade-offs between different dimensions of human security. For example, regions with drug economies may combine improvements in socio-economic security with declines in political dimensions of human security.

As the Ogata-Sen-report rightly highlighted, human security has to be tackled within a protection-empowerment framework. Protection means the creation, implementation and enforcement of normative frameworks – if necessary by coercion, as "The Responsibility to Protect" has convincingly argued. It will be based on a clearly defined set of universal criteria regarding the vital core of human rights and human security. At the same time, in particular concerning non-violent threats, human security also implies empowerment. Such an approach does not rely – to a great extent – not rely on "objective" criteria, but on "subjective" assessments of human security by local populations. The concept of human security as defined by the "Human Security Now!" may be a trigger for a more participatory approach in development cooperation and may serve as a powerful tool for jointly defining needs and development goals with local population.

Last but not least, human security is a political leitmotif, which in the past proved to have a great potential for effective mobilization of political forces. The Ottawa convention on the prohibition of anti-personal mines as well as the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) are such success stories where diverse political alliances guided by a common idea have made a difference.

In the current situation, the international agenda is full of security challenges: the achievement of the MDGs; concrete peace and state building endeavors in war-torn countries; man-made humanitarian crises like that in Darfur; the necessity to develop more reliable early warning systems for natural catastrophes like earthquakes and tsunami floods in South-East Asia. It is not my task to express a preference for one of these challenges at this point of the symposium. I feel, however, that one of the aims of this conference could lie in identifying one or two priority issues where Japanese and German development and foreign policy – based on the leitmotif of human security – could make a difference in the years to come.

Discussion of Session 1

Takao Toda, JICA
Human Security and the Practice of Development Assistance

Takao Toda, Director of the Office of Human Security at JICA, stressed that human security is only valuable once it is put into practice on the ground. Therefore, JICA is now applying the concept to its daily activities. It is thereby countering the trend toward "too much specialization" in development assistance by way of adopting a more comprehensive and human-centered approach. This allows for a "holistic" perspective when identifying people's needs and problems.

Three key terms are of particular importance in this context. The first is *people*. Since the "absorbing capacities" of recipient governments are often rather limited, JICA's efforts increasingly concentrate on reaching people and local communities in a more direct way. A second keyword is *peace*. Here, one needs to acknowledge the intricate link between conflict and poverty. To facilitate human security would thus require the utilization of a framework, which increases the opportunity for real sustainable development by not only protecting but also empowering the people. As an example for such an approach, Takao Toda referred to JICA's activities in Sri Lanka where the human security situation has markedly improved over the last couple of years. Finally, he emphasized the importance of global *partnerships* in moving toward the goals of peace and prosperity. It is hoped that the concept of human security will create closer connections with JICA's partners, which will in turn result in dynamic social changes for developing countries.

Mary Racelis, Institute of Philippine Culture
Human Security: Civil Society and People's Organization

Mary Racelis from the Institute of Philippine Culture at the Ateneo de Manila University agreed with Takao Toda that one needs to focus development cooperation on the community level. The important question, however, is how to approach the community from an external position. Mary Racelis made it very clear that the "initiative" for development action had to come from civil society groups within the affected community itself, not from the donors. In other words, outside intervention by development organizations can merely be a reaction to a set of specific needs already defined by the affected peoples. Local NGOs working on the ground level thus need to help people identify and assess their problems and shortcomings. Indeed, the particular way that people conceive their "human security" will very often differ from community to community, depending in each case on the respective needs-situation of the people. In this sense, local "empowerment" as critical self-awareness is a central aspect of human security. As Mary Racelis pointed out further, the voice of women is especially important in this context, since women tend to be most conscious of the actual community needs. Women are at the forefront of community-building and have "the highest stakes when it comes to a lack of human security."

Civil society groups and local communities also play a crucial part in facilitating peace, the second "key term" mentioned by Toda. Examples include the creation of so-

called communal "peace zones" in conflict regions. Here, an understanding of the very concept of "peace," i.e. of its different dimensions and its particular meaning in everyday-life, needs to be encouraged on the grassroots level, especially by teaching "peace" in schools. Furthermore, local NGOs can be very helpful in opening up and facilitating channels of exchange between communities and government institutions, particularly the military. As an example, Mary Racelis referred to the negotiating and mediating function of civil society groups in the religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Mindanao.

All in all, as the "Commission on United Nations (UN) – Civil Society Relations" stated in its report from June 2004, the scope of cooperation between NGOs and international organizations has improved. The World Bank has regular consultations with local civil society groups. Similarly, NGOs are increasingly integrated into UN procedures. However, reservations against civil society organizations remain, especially within some of the UN member-states, who fear a possible relinquishment of their political stake in the UN system. Hence, Mary Racelis argued for a "change of culture," which would perceive the organization not consisting simply of its member states, but as a system of "global governance" incorporating a variety of different, also non-governmental actors.

Klemens van de Sand, BMZ
Human Security and the Millennium Development Goals

Klemens van de Sand from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) alluded to the similarities and overlaps between the concept of human security and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Whereas the MDGs describe "results" rather than "priorities," they do lay out some of the "minimum conditions for a secure livelihood" and may thus be of some help in defining a "threshold" for human security as suggested by Tobias Debiel.

According to Klemens van de Sand, the "top-down" approach to achieving the MDGs has been overemphasized at the expense of neglecting the importance of facilitating local empowerment. He stressed that the MDGs are not state-centered, but instead people have to be the "starting point" for reaching them. While development cooperation should still concern itself with "top-down" institution-building, this is only half of the way. It is equally, if not more, important to support the self-organization of people from the "bottom-up."

Furthermore, he pointed out that the MDGs must be perceived and pursued within a political process, which extends beyond the "traditional" areas of development cooperation. Most importantly, of course, the domestic political conditions necessary for achieving the MDGs need to evolve from within the partner countries themselves. They certainly cannot be externally imposed by donor organizations, although development assistance might be of some help in building the capacity required to get a political process started. All in all, however, attaining the MDGs in a globalized world is not just a task for the BMZ but has to be integrated into a wider effort involving many different actors both on the local and global level.

Finally, there is a need for a better framework that bridges the gap between peacebuilding and development. The MDGs will, in all likelihood, not be reached in conflict-ridden countries with widespread human insecurity. Indeed, development cooperation should not only concentrate on the so-called "good performers," but also

consider more problematic countries. Often, successful poverty reduction requires different measures of crisis prevention, for example effective instruments of early warning and early action.

Klemens van de Sand also noted that JICA and the BMZ were "very much on the same line of thought" and thus needed to discuss possible spaces of cooperation in the future.

Ambassador Ortwin Hennig, Federal Foreign Office
Human Security and Peace Building

Ambassador Ortwin Hennig is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Federal Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention at the German Foreign Office in Berlin. The Action Plan was approved by the Federal Cabinet in May 2004. Ambassador Hennig pointed out that it is a "milestone on the way of enabling Germany to act more coherently in matters of crises prevention." Besides describing the new nature of conflicts and security, the plan has two basic elements:

First, it draws conclusions with regard to establishing an infrastructure for successful crisis prevention in Germany. In particular, the aim is to improve Germany's visibility in this area. For this purpose, an inter-ministerial Steering Group on crisis prevention was established, which serves as forum to ensure a coordinated and coherent policy response to global conflicts. The Steering Group thus streamlines government policy and thereby enhances the government's capability to act. Furthermore, it has an "advisory board" attached to it, which includes members of different NGOs. This assures the necessary points of contact between government and civil society.

Second, the Action Plan lists a total of 137 concrete measures to be implemented over the next three years. The main focal points are on strengthening multilateral approaches on the state-level and improving the peacebuilding capacities of civil society. This includes, for example, the training of German personnel for participation in international peace missions, the establishment of mechanisms for early warning and early actions, as well as the effective financing of Germany's contributions to different peacebuilding activities.

Ambassador Hennig also mentioned that the German Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention is very similar to the UN commissioned report "Human Security Now," since both documents embrace a comprehensive approach. However, the recommendations contained in the Action Plan are, in comparison, more state-centered. In this context, Ambassador Hennig stressed the importance of strong state structures in order to successfully implement the concept of human security. Indeed, while he fully agreed with the idea of placing people at the center of security analysis, a focus on structures rather than individuals may be easier to translate into practical policy.

Finally, Ambassador Hennig underlined the need to supplement the concept of human security by spelling out political and geographical priorities. Only then would it be possible to establish concrete mechanisms. All in all, he held that the German Action Plan is therefore more practical in this regard than the "Human Security Now" report.

Summary of Floor Discussion

The subsequent discussion centered on three main points:

- Human security and the role of the state

- The importance of “homegrown” solutions to development problems
- Security and development

Human security and the role of the state

Whereas Ambassador Hennig had drawn attention to the importance of effective state structures in order to guarantee human security, it was remarked that in many cases it is precisely the state, which does not facilitate but, on the contrary, undermines the human security of its people. In fact, from a civil society perspective, the state and state institutions are often a source of large-scale insecurity. The question of how NGOs should position themselves vis-à-vis states is thus very contentious and certainly not always straightforward. In general, to facilitate human security would not simply mean to strengthen state capacities, but more specifically to ensure that affected people’s voices were heard by the government and adequately responded to.

Importance of “Homegrown” Solutions

As State Secretary Chrobog had remarked in the Opening Address, security perceptions differ depending on geographical location. Hence, there was an overall agreement between all participants that threats needed to be defined, above all, by those directly affected, not by donors or other external actors. In the past, the “biggest sin” of development assistance had been to predefine its own solutions and neglect the particular views of local communities in the respective partner countries. However, as it was pointed out, there has been a considerable shift in thinking. “People” are now taken seriously by development organizations. This, of course, is reflected most obviously by the process of integrating the concept of human security into development work.

Security and Development

The concept of human security is based on an understanding that both development and security are interdependent. During the discussion, some participants reiterated this much-evoked view. However, it was also recognized that such understanding poses the important question on what kind of security-related cooperation with partner countries should be eligible as Official Development Assistance (ODA). In other words, it needs to be discussed where to draw the line between foreign military assistance and development aid unless one wants to undermine the credibility of ODA. As Klemens van de Sand from the BMZ made very clear, measures aiming to improve civilian control of the military, as well as those seeking to transform the security sector in accordance to democratic guidelines and the Rule of Law, should clearly count as ODA.

Final Remark

The panel discussion repeatedly drew attention to the importance of agreeing on certain priority areas within the rather broad concept of human security. However, the question as to where the main emphasis should be put remained unresolved during the discussion.

(Marc von Boemcken, BICC)

Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan
Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives

Opening Presentation for the Panel Discussion 2

Conrad SCHETTER, ZEF

1. Human Security Approach

In this presentation I would like to discuss the extent to which the human security approach is viable and valuable for the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The new approach of Human Security, which was published in 2003 (Human Security Now), is far more action oriented than the old one by stressing the empowerment and protection of the people themselves to achieve human security. While the "empowerment" dimension ("freedom from want") underlines the capacity building efforts of the people to survive, the "protection" dimension ("freedom from fear") stresses the role of the state to prevent physical as well as psychological threats – which was clearly missing in the previous understanding of human security. However, the new approach, which rather follows a political agenda than an academic approach, bears several problems which are difficult to solve:

- Firstly, it is not clear which groups within a society should be empowered and how this should be realized. Especially in a post-war situation as in Afghanistan it is particularly difficult to define which societal and political groups should be endorsed and which steps need to be taken to improve the overall human security situation. We still have to think about which security priorities should be set and if sequencing is wishful or not. We also have to take into consideration the discrepancies often occurring between various security dimensions: Seldom all positives arrive at the same time.
- Another problem is that the analytical framework became blurred. While the previous approach identified seven clear cut dimensions of security the new approach is very vague and its six dimensions are not as prominent within the concept as the ones in the past. The recent UNDP-report on Afghanistan ("Security with a Human Face"), for example, does not consistently incorporate the dimensions of human security. It mentions job, food and health security even though they are not part of the dimensions of the Commission on Human security.

However, in my presentation I will focus

- on what the international community has done in the last three years to promote human security and
- what means in accordance to the Human Security Commission concrete to improve the empowerment and protection of the people in Afghanistan.

I will first give an overview of the human security situation directly after the international intervention in autumn 2001. Secondly, I will analyze the international engagement in Afghanistan in regard to the empowerment and protection of the population. Lastly, considering the drug economy as example, I would like to discuss the challenges the concept of human security faces.

2. Challenges in Afghanistan

After the collapse of the Taliban, the reconstruction process in Afghanistan more or less started from scratch. The people in Afghanistan were suffering from a total lack of security in almost all dimensions of life. Following the analytical approach of human security I want to give an overview of the situation of the Afghan population in regard to political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural security – the six dimensions of human security:

- *Political security*: Afghanistan suffered from the complete destruction of the state. There was neither a functioning state apparatus, nor a monopoly of power or any capacity to rebuild the state. Thus the state was in no way able to protect its citizens. Furthermore, a "civil" political elite was not only not empowered, but rarely existent at all: Civil society organizations were absent and political parties were dominated by patronage and fragmented along regional, religious and ethnic lines.
- *Social security*: The social indicators for Afghanistan are some of the worst in the world, which reflects in some way the low level of empowerment of the people. Afghanistan has one of the highest population growths (4.92%), a life expectation of only 42 years and an illiteracy rate of 64%. In addition, the war affected virtually every family and destroyed family ties, which were not only the social capital of most people, but had been the traditional form of protection.
- *Environmental security*: Although environmental security seems to be of less interest, it is worthwhile to note that Afghanistan is polluted by mines to a very high degree (5–7 mill. mines). What is more, the population was afflicted with heavy earthquakes, droughts and floods during the last decade and is still lacking effective means of protection against natural disasters.
- *Economic security*: At U.S.$ 800, the official per capita income in Afghanistan is one of the lowest in the world due to the continuing war and the disastrous environmental and economic situation of the country. Subsequently, illegal activities such as drug cultivation and smuggling emerged as strategies of survival and have since become predominant economic activities. Today the opium economy makes up 38% of the GDP.
- *Military security*: In the course of fighting the Taliban the Coalition forces brought the warlords back to the saddle of power. The overall situation in late December was marked by myriads of commanders who controlled the country in an arbitrary manner. Clashes among these commanders as well as between the remnants of the Taliban and the Coalition forces caused a high degree of insecurity in all provinces of the country.

- *Cultural security*: The warring factions exploited the cultural richness of Afghanistan time and again for their own political and military interests. Thereby cultural identities became highly politicized during the war which led to a situation in which the belonging to one ethnic, religious or regional group was not only unfavorable, but put these individuals under a high physical security threat.

All in all we can say that the situation in the very beginning of the international intervention was more or less the opposite from a sound human security situation. While some may argue that the completely lack of security increases the chances of the international engagement to improve the situation, other may argue that an engagement in the wrong place and at the wrong time will strengthen the predominant structures and further aggravate the predicament of insufficient human security.

3. International Strategies and Human Security in Afghanistan

The international community was ready to fund the reconstruction of Afghanistan by donations agreed in Tokyo in January 2002 (4.5 bn.) and in Berlin in March 2004 (8,2 bn.) of a total of approximately U.S.$ 12,7 billion for the first six years. Additionally, the international community embarked upon a military engagement by means of the Coalition forces, which counted between 5,000 and 10,000 troops, to hunt down al-Qaida and Taliban, and ISAF, 5,000–6,000 troops, to provide security in Kabul and since late 2002 for the whole of Afghanistan.

The fundamental problem of the international engagement is that until today no concepts and strategies have been drawn up defining the main goals and timeframes. While the U.S. prioritized the war against terrorism, the UN intended to establish a peaceful environment and to focus on the rebuilding of the Afghan state. Other states (e.g. Pakistan, Iran) and international organizations were eager to impose their own agenda reaching from emergency relief and the rebuilding of the infrastructure to the introduction of human rights, democracy or a civil society. However, in the entire process it did not become clear what the general goals are. As a result, the reconstruction project included activities which started on various levels with several approaches at the same time; sequencing by setting clear goals for different periods was not realized. Against this background the human security approach was hardly taken into consideration, and the ideas of empowerment and protection were rather followed in a spontaneous than in a coherent way. I want to give an overview of the successes and failures of the international communities' efforts to improve the human security situation by focussing on the dimensions of political and military security.

3.1 Empowerment of the People

Undoubtedly the Bonn agreement was sketched out to empower the Afghan people. On the political level the agreement entailed several steps to introduce democratic principles in the country within a timeframe of three years. However, upon closer inspection of both Loya Jirgas and the presidential elections it became clear that at the crucial

junctions the decisions were not made by the Afghans themselves but by the international actors. I will give some examples:

- At the time of the emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy for Afghanistan, obviously put the former king Zahir Shah and the former president Burhanuddin Rabbani under severe pressure to withdraw their candidatures to enable the election of Hamid Karzai. Many Afghans perceived this interference as U.S.-paternalism.
- For the constitutional Loya Jirga there was no vote on the constitution, which had been negotiated by leading Afghan politicians. Karzai merely held a speech in which he informed that a new constitution had been enacted which left the representatives with no further chance to discuss it. Again many Afghans felt the opposite from empowered.
- Undoubtedly the presidential elections were a major success and the first ever symbolic event of the empowerment of the people. Yet we have to keep in mind that the whole registration process was carried out by the Afghan/UN election body with only one overriding goal: to register as many people as possible. Thus the election body paid little attention to controlling mechanisms. As a result, the vast majority of the Afghan elite was disappointed by the process, which they perceived neither as free nor as fair.

Another problem became obvious during the last three years: Who should be empowered in Afghanistan? While the Human Security approach, of course, follows a grass roots approach by empowering the ordinary people, it was in fact the Afghan elite which benefited most from the reconstruction: For one thing the traditional elite – landlords, chiefs and commanders –, who have been controlling the decision-making processes in the communities, managed to control the flow of resources. Secondly, the well-educated, English speaking elite became the broker between the international donor community and the Afghan people.

A promising approach to empower the people has been the National Solidarity Program (NSP). The aim of NSP is to channel funds to local communities on the grass roots level directly for development projects which are identified by the people themselves through democratic elected committees. This program was perhaps the most appropriate to empower the people. Despite the successes of NSP, though, the main problem of the program is that it is only designed for a short term of a few years and thus is far away from being sustainable. Ultimately, this means that slowly emerging local institutions of empowerment will break away as soon as the money flow ceases.

Lastly I want to throw up the provocative question what the international organizations have in mind first: to empower the people, the government or themselves? Even in the absence of a sound calculation it is obvious that large parts of the funds have been used for office rents, vehicles, advisers and salaries. A crucial problem of the whole reconstruction project has been the consistent brain drain from the government to international organizations, particular the United Nations, which is paying the highest salaries. The results are strong international organizations and a weak Afghan administration lacking crucial capacities. This is why Afghans are increasingly dissatisfied with the reconstruction process. We may conclude that the example of Afghanistan demonstrates that the empowerment of the international organizations comes first!

3.2 Protecting the People

Against the background of the weak state apparatus and the lack of a state owned monopoly of violence the government was not able to protect its people in the first two years after the fall of the Taliban. Thus the government was not in the position to respond to the arbitrary action of the warlords and commanders. This situation changed dramatically during 2004 when the government was able to depose strong warlords such as Ismail Khan. This empowerment of the state against the warlords was by and large the result of the increasingly successful training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) by the U.S. and of the government's ability to station ANA as well as police forces in nearly all provinces. While the Afghan government was able to improve its capability to provide protection to the people, the Afghan government is still not in the position to guarantee a minimum of social welfare standards or administrative duties.

While the international community has been engaged in the building of an accountable Afghan military and police force, the direct protection of the Afghan government and the Afghan people was another important issue. The most important aim of the deployment of ISAF in Kabul as well as the setup of PRTs across the country was to bring physical security to the people as long as the government cannot fulfil this function. However, the military engagement in Afghanistan also had a downside: The war against terrorism brought several regions of southern and south-eastern Afghanistan to the brink of war. The ongoing fighting between the Coalition forces and the Taliban destabilized these regions and hampered aid agencies from carrying out projects. Thus the initial aim of improving military security caused a decrease of socio-economic engagement of the international community. This is why we have to discuss which priorities need to be set by the human security agenda.

4. The Drug Economy – Challenging Human Security

Finally, I want to talk about the drug economy in Afghanistan. In my eyes the drug economy is challenging the Human Security approach because the latter does not imply a normative idea of legal and illegal. The opium economy in Afghanistan is the largest in the world. Without digging too deep in the numbers of the drug economy, it needs to be remembered that the Afghans' experience with opium growing was largely positive in the past:

- The drug economy is labor intensive, especially in the rural areas: 2.3 million people in 356,000 families (or around ten percent of the Afghan population) are involved in production activities. Another 15,000 or so people act as dealers, mostly within a limited radius because they only maintain links with a few farmers. The profits thus benefit a large number of small traffickers.
- There are no drug cartels up to date and a criminalization of the producers took not place yet.
- Farmers have some leeway in the process of price bargaining and opium production, for them, provides opportunities to access informal loans for seed. The main disad-

vantage is that they become increasingly dependant on dealers, a development which is hard to reverse.

- For many provinces such as Badakhshan and Uruzgan – two provinces that have always been exceptionally poor – drug cultivation has brought a modest but visible degree of prosperity for the people. The evidence is seen in new houses, vehicles and mobile phones.
- The gulf between rich and poor has not widened substantially as even landless peasants renting fields from landowners profit from the opium economy. The labor intensive production creates income for people with virtually no chance of regular employment.

Thus from certain points of the Human Security approach perspective the drug economy is to be judged positively: the farmers empowered themselves, and the drug economy facilitates economic security to a degree which was never achieved in the past. Not only for security reasons beyond Afghanistan but also for the political security of Afghanistan, of course, the drug economy should be combated to prevent the emergence of an Afghan narco-state. However, the example makes clear that often contradictions arise between the various dimensions of human security and that the problem of defining the dimension of security which should be given priority remains problematic.

6. Perspectives

In this presentation I intended to show that human security in Afghanistan is still in the early stages. What is more, the actions of the international engagement did not implement the idea of human security coherently, even though the international community launched projects and programs in each of the security dimensions to improve the overall situation.

While I am still convinced that the concept of human security is able to deal with security in a holistic way, it is still facing the problem of lacking a priority setting. I intended to highlight this problem by the brief excursion on drug production: The improvement in one security dimension can directly impair the security on other levels. My personal feeling from many talks with Afghans is that in a situation as critical as in today's Afghanistan, where all dimensions of security are under enormous pressure, physical/military security is still perceived as the most important goal followed by economic security. Issues such as political or cultural security are considered of secondary significance.

Lastly, I would like to add one important thought. We have to bear in mind how we can measure human security. The individual perception of security does not necessarily coincide with the objective measurement by outsiders which will be operationalized in facts and figures. Thus while the Human Security approach widens the umbrella of security, we have to be clear about the fact that no security concept will ever be able to cover individual feelings of security.

Discussion of Session 2

Kinichi Komano
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan

Ambassador Kinichi Komano pointed out that the shift from humanitarian aid to development cooperation as elaborated upon in the recently concluded Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) marked a corner stone in current efforts toward Afghan reconstruction. The ADF addressed five areas in particular: 1) The problems and possibilities of building infrastructure, which includes not only the construction of roads, but also ensuring water and power supply. 2) The necessary conditions for facilitating private sector development as engine of economic growth. 3) The strategy for placing Afghanistan within a comprehensive framework of regional development cooperation. 4) The question of how to link community-support and rehabilitation programs to regional development. 5) Security sector reform, counter narcotics and demilitarization of illegal armed groups. The Human Development Index of UNDP ranks Afghanistan among the lowest five countries. Whereas Ambassador Komano thus acknowledged that the "ground reality" in Afghanistan remained grim, he also stressed that the country was a "test case" for realizing the concept of human security.

Ambassador Komano went on to detail the Japanese effort in implementing human security in Afghanistan. In what he referred to as a "comprehensive regional development approach," the geographical scope of Japanese development cooperation takes the entire Central Asian region into account, while at the same time placing a special emphasis on the community level. In particular, Japan focuses on three key issues. First, it is concerned with the rehabilitation of communities. In Afghanistan people live and act, above all, as part of an integrated community. Hence, it is here that development cooperation needs to concentrate its principal efforts, be it directed at the successful resettlement of refugees, supporting poppy growing farmers by way of providing alternative opportunities to earn a living, or indeed at the demilitarization of illegal armed groups and the reintegration of ex-militias into civilian life. As Ambassador Komano contended, "the peaceful and prosperous community will provide the foundation for establishing security, law and order and for promoting democratization." Second, Japanese development work not only attempts to create a sustainable livelihood in the community, but at the same time also upholds the overall economic development of country. In other words, it combines both a bottom-up approach based upon the community level and a top-down approach based upon the government-led national economic and development strategy. Finally, Ambassador Komano stressed that the success for Afghan reconstruction depends to large extent on solving the dilemma posed by widespread insecurity. That is, lack of security in many areas of Afghanistan hinders successful development work. However, whereas the implementation of certain development projects might thus need to be temporarily suspended, he warned against discontinuing the overall effort toward Afghan reconstruction, which would be tantamount to a "defeat against terrorism." Instead, all kinds of alternative and flexible measures need to be employed so as to "avoid the permanent withdrawal of aid personnel and the permanent disruption of development projects." In particular, Ambassador Komano urged to expedite security sector reform. All together, as matters stand now he

concluded that the reconstruction work in Afghanistan is "half-way" and the key to its success depends both upon the continued commitment by the Afghan side to achieve reform programs and on the coordinated provision of support by the international community.

Herbert Sahlmann
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

From November 2003 to May 2004 Herbert Sahlmann was Commissioner of the BMZ for German-Afghan Development Cooperation in the Kunduz region. He elaborated upon the concept of the German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) which combines both civilian and military elements and was established in Kunduz in January 2004. Supported by soldiers from other European countries and within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the German armed forces were mandated to support the interim Afghan state organs in providing for a secure working environment for both Afghan and international development organizations. As Herbert Sahlmann emphasized, the German military did not revert to the use of preemptive force for this purpose, but rather served as a back-up for Afghan state institutions. Its central task was to create and facilitate a "security network" between Afghan security forces, conflicting parties in the region, civil society as well as different UN organizations and development agencies. Moreover, the armed forces were to oversee and supervise the reform of the Afghan security sector and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

Besides the work of the German military, Herbert Sahlmann particularly stressed the importance of the civilian component in the PRT, which "contributed significantly to the state building process in Afghanistan." For example, within the military camp of the ISAF-PRT Kunduz, representatives of the German Foreign Office maintained a political dialogue with Afghan state institutions and conflicting parties in the region. Also, German police officers provided training and equipment to the newly established Afghan security forces so as to improve the protection of civil society.

Outside of the military camp, but in close cooperation with the German armed forces, representatives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), the German Development Service (DED) and InWEnt, a German training and capacity building organization, are supplementing the military effort by way of facilitating a perspective of sustainable development for the Afghan people. The German development team supports the private sector and civil society, strengthens the central state functions at the provincial and district levels, finances the construction of roads, water supply and sanitation, and contributes to the improvement of the education and health sector. Herbert Sahlmann also emphasized that the German development team tries to address and integrate Afghan women groups "in all fields of development activities."

Herbert Sahlmann concluded that unlike American involvement in Afghanistan, which concentrates mainly on military aspects, the German ISAF-PRT concept was greatly accepted and appreciated by the vast majority of the Afghan people. As he stated, it "combines the competence of military and police security policy with the policy of reconstruction and development." However, he also pointed out that PRTs are currently only active in a select few areas. Many provinces enjoy no support from the

outside. It would thus seem that different regions in Afghanistan have different chances for peace and development, which could in turn create additional problems to the nation-building process. Indeed, an overall inequality of security and development in Afghanistan might even lead to an increase in violence.

Hessameddin Tabatabai
German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)

As country director of the GTZ in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2004, Dr. Hessameddin Tabatabai got a first hand impression of the "disastrous situation" in Afghanistan immediately after the fall of the Taleban regime. As he pointed out, the first GTZ Fact Finding Mission to Afghanistan was not aware of the concept of human security as outlined in the Human Security Now Report at the time of its arrival. However, to the extent that the GTZ adopted a comprehensive and integrated development approach, its work was very much "in the spirit of the report." For example, since 2002 the GTZ has built schools and hospitals, improved the supply of water and electricity, supported outside investment, improved the rule of law and helped in organizing the Loya Jirga. It thus applied the concept of human security without being aware of it, i.e. without conceptually basing its approach on the idea of human security. Although the achievements of development cooperation up to date are "remarkable," Hessameddin Tabatabai also acknowledged that the situation in Afghanistan might yet be better now had the concept of human security been integrated in development work from the very beginning. As he pointed out, such a clear agenda might have facilitated a better harmonization and cooperation between the different donor organizations. That is, a concept of human security could contribute to a better division of labor between the development actors.

Hessameddin Tabatabai stressed the importance of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) for providing the necessary security framework for conducting successful development work in dangerous environments. However, he also alluded to a few problems and shortcomings of development cooperation in Afghanistan. For example, the need of "cultural" reconstruction on behalf of the Afghan populace has been largely neglected by the donor organizations. Moreover, further problems and frictions might arise when supporting a partner country in democratization and establishing a rule of law when there is a contradiction between "our own" and local norms and values. Finally, Hessameddin Tabatabai agreed with Herbert Sahlmann in that "ethnic discrimination," i.e. the fact that some ethnic groups receive more development aid than others, could constitute a potential source for future conflict. However, since the security situations only allows development organizations to work in certain regions of Afghanistan, this problem could not be avoided.

Summary of Floor Discussion

The ensuing floor discussion mainly concentrated on two issues:

- The Afghan drug economy.
- The situation of women and other underprivileged parts of society.

The Drug Economy

There was an overall consensus that the Afghan drug economy is a complicated issue. However, participants disagreed over its precise impact on human security. On the one hand, it was argued that the economic benefits of poppy growing actually strengthen and empower farmers on the grass-root level. Moreover, criminalization of the drug economy remains minimal. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a threat to development. However, on the other hand, it was also pointed out that the drug trade promotes and reproduces structures of warlordism. Whereas it might benefit certain communities, it thus also impedes efforts of state-building. Certainly, there is no easy solution to this dilemma. Participants discussed various possibilities of encouraging poppy farmers to revert to alternative crops such as rice or cotton, however many remained skeptical as to whether such measures could in fact make a real change. Finally, some comments suggested that the drug problem could only be tackled in a holistic approach. In other words, efforts should not simply deal with the supply side in Afghanistan, but equally take into account the demand for drugs, which mainly comes from European countries.

The Situation of Women

A second theme of the floor discussion concerned the role of women on Afghan society. As some voices in the audience contended, the concept of human security does not only apply to men. However, the question of empowering women remains an extremely sensitive issue in Afghanistan. Again, participants disagreed. Some argued that the emancipation of women could not be achieved without foreign intervention. Others held that this issue should be left to Afghan society alone. Indeed, female subordination and oppression is by no means deep rooted in Afghan culture. For example, it was mentioned that prior to the Taleban regime women were very much emancipated. Especially the older Afghans could thus play an important role in recollecting cultural memories of female empowerment. Either way, panelists agreed that this process would take significant time and could not be expected to bear fruits within the next couple of years. Finally, one panelist urged to keep in mind that there is not simply “one picture” of Afghan women. For example, in terms of behavior and attitude there is a big difference between women in Kabul and Kunduz.

(Marc von Boemcke, BICC)

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa
Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives

Opening Presentation for the Panel Discussion 3

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Introduction

In the period between 1990 and 2002, the emergence of new wars and conflicts around the world has compelled the international community to explore broader definitions of security and human security. Until recently, African governments especially considered security in terms of protecting the state, its institutions and borders, the stability of the regime and defense of its military. Although this was the usual rhetoric, one can argue that most African states were more concerned about "regime" survival than state and societal security. Attention has primarily been shifted, therefore, from the security of the state to the security of its people, referred to in general terms as human security. From the definition of the Commission on Human Security, human security seeks "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity."[1]

Other definitions of human security have also been people-centered. In the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "human security means the security of the people – their physical safety, their economic and social wellbeing, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms."

Again under the African Union's (AU) Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, Human security is defined as "The security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development."

One would easily recognize that the individual is at the center of the concept of human security. However, when a country is in a state of war or conflict, these needs of the individual become difficult, if not impossible to realize. This is as a result of the fact that the state which is expected to guarantee these provisions becomes engaged with

[1] "Human Security Now," Commission on Human Security, New York, 2003. p. 4

regime protection and survival or the protection of the state. Even in cases where the state, especially in Africa, is not at war, the human security of the people is denied or the state is simply incapable of meeting those needs. Oftentimes and especially in conflict areas, it is those responsible for the protection of the population who have been known to undermine the security of the civilian population.

Especially in Africa, the weakness of the state has resulted in the state losing control over its territory. As a result, it is unable to exercise its legally mandated right and responsibility of protecting and ensuring the security of the citizens. This paper will attempt an explanation of some of the causes of state collapse and possible visible signs of state disintegration into failure. We will then discuss threats to human security of the African population during conflict and in post-conflict societies and attempts by the international community at post-conflict peacebuilding. Concentrating on particular regional and country examples, this paper will also consider the experiences and possible advantages of using the concept of human security in particular settings.

State Collapse and Human Security

In Africa the incapacity of the state to function effectively leads to weakness and eventually has resulted in further undermining the human security of the population. To explain the connection between state collapse and human (in)security, this paper analysis some of the most prevalent factors of state collapse and some characteristics of collapsed/failed/collapsing states.

A state which is on the verge of collapse:

- Losses its power to "demand" loyalty from its citizens and does not serve as a cohesive force;
- As a territorial entity, it cannot guarantee its sovereign control over its territory and is peoples;
- As the authoritative political expression, it losses its validity to control and administer its affairs;
- Expectations of citizens of the state reduces because of its inability to deliver services; and
- Due to the state's inability to control the weapons of violence there is increased societal insecurity.

Collapse finally ensues when the state is "in a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new."[2] "State collapse, therefore, is the breakdown of good governance, law and order. The state as a decision-making, executing and enforcing institution can no longer take and implement decisions … [it] is the extended breakdown of social coherence: society, as the generator of institutions of cohesion and maintenance can no

[2] William Zartman, "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

longer create, aggregate and articulate the supports and demands that are the foundations of the state."[3]

The resultant effects of such multiple processes is that, sub-state actor groups who are beyond and below the purview of the state begin to encroach on what ought to have been the prerogative of the state; namely its ability to protect its interests and citizens. A typical case of a collapsing state is Cote d'Ivoire, where the state has lost control of its northern territory. The territory is controlled by the Forces Nouvelles who seized power in September 2002 and has been able to resist central governments efforts at recapturing the lost territory. Cote d'Ivoire cannot be described as a failed state because the state has a firm hold over the economic space. It is, however, important to add that this probably was achieved as result of the prompt assistance and presence of French troops in Cote d'Ivoire. Subsequent deployment of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and later United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivore (UNOCI) in the country has helped preserve and control the disintegration of the Ivorian state as an entity.

The processes leading to state collapse include:

- The extent to which ethnic and religious divisions heighten tensions. Such was the case in Cote d'Ivoire where issues of ethnic and religious tensions were not properly addressed until it finally exploded in September 2002. If the root cause of this crisis is not tackled, it will be difficult to prevent an implosion in the country. Togo is divided along ethnic lines, where the Eyadema family's minority Kabye ethnic group controls all the state machinery, with 90% of the armed forces being members of that same tribe;
- The degree at which human rights violations have become increasingly overt; in Togo, opposition supporters have been killed and wounded by government forces in the run-up to the elections on April 24 2005;
- The extent to which the opposition has been suppressed by the state. The Eyadema regime in Togo has for the past 38 years suppressed all opposition until his death in January. This event was followed by constitutional unrest in which attempts were made for his son to complete his father's uncompleted term in office. This was widely criticized by ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, which compelled the ruling party to revert to the constitution and call for election.

In events leading to state failure, contiguous states may attempt to infiltrate and undermine the state much further. This was the case in Liberia where Guinea supported the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebels who launched an insurgency into Liberia from Guinea. Charles Taylor was known to have supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. It is also suspected that Liberia gave some support to the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO).[4]

Casualties of State Failure or Weakness

As stated earlier, human security is undermined during the processes leading to state failure and in weak states. Thus in Liberia, some 250,000 people are believed to have

[3] Ibid.
[4] Global Witness Report, 2003

died in war-related circumstances since 1989 – about 10% of the country's three million people.[5] In Sierra Leone, estimates of the total conflict deaths range from 20,000 to over 50,000 in 1998 alone when fighting intensified. In addition, 30,000 civilians, including children, have had limbs hacked off by the rebels. An estimated 215,000 to 257,000 women were victims of sexual violence during the civil war.[6]

More than nine years of war in Sierra Leone have devastated a country that was already impoverished, deeply indebted and suffering from years of mismanagement and failed development initiatives. Sierra Leone is currently ranked last on the UNDP's Human Development Index, with the lowest life expectancy in the world – 35 years, highest maternal mortality rate in the world and one of the highest infant mortality rates. The war has curbed agricultural production drastically, cut government revenues from mining and seen the destruction of hundreds of schools, health clinics, and administrative facilities. Forced displacement has effected more than half the population estimated at 4.5 million … At present, about two-thirds of the population is accessible to humanitarian organizations seeking to provide emergency relief.[7] In 2000, Sierra Leone was ranked 177 in the UNDP Human Development Index out of a total of 177 countries. In the 2004 report it is still ranked 177th in spite of all the humanitarian assistance programs in the country. This disintegration of the country is no doubt related to the war which has ravaged the country from 1991.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), an estimated three million people have died as a result of conflict. In neighboring Rwanda, 40% of the population have been killed or displaced since 1994. In Burundi, come 300,000 people have been killed over the past decade and fighting between the government and Hutu militias force about 100,000 people to flee their homes each month. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia has killed 100,000 people.[8]

The UN Secretary General's Report (document S/2002/1300) rightly estimated that "civilians rather than combatants, continue to be the main casualties of current conflicts, with women and children constituting an unprecedented number of the victims, with more than 2.5 million people killed and over 31 million displaced in the last decade."[9] This is because unarmed civilians have, in recent conflicts, been forcefully drawn into wars; in fact they have become an integral part of the warfare. This point is succinctly captured by Yusuf Bangura, who argues that "combatants deliberately target civilians rather than armed opponents in prosecuting goals, and atrocities are freely committed as part of strategies aimed at publicizing political statements. In countries rich in natural resources, the political goals of wars often interact with the multiple logic of resource appropriation … looting of private property, and vandalism. Such complicated outcomes have led many commentators to portray contemporary wars as being basically anarchical."[10]

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5 Jakkie Cilliers: Human Security in Africa; A conceptual framework for Review. *African Human Security Initiative,* 2004

6 Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report 2004

7 Comments from the a policy symposium titled "Sierra Leone one year after the Peace Accord: the search for Peace, Justice and Sustainable Development," June 21-23, 2000. Quoted in Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflict Report 2004.

8 Jakkie Cilliers, op cit.

9 UN Secretary General Report, S/2002/1300. 2000.

10 Bangura, Yusuf: Understanding the Political and Cultural Dimensions of the Sierra Leone War: a Critique of Paul Richards "Fighting for the Rainforest," *African Development,* Vol. 32, Nos 3,4, 1997

As a result of the "anarchical" nature of such wars, atrocities are committed against civilians, there is wanton destruction of individual and state property and looting is encouraged by armed forces as a survival strategy. In other instances, the state itself perpetrates these acts against civilians for their support of belligerent groups. These abuses have also continued and increased as leaders of combatant groups and supposedly functional states who engage in such abuses are not held accountable for their own personal actions and the actions of their followers.

The State as Provider of Individual Security: Myth or Reality?

To assume that most African regimes are capable of protecting its citizens from threats in order to provide them with the possibility of leading the "good life" is not only wrong but perverse. In several cases, the state or regimes have not only failed to protect large sections of the population from violent attacks and killings by others and threats to their general well-being, but in many instances the state and its agents instigated as well as planned and took active part in these events.

Let us contextualize this study by taking a closer look at the Zairian situation in order to support argument (several other states also fit the bill). In Zaire, Mobutu Sese-seko and his military were the main sources of insecurity for the large majority of the population in many ways. Rather than enabling them to lead the "good life" they transformed Zaire into an "extractive state" based on the exploitation of the country's people and resources. The main medium through which this extractive process occurred was through violence. In order to ensure his grip on power and wealth, Mobutu and his supporters employed a "divide and rule" system of "dialectic oppression" which they on the one hand fostered and perpetuated corrupt and exploitative practices at all levels of society by using the interplay of insecurity and scarcity, while concurrently eliminating and repressing resisting sections of society by the instigation and fuelling ethnic conflict and state oppression tactics.

Economically, Mobutu exploited Zairians in several ways. Through his immense extraction of funds from Zaire's profitable mineral industry, the Mobutu regime succeeded in preventing others from the possibility of sharing in these profits. After nationalization in the 1970s, previously state-owned companies were distributed to his cronies as part of his patrimonial strategy and excluded competitors through monopolization and other political tactics.

Moreover, by using a sophisticated method Mobutu was also able to use his power over state institutions to divert loans from the international financial institutions, private banks and most importantly bilateral donors (especially the U.S.) into his personal accounts and those of his supporters. Another important result of this extractive strategy was that it created through its detrimental effect on economic stability and health, very high costs for economic activity and thus great economic insecurity for especially for the people not aligned to Mobutu's empire.

It is important to appreciate the "musical chairs" or revolving door policy of the Mobutu state. This is critical because by focusing on Mobutu's and not the regime's security since the rapid turn-over or exchange members of the regime was so frequent that one can barely characterize what existed as a regime. In this paper, we argue that

the Zairian state embodied by Mobutu did not only "take away" but it also failed to "deliver" well-being and physical security to its people. Not only did basic social services drastically deteriorate in the 80s and 90s but the system of dialectic oppression ensured that even the most basic state services were targets of rent-seeking bureaucrats (who were themselves often un- or underpaid) so that ordinary people had to "buy" any kind of government services.

Probably the key and major contributor to civilian insecurity was the role and behavior of the statutory armed forces and other non-statutory armed groups. These formed part of Mobutu's divide and rule strategy, abused any groups or individuals that they felt assailed their position. Such behavior was in order either to survive or to make profit. Mobutu usually left these armed groups unpaid so that it would have low morale and discipline and certainly would not have the capacity to challenge his well-equipped presidential guard, these soldiers sought to sustain themselves and their families through the exploitation of the populace through the use of force. Therefore in vast and dispersed regions of Zaire, several military commanders run were in effect semi-autonomous fiefdoms. With many of their troops unpaid, they resorted to private commerce, raise contributions at roadblocks, or loot and pillage from the local population, and rape women and girls.

To sum up, Mobutu's person and his regime more than any combination of factors or forces became the prime source of insecurity for large sections of the population whether in economic or physical terms. State power and resources were employed to economically marginalize the vast majority of people except for a tiny political and economic elite. These were mainly responsible for large amounts of killings, tortures and rapes as part of his repression and ethnic conflict tactics. By the end of Mobutu's reign and the start of the rebellion that overthrew him, the state's only apparent function was the systematic exploitation of its people and resources, while it offered nothing in return, not even security. Instead, the state itself and its agents were the principal sources of insecurity. As has been argued above, until recently, most African states were certainly not the providers of societal security and thus also lost its "right" to be the only legitimate referent object of security.

Applying Human Security in Conflict Societies

Abuse of civilians by armed factions has developed beyond the simple term of human right abuses. With the introduction of the concept of human security, which encompasses the basic denial of access to social goods and services by either the central government be it in times of war or peace, more actors are made responsible for guaranteeing human security. In using the term human security, development partners and humanitarian agencies in conflict societies, have been given some impetus to assist in providing services which guarantee human security.

Whereas the issue of human rights abuses could become the responsibility of the state or other armed factions, the creation of social, economic and environmental conditions for survival of the individual could readily fall within the purview of humanitarian agencies and development partners. The concept of human security has solicited the involvement of the international community in not only restoring law and order in

conflict societies, but also in the provision of social and economic amenities. Thus the restoration of infrastructure facilities in a war ravaged country enhances the human security of the community. The restoration of electricity and potable water forms part of the process of restoring the dignity of the human being.

When former combatants are demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated into society, it enhances the human security both of the ex-combatant and the community. The reintegration of former combatants, in the human security context, involves building societies for them to fit in. It involves rehabilitating both the ex-combatant and the society. This approach to human security ensures a long-term development role for humanitarian agencies.

The assistance of the international community in conducting elections in a post-war country, which ensures good governance, enhances human security. However, humanitarian agencies and development partners have in the past withdrawn services immediately after successful elections. Successful elections, does not by itself imply the return to peace and order, as was the case in Liberia Sierra Leone. It is expected that with the broader concept of human security, development partners will go beyond the "election limit."

From a human security perspective, the needs of migrants and refugees are provided and sustained in the long term. They are sheltered and protected from the moment they leave their homes until their return to their countries. This entails, feeding, clothing, providing them with shelter and employable skills to the extent where they are given the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. Thus achieving human security includes not just protecting people but also empowering them to fend for themselves. This concept has given humanitarian agencies room to manoeuvre in conflict societies.

From Instability and War to Security Sector Governance

This section presents a generic discussion of the processes for re-establishing security and improving civil-military relations in countries as they emerge from conflict. The main focus of this section will be on the need for security sector reform and governance (SSR/G).[11] It is necessary to focus on this sector because the history of most post-conflict societies has been the history of the atrocious behavior and lack of control over these particular groups.

The emphasis on SSR/G is critical because it provides a measure of control through fiscal transparency.[12] Security sector issues are thus critical for post-conflict peacebuilding activities.[13] This is because the actions of security sector groups (espe-

[11] This concept paper has made a conscious point in selecting the security sector as only one focus for concentration. The economic sector would certainly need its own endeavors too.

[12] International Monetary Fund. 2001a *Code on Fiscal Transparency*. Washington, D.C. at www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code/htm#code accessed on 12 September 2004; and International Monetary Fund. 2001b *Manual on Fiscal Transparency*. Washington, D.C.

[13] Recent discourses seem to point to the increasing efficacy of peacebuilding. See for example the report by the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. December 2004. p. 83 It argued that "…

cially the statutory and non-statutory groups) as has been described above are contributory factors to the outbreak of conflicts and any endeavor at post-conflict stabilization As a result, reforming and establishing governance institutions, which combine "armed forces … police forces serving all the people, and a judicial sector that delivers justice, is clearly a contribution to conflict prevention [and post-conflict peacebuilding]."[14] Thus to leave this sector out of any post-conflict peacebuilding endeavor could be dangerous. More importantly, it is critical that the provision of security is perceived as a *service* like other services. In this light, in his March 2005 report "In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All," the Secretary-General notes that "the proposals … are designed to strengthen states and enable them to serve their peoples better by working together on the basis of shared principles and priorities … one of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all states are strong enough to meet the many challenges they face."[15]

As a result of the above discussions, the arguments in this section will be premised on five critical assumptions. These are that:

1. When conflict end in large parts of a country it is important that a certain level of central authority is perceived to be present;
2. A comprehensive, inclusive and non-time bound demobilization, demilitarization, reconciliation and reintegration process (DDRR) is in place in which the international community and especially development partners are interested in supporting. This is also recognized in the Brahimi Report of 2000 in which it is argued that the "disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants – key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence – is an area in which peace-building makes a direct contribution to public security, law and order:"[16]
3. A process of establishing a nationally united armed forces under central command is proceeding and almost in place;
4. That a functional all-inclusive constitution and a democratic process is in place in which all former armed combatants and political groupings are willing to abide by; and
5. A functional parliamentary process is also in place.

The above five points, we posit are critical to any discussion of improving civil-military relations in the post-conflict phase.

Before continuing, it is important that there is a clear understanding of the constituent components of the security sector. Three definitions of the security sector will be concurrently applied throughout the paper. The World Bank (WB) conceives of security sector reform as "controlling the illegal weapons trade, demilitarizing police forces, and restructuring armies can be important stabilizing factors in countries making a transition from war to peace. Sometimes weapons are one of the country's major

strengthening the United Nations capacity for peacebuilding in the widest sense must be a priority for the organization."

[14] Brzozka, Michael. 2003: Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), *Occasional Paper, No. 4*, p. 13

[15] See A/59/2005, p.6

[16] United Nations Development Programme. 2000: Overcoming Human Poverty. New York: UNDP, especially p. 7

investments; close attention must be paid to the disarmament process to avert further conflict. A reformed security sector will alleviate many concerns of potential investors and thus help to rebuild the economy."[17]

The second definition comes from the Department for International Development (DfID), which defines "key principles of good governance in the security sector" as:

- Security sector organizations, particularly in the security forces, are accountable both to elected civil authorities and to civil society;
- Security sector organizations operate in accordance with international law and constitutional law;
- Information about security sector planning and budgeting are widely available, both within government and to the public, and a comprehensive and disciplined approach to the management of the defense resources is adopted;
- Civil-military relations are based on a well-articulated hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and the defense forces, and on a relationship with civil society that is based on respect for human rights;
- Civil authorities have the capacity to exercise political control over the operations and expenditures of the security forces and civil society has capacity to monitor the security forces and provide constructive input to the political debate;
- An environment exists in which civil society can be consulted on a regular basis on security policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues;
- Security-force personnel are adequately trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner consistent with the requirements of democratic societies; and
- Fostering an environment supportive of regional and sub-regional peace and security has a high priority for policy-makers.[18]

Another useful approach has been provided by Dylan Hendrickson, who on the other hand, has defined the security sector as "… those bodies that are responsible for, or should be responsible for, protecting the state and communities within it. This would include three pillars: Groups with a mandate to wield the instruments of violence – military, paramilitary and police forces; institutions with a role in managing and monitoring the security sector – civilian ministries, parliaments and non-governmental organizations; and bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – the judiciary, the penal system, human-rights ombudsmen and, where these bodies are particularly weak, the international community."[19]

What can be deduced from these positions above is that the security sector comprises:

- Those groups with legitimate authority to employ force;

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[17] Coletta, Nat, Johanna Mendelson-Forman & Jan Vanheukelon. 1998: Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development – Challenges for the New Millennium. Post Conflict Unit, The World Bank & Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Cooperation, Washington, DC, September.

[18] DfID, 2000: Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risk for Donors, High Return for Development. Report on an International Symposium sponsored by DfID, London, 15 – 17 February, p. 46

[19] Dylan Hendrickson. 1999: A Review of Security-sector Reform. *The Conflict, Security & Development Group Working Papers*, No. 1. (London: Centre for Defence Studies, King's College), p. 29.

- Justice and public security bodies;
- Civilian statutory management and oversight groups;
- Private (nonstatutory) organizations that contribute in different ways to the performance of the oversight institutions; and
- Nonstate actor organizations engaged in the legitimate and legal performance of community protection.[20]

Although Nicole Ball shares in the above characterization of the security sector, she nevertheless broadens it to include other critical actors. Ball includes a group that she terms as "external actors" whom she classifies as

- Security actors;
- Development/financial actors; and
- Nonstate actors.

This motley group of external actors, Ball describes as, those "whose support for improving security-sector governance may be sought [as] each of these actors can provide varying kinds and degrees of advice, information, analysis, financing, technical assistance, and co-ordination services. But at least as important as what they can provide is how they should provide it."[21]

Ball's provision for and acknowledgment of the critical role that donors play and have played in the shift towards a more transparent and democratic governance of this sector is commendable. This is because such an inclusive definition opens avenues for a critical engagement and interrogation not only of what and how but when the activities of so-called donors and partners are needed and necessary. Such interrogative processes allow for a disaggregation of policies that, more often than not are unilaterally foisted on poorer partners in the developing countries.

Thus a typology of the statutory and non-statutory organizations that would serve as members of the security sector in post-conflict societies would be the

- Armed Forces (comprising of the army, navy and air force);
- Police Service;
- Paramilitary organizations: those dealing with Immigration and Customs;
- The Penal System: comprising the Prisons Service and Judiciary;
- Intelligence Organizations;
- Private security companies;
- Specialized Parliamentary Committees;
- Ministries, Departments and Agencies; and
- Other actors like the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

[20] Hutchful, Eboe. 2004: "Security Sector Governance: Institutions, Processes and Challenges," paper presented at DCAF Workshop on "Challenges to Security Sector Governance in West Africa," Abuja, Nigeria, April 19 – 20, pp. 1-2, p. 3.

[21] Nicole Ball. 2004: "Reforming Security Sector Governance," paper prepared for the Global Policy Workshop on Security and Development, January 25-26, 2004, New Delhi, India, p. 3

What Needs to be Done? The Shift from Rhetoric to Operationalization

In this concept paper, it is posited that the state has collapsed in varying degrees, then its institutions must be reconstituted one way or the other, then it is important to improve the nature of post-conflict civil-military relations. Therefore, several critical questions would need to be considered: how does one bridge the chasm from the rhetoric of SSR/G to the reality of operationalization?

There is now broad agreement on the need to restructure armed forces, police and other elements of the security sector in the post-conflict phase. This is because post-conflict situations as exemplified by several African states offer several chances for SSR. Such post-conflict SSR, it has been argued, serves several objectives. Amongst them are

- The need to "right size" the security sector and reform it as part of the post-war reconstruction effort;
- Its contribution to conflict resolution through the integration of various forces into a new armed force;
- Need for police reform;
- Training of parliamentary committee to play their oversight functions;
- Training Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to play their oversight functions; and
- Defining watchdog roles for NGOs and civil society organizations with the interest and expertise on SSR/G processes.

The argument here is that post-conflict situations open particular spaces and "windows of opportunity" for the introduction of broader security sector reform projects.[22]

What can be done to improve civil-military relations in post-conflict states? A set of generic activities that are perceived as useful will be suggested. The core objectives to improving such relations should be

- To contribute through a comprehensive and inclusive capacity training schemes a core of citizens knowledgeable in issues of conflict prevention and security and to improve their effective participation in various governance processes;
- Promote public policy advice on conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
- Strengthen capacity to understand, anticipate, plan and forecast security challenges;
- Strengthen conflict prevention and security sector capacities of civilian bureaucrats and NGOs;
- Develop capacity of specific local institutions to conduct critical analysis and generate public debate around SSR/G issues; and
- Encourage dialogue among civil society, government and the security forces on various peace and security issues including security sector governance.

To achieve these broad set of objectives, specific training activities should take place

[22] Brzoska, op cit. p. 32

- Improving through training the number of civilian actors knowledgeable about security sector reform and governance processes;
- Building the capacity of civil society to monitor governance and human security issues;
- Widen the knowledge base of local institutions in post-conflict states for critical analysis of SSR/G processes; and
- Assess the challenges posed to SSR/G by the exclusion of particular societal groups in post-conflict states.

Concrete Steps Forward

This paper has presented the basic assumption that for any post-conflict reconstruction process, there must be two critical ingredients: (a) a political will to carry through difficult decisions and make equally difficult choices; and (b) the role of Parliament and parliamentary committees in playing the critical oversight roles assigned to them.

Although all these suggestions are achievable in the medium- to long-term, there is the need for critical and sustained training of parliamentarians to achieve these objectives. These are technical matters and expertise will need to be built over several years.

Conclusion

While there is an emerging agreement that improved security sector governance is necessary for stability and the provision of security and development, these discourses in almost the whole of Africa south of the Sahara but especially in conflict and post-conflict societies do not meet the minimum standards of democratic control and accountability. Because of the militarization processes that preceded conflicts, it makes SSR/G processes crucial to post-conflict issues. Thus, while the general discourse has been to govern the security sector, it has more often than not been driven by donors. This paper has suggested ways and means of improving knowledge of how to expand the reform and governance of the security sector in such post-conflict states as well as encouraging the circumstances for reform of existing or establishing new institutions in ways compatible with democratic accountability.

Finally to ensure lasting peace and stability, it is important that the local community be made a part of the peace and reconstruction process. The local police, the legitimate state Armed Forces should all be involved in the process. The citizens must have a certain ownership of the process to ensure continuity. This will entail using the locals to assess their own needs, instead of the usual “cutting and pasting” of development projects.

Guaranteeing human security is the collective responsibility of government, armed forces, other security apparatus, NGOs, civil society groups and the humanitarian community. It encompasses the whole spectrum of post-conflict peacebuilding. Government forces are sometimes poorly trained, badly paid, sometimes forcefully

recruited, and have no interest in protecting civilians when they themselves are fighting for their own survival Restoring law and order and reform of the security sector therefore becomes an important component of restoring communities. Peacebuilding helps to prevent violent conflict from breaking out; paves the way for and supports peacemaking processes and helps rebuild post-conflict societies.

Discussion of Session 3

Helmut Asche
German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)

Helmut Asche from the GTZ agreed with Kwesi Aning that in the past development assistance has been far too obsessed with a state-centered approach, especially in terms of security related issues. As an example, he referred to development cooperation with Rwanda just prior to the 1994 genocide where technical assistance was given to the security forces although they were only serving the interest of the state, not the people. Human security would have been a good "counter-concept" here, since it would have enabled the donor community to realize that although state-security was relatively high in Rwanda, on the level of population security was virtually absent. Helmut Asche contended that, as matters stand now, "we are still not entirely shielded against repeating the same mistake." As the situation in, for example, Côte d'Ivoire illustrates, international development cooperation tends to still "consider a state a state" when the opposite is true, i.e. when the state is not able or willing to deliver the most basic security services to its citizens. However, on the other hand, Helmut Asche acknowledged that in comparison with all other sectors of development cooperation, the work on conflict transformation and crises prevention has diversified the most over the last couple of years. As he went on, this observation is especially true for development work on the African continent. The recent support given to African regional and subregional organizations and institutions, such as the African Union (AU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is a good case in point. In the context of regional development cooperation, many security issues, in particular those which exceed the geographical scope of a single state, have been tackled, often quite successfully. Examples include efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and the civil reintegration of former combatants, especially child soldiers. Helmut Asche then made specific reference to the work of the GTZ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which not only covers a broad range of security sector reform measures, but also aims at "empowerment" on the community level, for example through the support of small and medium enterprises as well as the maintenance of infrastructure and local reconciliation, and thus resonates with the human security approach as outlined by Mme. Ogata. Indeed, Helmut Asche concluded that such local activities only make sense if they are "embedded in an overall security concept that is coherent and makes political sense."

Nori Shimomura
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Nori Shimomura, JICA Resident Representative of the South Africa Office, gave an overview of the peace consolidation work of JICA in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). First, he provided some background information on the current political developments in the country, drawing particular attention to the planned election in June 2005. However, second he also pointed out that although people were eager to cast their vote as soon as possible, elections were unlikely to take place that early. Not only is it a

problem to register all people in a huge country with only very poor infrastructure and weak administrative structures. The election process is also threatened by continuing conflicts and insecurity, particularly in the East of the DRC. Given these problems, JICA's work in the DRC deals specifically with the provision of electoral assistance as well as support in electoral security. For example, by the end of May, JICA will have completed a training of officials working for the DRC Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in matters of conflict resolution and mediation. Together with the South African police services, various South African non-governmental organizations and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) JICA also organized a training seminar for Congolese police officers. The training concentrated mainly on the provision of electoral security as well as on some basic principles of police work, such as adherence to human rights standards and child protection through the development of codes of conduct. However, Nori Shimomura also stressed that the shortage of time only allowed for a limited number of issues, which could be addressed in the training course. Furthermore, and in line with the human security approach as presented by Mme. Ogata, JICA is in the process of implementing various different projects aimed at empowering and reconciling different groups and communities on the local level, thereby providing the necessary framework so as to carry out peaceful elections. Finally, Nori Shimomura emphasized the paramount importance of the IEC taking up its work in preparing the elections as soon as possible. Any postponement, he warned, might be extremely dangerous, since it could be utilized as an excuse by those interested in re-igniting the war.

Summary of Floor Discussion

The subsequent floor discussion concentrated on many issues related to development and security on the African continent. Most participants agreed with Helmut Asche that development cooperation needed to concentrate on sub-regional and regional rather than simply national approaches. However, the general difficulty of mobilizing the necessary financial resources for development and, in particular, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration projects in Africa was also alluded to. With regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo, five issues were touched upon:

Resource Wars

Some participants pointed to the importance of taking into account the role of the extraction industry in financing the continuation of conflicts in the DRC. They urged to consider alternative strategies of how, for example, the exploitation of oil and diamonds could contribute not to war, but to peaceful and sustainable development. It was stated that donors needed to adopt a more active stance in this question.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

According to one comment, comprehensive projects supporting the successful reintegration of former combatants into civil society are neglected in the DRC. Whereas the UN budget only covers demobilization and disarmament, it does not provide resources for a long-term reintegration strategy. The latter would thus rely on voluntary contributions from the development community.

Security Sector Reform

It was also mentioned that "freedom from fear," that is the protection from physical violence and the re-establishment of law and order, has to be treated as a top priority in facilitating human security in the DRC. Rape and plunder by the Congolese armed forces remain very common. Indeed, underfunding of the police and overspending on the military is a "recipe for catastrophe." Therefore, more development aid needed to be spent on strengthening law enforcement and security sector reform.

Elections

Pointing to the severe difficulties in carrying out successful and democratic elections in the DRC under the present circumstances, it was warned that premature elections might simply be used as a welcome exit-strategy for the international donor community.

"Sequencing"

Finally, lack of adequate sequencing and timing of development cooperation in the DRC was criticized. For example, it was pointed out that we not only have to think about "what" should be done, but also "when" and on "which level." In particular, donor assistance needed to be de-centralized. For this purpose, the concept of "provincial reconstruction teams" (PRTs) as currently tested in Afghanistan might turn out to be also very helpful in the DRC.

(Marc von Boemcke, BICC)

Perspectives on Human Security and Development Assistance from an African Perspective
Keynote Address

Mutahi KAGWE
Kenya National Assembly

Martin Luther King Jr., in "Remaining Awake through A Great Revolution," said *inter alia*, "Through our scientific and technological genius, we have made of this world a neighborhood and yet we have not had the ethical commitment to make of it a brotherhood. But somehow, and in some way, we have got to do this. We must all learn to live together as brothers or we will all perish together as fools. We are tied together in the single garment of destiny, caught in an escapable network of mutuality. And whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly."

Martin Luther King Jr. uttered those words forty years ago, and they could not have been more true today. The world is still an insecure, unequal and divided place, in spite of the massive advancement in our interconnectedness, and interdependency.. More than ever before in the short history of mankind, we increasingly share common languages, cultures, aspirations, resources and values, yet we are so incapable of acting to reduce human suffering, in spite of the destiny that we all share.

Overview of What Has Been Discussed and Achieved at the Meeting

In the last two days we have discussed the dimensions and causes of human insecurity to which we are all now collectively exposed.

Based on my own experiences from the East and Horn of Africa region, and more Kenya, where I come from, I am compelled to ask, "What has been the achievement of this meeting? Has it succeeded in defining security in a more meaningful way, especially for the Developing world? Have we collectively proposed actionable points which our governments can use to mitigate the spiraling poverty, underdevelopment, racial intolerance, insecurity and despondence afflicting the majority across the world?

This is not the first such high level meeting to discuss issues of human insecurity and underdevelopment, and neither will it be the last, and in spite of the eloquent, profound and thought provoking speeches and discussions that we have heard on this matter, one wonders whether we pulled ourselves out of the modern day curse of "paralysis by analysis". From here we will still return to a world with attendant insecurity and underdevelopment in developing countries that threatens to bring down the walls of Jericho erected around the prosperous nations.

Agenda of this Paper

In this paper, I posit that, as we have discussed, human insecurity is directly related to poverty and marginalization, and that as long as these conditions persist in some quar-

ters in the world, there will never be complete security. I believe that it is in the interest of the developed world to invest in poverty reduction, democracy, and reduction of marginalization in the developing world, especially Africa, to secure lasting peace. I do not propose that these are the only causes of insecurity but I do think that they play a key central role. Addressing poverty creates an environment where other political causes of insecurity e.g. ethnic, racial and religious differences are mitigated. The time for talking is now over, we need action to address these issues.

If I sound brutal it's because I am a politician, not a Diplomat or theoretician. In my view, the following are the key elements towards attaining human security.

The Poverty – Insecurity Nexus in Africa

The question I would like us to ponder about is "what do we mean by security anyway?"

As Ralf Fucks[1] says in Security in Our One World[2], no other political term has experienced such international ambiguity, this and last century, precisely because of the multiplicity of issues, perceptions, experiences and implications of security across different sectors and societies across the globe.

Is it defense against terrorist attacks? Is it preventing extremist states against possessing nuclear weapons? Does it encompass protection against rape, torture, genocide and discrimination based on race or gender for women in Gulu in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo or Gypsies in Europe? Or is it protection against the natural elements, provision of a full meal a day, medical treatment and education opportunities for a refugee in a tin shack holding camp in Lokichoggio in Northern Kenya or in Darfur? Is it the mandate of the state or the international community?

Now, my next question is to what extent does poverty cause insecurity?

Poverty in Kenya

Kenya, where I come from, with a per capita income of $340, is among the 48 poorest countries in the world, whose combined Gross Domestic Product is less than the wealth of the world's three richest people combined[3], and whose share of global exports accounts for less that 0.4 percent of global exports[4]. 56% of our 30 million Kenyans are living below the poverty line, i.e. on less than a dollar a day[5]. This degrading poverty has been a major factor giving rise to internal insecurity, especially in urban areas where street muggings, carjackings, petty theft, murder and rape threaten to over-whelm the security forces, especially with the ready availability of illegal small arms from neighboring states that have been in conflict for the last one decade.

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1 Chair of the Board, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, a German political foundation affiliated with the German Green Party, currently in coalition Government with Gerhard Schröder's Social Democrats.

2 The preface to the German edition of World Watch Report 2005, published annually by the World Watch Institute.

3 From Ignacio Ramonet: The Politics of Hunger. 1998.

4 The Human Development Report 2000, UNDP.

5 The United Nation's Development Program, Human Development Report, Kenya, 2004.

Inadequate Resources for Policing in Kenya

To worsen matters, reeling under a debt of $10 billion, equivalent to its Gross Domestic Product[6], Kenya cannot afford to devote the budgetary resources needed to police its borders and its people, among the many other competing development and recurrent expenditure items. Although an ambitious police reform program has been mooted, which needs $1 billion to fully implement, these funds are not forthcoming either from the government or its development partners.

Linking Poverty With Internal and External Insecurity

Poverty leads to despair and despondence, and crime becomes a life option for those with no other route to fulfilling their lifestyle goals, especially if mitigated by a break-down of traditional systems of obligation and support still present in rural areas. Against this background, and the lack of proper policing, insecurity in Kenya and other poor nations is likely to increase and these countries stand the risk of becoming a recruitment ground for international terrorism. We are not immune to international terror, and have been hit twice by terrorist attacks, in 1998 when the US Embassy in the capital Nairobi was demolished, and in 2001 at Kikambala at the coastal town of Mombasa, Kenya's second largest city.

Thus as acknowledged by Michael Moore, the former head of the World Trade Organization poverty in all its forms is the greatest single threat to peace security, democracy, human rights and the environment[7].

After 9/11, the U.S. appointed a commission to analyze the underlying causes of growing insecurity in the world, despite unparalleled gains in human development and prosperity in all fields, and the report concluded that *inter alia*, "that a comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future. When people lose hope, when societies break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created. Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and passions have no constructive outlet."

Does the World Care About Insecurity in Africa?

The question of whether the world's care is best answered in summary by a member of the Lendu community from Bunia in DRC, Salvatore Bulamuzi, whose entire family was wiped out in 2003: "... I am convinced now that the lives of the Congolese people no longer mean anything to anybody. Not to those who kill us like flies, our brothers who help kill us, or those you call the international community … even God does not listen to our prayers anymore and has abandoned us."

6 National Economic Survey, 2004.
7 Former Head of the World Trade Organization, 2003.

A critical look at the current state of insecurity and conflicts zones in Africa will suffice here. In the entire continent of Africa, there have been over 9.5 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of people have been slaughtered in a number of conflicts and civil wars. There are those who say that if this scale of loss of human life, destruction and fighting was in the developed world, then it would be called World War III and the entire world would rush to report, provide aid, mediate or try to defuse the situation.

In **Northern Uganda**, where the Uganda government under President Yoweri Museveni has been fighting a war of attrition with Joseph Kony's Lords Resistance Army (LRA) rebels over the last 18 years**,** aid workers believe it is the world's biggest neglected disaster, with almost 1.6 million people having been internally displaced and forced into refugee camps, with many victims being children who have suffered mass kidnappings, and civilians who have either been massacred or mutilated.

In **Sudan**, another simmering conflict has been in the **Darfur Region**, considered to be the scene of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today by the African Union, the United Nations and the US, but with little international intervention. This has led to the displacement of more than 1.5 million people from their homes, as many as 2 million civilians are in need of emergency aid, and the UN conservatively estimates that 100,000 people have died from disease and malnutrition in 2004 alone. Women have been raped and taken into slavery. Although a peace deal was struck late last year the Darfur conflict remains unresolved, and the Khartoum government denies the extent of atrocities committed. It has been accused of using the Janjaweed Arab Militias, to loot and burn non-Arab villages, but denies this and refuses to disarm the militias. This conflict poses a great threat to the peace that has finally been established in Southern Sudan after 21 years.

However, as is usual with African issues, the international response has been slow, ambiguous, and low key. The UN has constantly called for a cessation of hostilities, and has threatened to impose sanctions against Sudan oil exports, while the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said too little has been done to punish those responsible for war crimes there. The UN Security Council passed the first resolution on July 30, 2004 which placed arms embargo on the Janjaweed militias and the rebels, but the resolution directed no measures against the Khartoum government, despite evidence that indicates that the cease fire is being violated by both sides. While the European Union and the U.S. have indicated a willingness to support, logistically and financially, firm commitments have yet to be reached.

In the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC), the U.S. has played a key role in the insecurity situation over the years, more to secure its own interests in the region than to help foster a stable, secure and peaceful future for the people. Its provision of more than US$300 million in weapons and $100 million in military training to Mobuto Seseko's government led to the despot repressing his own people and plundering the nation's resources.

A number of human rights groups have charged that some multi-national corporations from rich nations have been profiting from the war and have developed "elite networks" of key political, military, and business elite to plunder DRC's natural resources. *The Independent* newspaper of Britain reported in October 2003 that some western governments pressurized a United Nations panel to omit details of shady business dealings in the country: "Last October, the panel accused some 85 companies of breaching OECD standards through their business activities. Rape, murder, torture and other human rights abuses followed the scramble to exploit Congo's wealth after

war exploded in 1998. … Many governments overtly or covertly exerted pressure on the panel and the Security Council to exonerate their companies."[8]

Thus, the conflict has been fueled and supported by various national and international corporations and other regimes which have an interest in its outcome. Overall this conflict has led to the death of at least 3.3 million people mostly women, children and the elderly from disease and starvation, with more than 2.25 million people being driven from their homes, many of them beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies.

Who Will Secure Africa?

These illustration paint a worrying picture, and a vicious cycle of insecurity where poor nations are too poor to provide the security required for them to develop.

The effort by Africa to secure Africa using its own resources, will only be a half measure. Therefore development assistance both in the wider sense and in security apparatus in particular by the international community is necessary.

As a result of this problem in Africa, it is then no wonder that the human spirit fights to look for opportunities elsewhere. In a video conference on WTO with other parliamentarians chaired by Hugh Bailey, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, UK, I expressed the opinion that the spirit of man has always sought betterment and self fulfillment and no matter what the circumstances and odds, It will not be subdued in its eternal search for opportunity. This explains why Vasco da Gama, and Christopher Columbus after him, set out to sail for the far East and coast of Florida, Miami, respectively. Europeans explored Africa for resources against all odds. Thus despite of their predecessors bones lying along the Straight of Gibraltar, Africans will continue to cross in the other direction to prosperous Europe. No amount of policing or legislation will defeat this spirit: Its cheaper to provide opportunities where people are.

Is the World Seriously Addressing Poverty? Current Global Expenditure Priorities

Although we have all gathered here to discuss human security in all its diverse manifestations, it will remain a pipe dream as long as our global priorities remain as lopsided as they are. For example, less than one percent of what the world spent on weapons in 1998 was needed to put every child into school.[9] I doubt whether these statistics have changed.

While the Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that $40 to $60 billion a year is needed to cut poverty globally in half before 2015, this amount has not been forthcoming from the developed countries, which spent a whopping $140 billion on the Iraq War and occupation as of October 2004.[10]

[8] Declan Walsh, in *The Independent*, October 2004.
[9] State of the World, by *New Internationalist* 1997.
[10] The Borgen Project, 2005.

Table: Global priorities in 1998

Global Priority	**U.S. $ billion**
Basic education for everyone in the world	6
Cosmetics in the United States	8
Water and sanitation for everyone in the world	9
Ice cream in Europe	11
Reproductive health for all women in the world	12
Perfumes in Europe and the U.S.	12
Basic health and nutrition for everyone in the world	13
Pet foods in Europe and the United States	17
Business entertainment in Japan	35
Alcoholic drinks in Europe	105
Narcotic drugs in the world	400
Military spending in the world	780

At $416 billion in 2004, the U.S. military budget contrasts starkly with a modest total investment cost of $23 billion per annum is needed to meet the World Food Summit goal of halving world hunger before 2015. Thus we all realize that the cost of under-writing poverty reduction, security, democracy and human rights are shockingly low and the benefits multiple, in comparison to military expenditures.

In contrast with reality, the perception that by their governments populations in the developed world have of the amount committed to aid expenditure currently, is often misguided. For example, a recent survey of the population of the U.S.A., showed that the average American considered that 20% of the countries GDP was committed to aid, whereas we all know that in reality it is less than 1%. Its no wonder then that they think it should be stopped!

Ten-Point Proposal Towards a More Secure World

Here is my ten-point proposal for attainment of a common secure world.

1. Fairer trade rules and reform of the international financial architecture

As the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Finance, Trade, Tourism and Planning in the Kenyan National Assembly, I have been involved in the WTO trade negotiations. It has been widely acknowledged by our committee and our sister committees in the G8, that there must be fairness in trade – true fair trade regime must have a dominant development agenda. That is why we believe in the implementation of the Doha development before proceeding any further in WTO. It is a fact that the unfair and unbalanced terms of trade between the Developed and Developing countries, and the barriers to trade that face developing countries when exporting to rich-country markets are four times higher than those encountered by rich countries, and that this costs them $100 billion a year – twice as much as they receive in aid.[11]

[11] OXFAM Make Trade Fair Report, 2004.

It is also uncontested that subsidies, especially in Europe and the U.S., devastate impoverished nations. The EU and the U.S. give their farmers subsidies of up to $1 billion a day roughly six times the amount they spend on aid. This amount is more than the total income of the 1.2 billion people in the world living on less than $1 a day.[12]

A familiar case of how the industrialized nations could do more good for Africa is an analysis of the subsidies given to U.S. Cotton farmers; the U.S. spends more on these cotton subsidies than it gives in aid to all of Africa. In 2001, the U.S. Cotton Industry received $3.6 billion in government support. Because the U.S. is the world's largest cotton exporter, accounting for 40 percent of the world market, these subsidies lowered world prices: by around 25%. In Benin, the price decline associated with American subsidies translates into a 4 percent increase in the incidence of poverty, or a further 250,000 people falling below the poverty line. Burkina Faso loses more because of U.S. subsidies than it gets in debt relief.

If Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America were each to increase their share of world exports by one percent, the resulting gains in income could lift 128 million people out of poverty.[13]

2. Political and financial commitment to the implementation of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

We have already looked at the issues related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). If achieved they would set a development base for poor countries.

Fulfillment of these goals requires a paradigm shift in the way the world is viewed in the developed countries. They require far sighted and visionary leadership in the global economic and political arena. This, it seems, is in short supply.

3. Controlling defense spending – fight poverty

The upper limit of 2% of spending on defense as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product recommended by the World Bank and the IMF for developing countries, is not achieved, and my contention is that this should be strictly followed and implemented. African countries must spend money on social/economies – not arms. Tied to this, I am urging the total reform of the opaque defense procurement system, which ensures that tenders are not open to both parliamentary scrutiny, and general public scrutiny, despite the fact that this is public spending. This is common all over the world, including in Kenya.

4. Reform of the UN and multilateral lending institutions

The time has come for the global comity of nations to reflect deeply and act on the recommendations of the UN, and its associated mandate and structure, to make it more responsive to the world fifty years after its formation. The most urgent recommendation, in my opinion, and a step towards securing global peace and harmony by overcoming geopolitical and economic segregation, is the proposal to expand membership of the UN Security Council from the original five by four to six seats.

[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.

5. Fast-tracking regional economic and political integration

As illustrated by the success of the European Union in integrating economic and social interests, NAFTA-The North American Free Trade Area, the ASEAN, and now NEPAD under the African Union, multi-country associations can be important in establishing and maintaining peace and security, and in promoting economic growth However, external financial and technical support for these initiatives remains low for developing countries, and greater commitment is needed to fast track them The three East African Presidents have formed a "Fast-Tracking" committee to forward the process of economic and political integration already started.

6. Strengthening the fight against corruption

Causal factors of poverty include anti social practices within the poor states. Corruption is one of the biggest problems in the South. The war against corruption must be internationalized and those involved in corruption must be made pariahs of the global community. Proceeds of corruption must be given back to those it is stolen from whichever country it is held in and in whatever form. This is the challenge that global governments have when they meet in September 2005 in New York.

7. Home grown solutions

My recommendation in this area is that there needs to be home-grown solutions to the problems of our societies. While participation in decision making in the area of international policies, trade issues, development approaches has improved, as yet many of the decisions in the area, for example, of aid priorities are dreamed of in board rooms thousands of miles away from Africa. Ideas on the way forward for Africa and indeed the rest of the South must be indigenous.

8. Visionary leadership in developed nations

Many of us gathered here over these last two days understand the centrality of visionary and accountable leadership in defining a nation's destiny. This country has not forgotten the lessons of history in the last century, when the Marshall Plan, developed through visionary leadership on the part of allies, assisted in the postwar development of Europe. Have these lessons from history, which formed the foundation of the League of Nations, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, NATO, and most importantly the Marshall Plan, been employed in securing and developing Africa?

My answer is an emphatic No!

Unlike Europe in 1945, or Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005, Africa has been given short-shrift in post-reconstruction and development efforts. We all collectively understand these challenges, so what is the problem? Why don't we do what needs to be done?

9. Role of education in human security

Public opinion in the developing and the developed world must change. There is a need for education at a global level, in respect of the relationship between insecurity and development assistance. This must start at a young age in schools. Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, marginalization on the basis of race, ethnic group, religion and other divisions, has lead to increased insecurity the world over, and extremism in various forms must be discouraged.

Whereas the current systems of education are determined by Nation states, one wonders if a time has not come where part of our education should be a "global curriculum" – and tackle the issues of the differences and misunderstandings in the world that cause war and general insecurity. It must highlight the positive aspects of our differences, emphasizing on what unites us rather than what divides us, addressing extremism whether it be in religion or culture, as well as a better understanding of each individual's responsibilities in creating a more equal and tolerant world. This will ensure that future generations are more reasonable than ours. Only then will we have moved away from the realistic assessment of Prof. Wangari Maathai.

Hon. Prof. Wangari Maathai, the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and my fellow parliamentarian recently said that, "It would appear that our vision is not global enough. Our minds do not yet embrace a common Future for all mankind. We are still too secure, too greedy, too selfish, and too blind. We have no sense of urgency. We believe that we have all the time in the world. We also still believe that conflicts, poverty, diseases, ignorance, only afflict others, because we are in control of our world. It also appears that a critical number of people are extremely insecure and they need things to give them security: big things, rare things, prestigious things, even when such things degenerate the environment, impoverish large numbers of people or drive some forms of life into extinction."

10. Finally and in conclusion let me introduce a term – The concept prophylaxis for insecurity

People traveling to Africa take anti-malaria tablets to avoid the dreaded malaria disease. The medical people call these prophylactic drugs. I am told that prophylaxis is a Greek word which means advance guard. The advance guard against insecurity should begin with massive development assistance and mental restructuring of the way we all view our world. There is too much attention given to imaginary geographical lines. The development problems that we face as a united world are challenges also provide opportunities to secure our common future. This is the vision that I share with you today.

Thank you.

Program for the Symposium

Human Security and Development Assistance

Thursday, April 28th, to Friday, April 29th, 2005
at the JDZB

Thursday, April 28th

Ceremony 20th Anniversary of the Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB)

Welcome
Angelika VIETS (JDZB)

Welcome Address
State Secretary Jürgen CHROBOG (Federal Foreign Office)

Opening Remarks
Wolfgang SCHMITT (German-Japanese Forum / German Technical Cooperation, GTZ)

Key-note Address
Sadako OGATA (Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA)

Session 1: Mainstreaming Human Security

Introduction of Panel/Moderation
Dr. Michael BRZOSKA (Bonn International Center for Conversion - BICC)

Opening Presentation
Dr. Tobias DEBIEL (Institute for Development and Peace, INEF)

Panel Discussion

Human Security and the Practive of Development Assistance
Takao TODA (JICA)

Human Security: Civil Society ans People's Organization
Dr. Mary RACELIS (Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University)

Human Security and the Millenium Development Goals
Dr. Klemens VAN DE SAND (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development)

Human Security and Peace Building
Ambassador Ortwin HENNIG (Federal Foreign Office)

Questions to Panel and Floor Discussion

Session 2: Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan: Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives

Introduction of Panel/Moderation
Günther KNABE (Deutsche Welle, DW)

Opening Presentation
Conrad SCHETTER (Center for Development Research, ZEF)

Panel Discussion

Ambassador Kin'ichi KOMANO (Afganistan Assistance Coord. and Human Security)
Dr. Hessameddin TABATABAI (GTZ)
Herbert SAHLMANN (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development)

Questions to Panel and Floor Discussion

Friday, April 29th

Session 3: Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa: Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives

Introduction of Panel/Moderation
Peter CROLL (BICC)

Opening Presentation
Dr. Kwesi ANING (African Security Dialogue and Research, ASDR, and African Human Security Initiative)

Panel Discussion
Dr. Helmut ASCHE (GTZ)
Norio SHIMOMURA (JICA)

Questions to Panel and Floor Discussion

Final Remarks

Keynote Address
Mutahi KAGWE (Kenya National Assembly)

Wrap-up of Symposium
Peter CROLL (BICC)
Masashi MIZUKAMI (JICA)

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADF	Afghanistan Development Forum
ANA	Afghan National Army
ASDR	African Security Dialogue and Research
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
DD(R)R	Demobilization, Demilitarization, (Reconciliation) and Reintegration
DED	Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst German Development Service
DfID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit German Technical Cooperation Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	International Criminal Court
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission (DRC)
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEF	Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Institute for Development and Peace (University of Duisburg)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
JDZB	Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin Japanese German Center Berlin
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency

LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDAs	ministries, departments and agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPIGO	Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NSP	National Solidarity Program
ODA	Official Development Assistance (Japan)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute of Oslo
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SSR/G	Security Sector Reform / and Governance
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOCI	United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZEF	Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung Center for Development Research (University of Bonn)